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An analysis of the inability of the Provisional Government to prevent the Bolshevik 
seizure of power and the failure of Kerensky's coalition politics in 1917. 
Master of Arts 1997 
This thesis examines the weaknesses o f the Provisional Government and Kerensky's 
coalition politics. I t is argued that a teleological deterministic view of Russian history must 
be laid aside i f the study is to progress. I t is shown that whilst Provisional Government 
policies were not successful on the key issues of bread, land and peace, these issues were 
not resolvable in the short term, and the Bolshevik promise of bread was fallacious. On 
the question of peace, however, the Provisional Government failed to recognise Russia's 
need for peace, and consequently failed to prioritise Russia's withdrawal from the war, 
which was a major factor in the Provisional Government's inability to win widespread 
support. I t is shown that the war was a financial and logistic crisis for the Provisional 
Government. There was an implicit contradiction in the soldiers' desires to retain their 
new rights and freedoms, and the desire of senior command to restore order in the army. 
The position o f the Petrograd workers was crippled by the failure of moderation and 
legitimate means to improve workers living conditions. As a result, 1917 saw a definitive 
move to the left in the workers' movement. The three moderate political parties all lacked 
a firm party organisation and discipline, and had no experience of coalition politics. The 
two socialist parties were unable to reconcile their differences constructively, and allowed 
personal enmity to interfere with political life in 1917. The SR-Menshevik alliance had the 
potential to prevent the Bolsheviks f rom gaining control of the Soviets, and combined the 
popular support o f the SR's with the mature leadership o f the Mensheviks. A l t h o u ^ 
Miliukov and the Kadets had the greatest political experience, they handicapped the 
coalition because they would not accept radical social change. Assessment of the role of 
T^exander Kerensky in the events of 1917 shows that much of the criticism he has faced is 
unjust, and that he acquitted himself well in 1917. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
This thesis has been produced with the intention o f offering a broad picture of 1917, 
taking in political, economic and social perspectives. I t will be shown that the allure of the 
Bolshevik party was based on promises it could not possibly fiilfill, and that the main 
achievement of the Provisional Government was to avert civil war for e i ^ t months. The 
actions o f the workers, peasants and soldiers in 1917 were not anarchic and irrational, but 
followed a very clear logic. I t will be proposed that many Russian workers, soldiers and 
peasants resisted the Provisional Government not to fiilfill some mysterious Marxist 
master plan, but in response to the difficult material conditions facing them. The aim of 
this thesis is to point to the problematic nature o f the Provisional Government's position, 
and to see i f there were viable alternatives to the courses that they followed. 
The groundwork for the thesis is laid in the first three chapters. The first chapter 
introduces the theoretical debate surrounding 1917, knowledge of which is necessary to 
legitimise study o f the Provisional Government, which has been treated l i ^ t l y by some 
historians. Chapter two starts with a summary of the political events between Februar)^ 
and October o f 1917, and introduces the personalities involved in the political scene 
precedmg more in-depth analysis of the three defining issues of 1917; bread, land and 
peace. The third chapter discusses the leadership, composition and policies of the three 
moderate parties, who set the tone for the coalition govemment. Chapters four and five 
look at the role o f the army and the workers in 1917. These social-based studies 
complement the work on the political scene that has preceded them, and are an important 
factor in understanding the period more completely. The concluding chapter focuses on 
Alexander Kerensky, on why his role was important, on the comments of his detractors, 
and on his personal response to 1917. By concentrating on the most prominent individual 
o f the Provisional Govemment epoch, a personal insight is shed on the period, and a 
more impartial picture o f Kerensky emerges. 
For source material, memoirs o f participants in 1917 have been drawn on extensively as 
well as published documents fi-om 1917, both in Russian and in English. The most 
frequently quoted source is the collection of documents compiled by Robert Browder and 
Alexander Kerensky\ There has been doubt thrown upon the fairness and worthiness of 
' Browder and Kererisky [1961] (3 volumes) 
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this collection by Boris Elkin^, but the Browder and Kerensky collection is the biggest 
collection on the Provisional Government in the English language, and contains a lot of 
material o f great value to the historian^. Particular care has been taken when using 
Browder and Kerensky to note the source, and any editing marks. As many documents 
find their source in the newspapers, which had strong political delineations, a list o f party 
affiliations of the newspapers mentioned is included in the appendix''. 
'Elkin[1964] 
^Vishniak [1966], responds to Elkin's criticisms, and points out that any collection of documents is 
forced to be selective to a certain extent. 
" See table 9, p. 136 ^ 
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CHAPTER O N E 
Theoretical debate on 1917; some implicit problems for the 
Provisional Government 
The theoretical debate surrounding the events of 1917 is extensive, and involves a number 
of fiandamental disagreements amongst the protagonists. Much of the writing has 
considerable bearing on the study o f the success or failure of the Provisional Government. 
To look at the reasons for the failure of the Provisional Government, these theoretical 
problems must be tackled, as without an understanding of them the Provisional 
Government period can be viewed as an historical irrelevance. Determinism, and looking 
into the past in terms o f the present, detectable in many histories of Russia', has recently 
been subject to criticism by Michael Confino^. This determinism has placed the 
Provisional Government period in something o f a limbo. When the historian looks at 1917 
while implicitly accepting that the Bolshevik coup of October was inevitable, the 
Provisional Government period becomes nothing more than a failed experiment, a 
democratic aberration in Russian history, since it is allotted no more potential than the 
eig^t months it occupied. This chapter examines a selection of the major issues tackled by 
the theorists, and highlights some of the problems they raise for the study of the 
Provisional Government. Thus it will offer some insigjit into the way in which one can 
avoid the theoretical pitfalls that litter the study of Russia in 1917. 
Russian exceptionalism: no chance for liberalism? 
This concept often underlies what historians write about Russia, and has serious 
implications for studying the viability o f the Provisional Government. I t propounds that 
Russia has to be studied apart f rom the rest of Europe, as its conditions were exceptional. 
T h o u ^ rather dated, the articles by Theodore Von Laue^ in the 1960's put forward a 
variation on this case very clearly, in a way which would be more difficult to do now due 
' Pipes [1990], for an oft criticised example. 
^ Confino [1994] 
^Von Laue [1965] and [1967]. 
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to burgeoning political correctness. Von Laue argued that the 'Russian temperament' 
opposed westernization, and did not respond appropriately to democracy. The 
compromise necessary for the success of a liberal regime was not to be found in Russia; 
Chernov said. 
Hearts and minds can be moved only by an idea which marches feadessly to its logical 
conclusion'4 
This notion is confirmed by Miliukov, who said that Russia lacked 'the cement of 
hypocrisy', that was compromise^. Von Laue concludes by saying that there was no chance 
for liberal constitutionalism in Russia, as Russia lacked the necessary unity and cohesion. 
Whilst nothing written more recently expresses these views so clearly, there is an element 
of this thinking in the writing o f a number of modem historians. Pipes and Figes like to 
emphasise the anarchic, brutish nature of the Russian masses, which they use to reinforce 
their politically based arguments on why Bolshevism became the inevitable step for the 
disassociated masses*. The research o f the social historians has i f nothing else shown that 
the Russian 'masses' are not adequately described as such, as their multifarious nature and 
specific interest groups show. 
As Confino so astutely points out', a surreal 'west' has been created, into which most of 
western Europe did not actually fit. The fijnction o f this west is to serve as a comparison 
point between the smooth and sensible course of western European nations, and Russia's 
awkward society, awkward classes, and awkward political change. On the template of the 
mythical west, Russia does not fit. Significant contributions have been made to the myth 
o f the west by the Russian intelligentsia writing in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. The liberal intelligentsia tended to look towards westem Europe as an ideal 
model, since countries like Britain and France had liberal regimes towards which they felt 
Russia ought to aspire. This longing for a free and liberal west had curious repercussions. 
Herzen, in his autobiography, poignantiy portrays the corruption at all levels of Russian 
society, but pays particular attention to official Russia*. T h o u ^ Gogol clearly had 
considerable affection for the Russian 'soul', he lost no time in subjecting the Russian 
national character to abuse, focusing specifically on the activities of what one could 
describe as 'the lunching classes', and the chinomiki, or bureaucrats. His criticisms are 
deeper than criticisms of individuals, and specific corruption. He needles the entire 
' Chernov [1936] p. 140 
^ Von Laue [1965]p. 42. 
* Figes [1996] pp. 319-323, for one example, and Pipes [1990]. 
^ Confino[1994] p. 854 
' Herzen [1980] 
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Russian mentality, f rom the state o f the roads to the habitual drunkenness and ignorance 
of the peasants'. This subtle denigration of all things Russian (often compared to the 
German model) has crept into the historical analysis of Russia. The unspoken implication 
of these criticisms is that such levels o f corruption and slothfiihess did not exist in more 
'advanced' nations like Germany, Britain and France. Such assumptions about national 
character should have no place in dispassionate historical analysis, as they serve only to 
mystify the past. 
The upshot o f this creeping anti-Russian sentiment is that historians often make subtle 
value judgements about Russia's worthiness, instead of trying to assess just what was going 
on in Russia in 1917. Hence, 'the Russian people were not ready for democracy', implies 
that other countries were somehow much more ready for democracy. Von Laue, then, uses 
his template o f 'the west' and westernization to compare Russia to, and finds that Russia 
does not fit, thus apparently proving his argument of Russian exceptionalism. Confino 
sums up the excessive teleological bent shown by scholars of the Russian revolution thus, 
' the dominant view remains that nothing in Russia was as it should have been. This normative 
nonsense amounts to a bastardization of Russia's history'i" 
Prior to the collapse of the old Soviet Union, Soviet historians tended to use a strictly 
Marxist- Leninist interpretation o f the revolution . The title inevitably awarded the 
October coup illustrates the attitude well, Velikaia Oktiabrskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Revoliutsiia', 
or the 'Great October Socialist Revolution'. The title alone implies important judgments; 
both that the accession o f the Bolsheviks was a good thing, and that it was fundamentally 
socialist in nature. The standard Soviet interpretation was that the union of toiling 
proletarian workers and poor peasants swept away the self seeking bourgeois Provisional 
Government, and initiated the transition of Russia into a socialist state. The workers and 
the Bolshevik party are unfailingly portrayed as homogenous and united, whilst the poor 
peasant part o f the equation tends to be rather neglected. There was a strong tendency 
towards the teleological determinism that has already been seen in the Western historians, 
t h o u ^ in this case the bent was towards the idea that the Bolshevik victory was evidence 
of the inexorable path o f history, and inevitable. 
A notable element of reading Soviet historians is their preponderance to quote the works 
of Lenin extensively to prove their argument, the footnotes often reading as a long list of 
citations f rom Lenin. The moderate socialists are treated, as Lenin taugjit, with the utmost 
^ Gogol [1937] 
10 Confino[1994] p. 855 
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disrespect. They were bourgeois betrayers of the proletariat, attempting to lead the 
working classes into domination by the old ruling classes. This attitude can be found in 
relatively recent Soviet articles, such as one by Stishov, discussing the SR/Menshevik 
conception o f the October revolution". Stishov starts his discussion by stating that the 
SR's and Mensheviks could not possibly have a conception o f the October Revolution, 
Tor where could ideologists of die petty bourgeoisie get a conception of the proletarian 
revolution?'i2 
Since the momentous recent breakdown of the old Soviet Union, there has been a radical 
overhaul in historical writing, as historians are no longer constrained by institutionalized 
official Marxism, and are made forcibly aware of the inadequacies of the rather thin 
theories they have been touting for years. This has forced a real crisis in Russian historical 
writing, as there is a search for a new focus'^. The question for West European historians, 
however, is to ask i f there is need for historical reappraisal in the l i ^ t of the fall of the 
Soviet Union. I t is inevitable that historians are influenced by their present, and that this 
will reflect on their interpretation of the past. I f this new situation opens new passages for 
historians to escape the determinism that has plagued Russian historical writing, then that 
can only be positive, in so far as it does not involve any desperate quest for the answers of 
1991, dredged from the history of Russia. Instead of trying to find answers from the past, 
one ought to attempt to conduct a dispassionate review of specific areas of 1917, in order 
to formulate a clear view. I t is possible that historians will switch from seeking causes for 
the endpoint that was October and the Communist regime, to seeking causes for the 
events o f 1991, and seeking precedents for reformism in pre-1917 history. This is dubious 
historically, as one can look, and indeed find, specific 'answers' from the study of the past, 
without necessarily improving one's understanding of historical events. 
Kerensky's central belief was that the Provisional Govemment was not doomed to fail as 
some commentators suggest, but on the contrary that it was poised to lead Russia to 
constitutional democracy with a Constituent Assembly, had the will of two irresponsible 
men, namely Komilov and Lenin, not thwarted it. Melgunov and later Daniels'* both 
favour this conservative-accidentalist approach, that October was in no way inevitable, but 
that the Bolshevik victory was as a result of the indecision of the Provisional Govemment 
and the absolute determination o f the Bolshevik party led by Lenin. Both Daniels and 
Melgunov exaggerate the influence o f Lenin, portraying him as something of a power 
" Stishov [1971] 
Stishov, [1971] p. 300 
Confino, [1994] p. 842 
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dervish who single-handedly forced a r i f t in Russian society. The sole influence of Lenin 
and the Bolshevik party has since been discredited by closer study of the Bolshevik party, 
which has revealed it to be a less homogenous body than communist myth and western 
antipathy would have us believe'^. Also, while admitting the importance of individuals in 
'making history', Lenin should not be given sole credit for the whole range of 
circumstances that led to the October coup. 
The individual versus society 
Alexander Herzen, the Russian radical emigre, wrote in 1855, 
'Nothing in the world can be more stupid and more unfair than to judge a whole class of men in 
the lump, merely by the name they bear and the predominating characteristics of their profession. A 
label is a terrible thing.'i* 
Herzen's memorable statement applies most aptly to studies of the Russian revolution. All 
too often there is a simplification of people and their lives into the categories of 'the 
working classes', 'the peasants' and worse still, 'the masses'. In his history of Russia, Pipes'' 
makes litde o f the Russian 'masses', a term he favours, and places the impetus of the 
events o f 1917 firmly on the shoulders of the intelligentsia, a few unscrupulous individuals, 
the most notable being Lenin, whom he loathes. T h o u ^ Keep'* appears to be taking a 
rather different view by studying the revolution from the perspective of the mass 
organizations, he actually reinforces traditional interpretations of the revolution. He 
concludes that moderate socialism was doomed by the radicalization of the workers that 
drew them inevitably towards Lenin, by the weakness of the Provisional Government and 
by the skilled manipulation o f the 'masses' by the Bolsheviks. This view, like Pipes', rather 
neutralizes the mass movements and consigns the majority of Russian citizens into one 
lumpen mass. Both these historians write their history from the front back, that is, with an 
eye on both the October coup of the Bolsheviks, and the subsequent Stalinist dictatorship. 
Social historians have revised this traditional view of 1917 as a year dominated by h i ^ 
politics, and more particularly by the dynamic force of individuals. Subjugating the 
politically prominent figures o f 1917, the social historians look rather to the motivations 
and actions of particular social groups in Russia, with the most work focused on the 
Melgunov [1953] and Daniels [1967] 
Longley [1972] 
Herzen [1980] p. 172 
"Pipes [1990] 
Keep [1977] 
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workers o f Petrograd and Moscow". There have also been some interesting regional 
studies on the peasant movements o f 1917^", and Allan Wildman has made an in depth 
study of the soldiers^^ These studies have had the welcome effect of breaking down the 
notion of the Russian populace as a lumpen undistinguished mass, ruled only by base 
instinct and historically based anarchism. Instead, there have emerged clear pictures of 
separate groups with clearly focused interests and needs, acting in a logical way. For 
example, Koenker and Rosenberg's study of the strike movement in 1917 shows clearly 
that the process o f striking was a learning process, which their study displays as 
illuminating the reasons for the drift to Bolshevism in 1917. These studies of particular 
groups and their specific desires and motivations is undoubtedly a way forward to greater 
understanding of the events of 1917. The social historians come in for some fierce 
criticism f rom Marot for allegedly forcibly extruding the role o f political competition and 
reducing the scale o f the Bolshevik triumph, f rom their otherwise worthy works^^. Marot 
claims to be in favour o f their work, which implicitiy draws away from a political elite 
manoeuvring the working classes, whilst his own hypothesis claims that the Bolsheviks 
alone determined the path o f 1917, in particular the events of October^. To suggest 
however, that the Bolsheviks alone determined the course of 1917 devalues the work of 
the social historians who, by intimate study, conclude that the material conditions and tiie 
situation o f 1917 impelled the workers towards Bolshevism. 
The curious thing about these diametrically opposed theories is that both accept a 
deterministic view of history. The political historians, by emphasising the influence of 
specific individuals, imply that the presence of the 'historic indi^'iduals' necessitated the 
turn o f events, whereas the social historians, using the inexorable pattern of events and 
circumstances, again suggest that there was no altemative to the events of 1917. This 
teleological approach must be treated very cautiously. I t is the nature of historj' that, 
apparentiy, the 'whole picture' is viewed when one looks back. This is an illusion, however; 
just because it is now known that the rule of the Provisional Govemment ended in 
ignominious defeat in October, it should not be assumed that this path was the only one 
available in 1917. The changing face of historiography in the last twenty years should 
demonstrate that history is never finally written. 
" To name just a few of these studies, Mandel [1983], Smith, [1993], Koenker and Rosenberg [1989]. 
^°Figes [1989] was groundbreaking work in this area. 
21 Wildman [1987] 
Marot [1994] 
Marot [1994] pp. 155-6 
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Haimson's works on difficulties in the social 'classification' of Russia h i ^ l i g ^ t the problem 
of defining class in Russia, and demonstrate that more subtle class definitions are required 
i f we are to gain any understanding of the social complexities of Russia^". His work in the 
60's set the agenda for the social historians to look more intimately at the complexities of 
social composition, and in 1988 he wrote an update of his theories. Mandel's work on the 
Petrograd workers is a good example of how the work o f the social historians has both 
clarified and complicated the picture of 1917; Mandel, by studying the workers, and using 
the labour history pioneered by E.P. Thompson^, detects numerous divisions within their 
ranks according to skill levels and profession^^. This work demonstrates that the 
interaction between different groups in 1917 Russian society was very complex, and the 
old denominations of 'working class', 'intelligentsia', and so on are not adequate in 
describing the social groupings of 1917. 
So, while Von Laue suggested that sociological study would show that there was no way 
forward for liberal constitutionalism in 1917, the work of the social historians suggests that 
all sorts o f possibilities were open for Russia in 1917, and denies the simplifications both 
of the Soviet and western historians who thought that they saw inevitable patterns 
emerging in 1917. The old teleological determinism deserves now to be shed. 
A point worth noting when considering the role of individuals compared with 'society' is 
the amount of attention devoted to the working class, particularly o f Petrograd and to a 
lesser extent Moscow. This artificial lean towards the significance of the workers' 
movement is evident when one surveys the available literature on 1917, and stems from 
Bolshevik claims for legitimacy. The Bolsheviks, who styled themselves as representatives 
of the proletariat, felt a need to emphasise the political awareness and autonomy of the 
proletariat, as only this fitted in with Marxist doctrine on a country's readiness for 
revolution. This concentration has resulted in an imbalance of the writing on 1917. The 
social historians Koenker, Rosenberg, Smith and Mandel, have all focused their studies on 
the working classes. These studies have actually played a significant part in debunking the 
communist myth o f a homogenous, united working class. The upshot of this, though, is 
surely a need to move away from study o f their significance in isolation, and into a look at 
their significance within a broader picture. Whilst the working populations of Petrograd 
and Moscow had inordinate influence on events, because of their proximity to the centre 
^''Haimson[1988], p.2 
Thompson [1963] 
Mandel [1983] chapters 2 and 3 
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of power, their concentration and their relatively high level of organisation, this should not 
be allowed to overwhelm the study o f 1917. 
Power and authority: the significance of dvoevlastie 
When addressing the difficult question o f power and authority, there are a number of 
issues which become prominent; is there a real difference between the power of being 
influential and able to exercise one's will, and authority which comes from delegated 
power? Where does power lie, and are some seats o f power of greater significance than 
others? Can there be authority without power? These issues go r i ^ t to the heart of the 
debate about the existence and significance o f the duality of power between the Petrograd 
Soviet and Provisional Govemment in 1917. 
In 1917, Soviets were formed at grass root level in the factories as early as 24* February^^. 
Though these initial efforts were crushed by the Tsarist authorities, they were an indication 
of the strong urge felt by the working population towards the construction of Soviets. The 
Petrograd Soviet, however, was constructed on the initiative of members of the central 
workers group who had just been released from prison, led by Gvozdev, and several 
socialist Duma members, including the Menshevik Chkheidze. They formed the 
Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in the afternoon of 
27* February. One o f the first tasks o f the Executive Committee was to form a Military 
Commission, to defend the young revolution. Mstislavskii, an SR who was involved with 
the military commission, gives a poignant description of these first frantic hours^'. The 
early days o f the Soviet set the tone for the domination of the intelligentsia over the mass 
working class and soldier support, in the form of the Executive Committee. The 
popularity o f the Soviet secured it power however. There was a scramble from workers 
and later soldiers to elect their delegates to the Soviet. For the working people and soldiers 
of Petrograd this was a real manifestation of democracy. Where only a couple of days 
before they still ran the gauntiet of arbitrary policing and the Tsarist state, now they were 
freely electing real representatives to 'their' political assembly. The remnants of liberal 
Russia and the Tsarist regime that made up the first Provisional Govemment could not 
hope to compete in this context. Whilst the Soviet did have mass membership, its decision 
making body, the Soviet Executive Committee, was made up predominantiy of the 
intelligentsia, including many radical party leaders. 
Anweiler [1958] p. 104 
Mstislavskii [1988] pp. 17-56. 
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Power in one context lay with the Soviet, by virtue o f its undoubted popularity and mass 
support. The Duma Committee, which was to evolve into the Provisional Government, 
was on a different plane of political life in many respects. Its legitimacy lay in its origins as 
the Duma, the elected consultative and nominally legislative body of Russia. This 
legitimacy claim is more strained when one considers that the electorate of the Duma was 
a tiny percentage o f the Russian population. As there were no precedents, however, for 
mass representation, it is hard to see what the altematives for Russian succession to power 
were. Miliukov identified this problem, and believed that the only way to avoid a crisis of 
power and authority was to ensure the succession of the Tsar's uncle to the throne. This 
shows Miliukov's inability to come to terms with the new situation; though his political 
theory was quite correct in wanting a legitimate succession after the abdication of Nicholas 
H, it is difficult to envisage a policy less in tune with the desires of the insurgents on the 
streets of Petrograd. I t can be established that whilst the legitimacy of the Provisional 
Government was tenuous, there were no altematives that could claim greater legitimacy. 
The claims to legitimacy later made by supporters of 'All power to the Soviets' were 
fallacious. Deputies elected in open meetings by shows of hands, in limited areas, did not 
mirror accurately the wishes of the population. Direct democracy may have been the only 
practical and popular alternative, but it was certainly not representative of the Russian 
nation. The only body which could claim real legitimacy was the short lived Constituent 
Assembly, which was freely elected by the whole o f Russia. As the Provisional 
Government's mam task was to arrange the elections for the Constituent Assembly, it can 
claim legitimacy as the precursor to the Constituent Assembly. 
Authority, however, did not spring from legitimacy in 1917, or at least not legitimacy in its 
more formal sense. Authority, that is, delegated power, was notable for its absence for the 
better part o f 1917. The Soviet, considered to have support and therefore authority, was 
swept by the tide o f public opinion as a result o f their dependence on their supporters. 
When decisions were made that were not popular, the effect was that the Soviet leadership 
lost credibility, not that they asserted their authority. One can argue that the power 
delegated by the population o f Petrograd was never allocated to any one body. This is 
amply illustrated by the frantic efforts of the Duma committee to come to some 
agreement with the Soviet in order to secure some semblance o f legitimacy. The Duma 
Committee accepted the moderate demands of the Soviet, in retum for the Soviet's 
unreserved support for the new Provisional Govemment, and their assistance in restoring 
law and order to the capital. This attempt on the part of the Provisional Govemment to 
harness the mass support o f the Soviet was shrewd, but did not take into account that the 
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Soviet leaders and the people who supported the Soviet were not inseparably linked. 
Within twenty four hours o f the agreement, order no 1^ ' had been issued, which secured 
the support o f the soldiers for the Soviet, and Steklov offered the Provisional 
Government the conditional support o f the Soviet. Hasegawa pinpoints the problem of dual 
power as lying with the inconsistency between the wishes of the leaders of the Soviet, and 
the wishes of their mass support^". 
Both bodies were, then, invested with some measure o f power, the Soviet by virtue o f its 
popular support, and the Provisional Government by virtue of its perceived legitimacy. 
The usual explanation is that t h o u ^ the Soviet had the power, and therefore the capacity 
to rule, its Menshevik leaders, in submission to Marxist doctrine that there had to be a 
capitalist-bourgeois stage o f the revolution, handed over their power to the Provisional 
Government, with the aim that the Soviet should take a supervisory role, ensuring that the 
new Capitalist government did not restrict the Russian people's new found freedom. This 
quote f rom Sukhanov embodies this view, 
'...a new programme had now been presented to the democracy: to prevent the revolution, once 
accomplished, from becoming the foimdation of a bourgeois dictatorship, and ensure that it 
formed the starting point for a real triumph of the Atmozncj.'^^['democracy' here means 'demos', or the 
ordinary people, defined here as the working class led by the intelligentsia in the form of the Soviet] 
Whilst this explanation holds an element o f truth, it is misleading. A glance at the memoirs 
of the major political participants in the first days o f the revolution shows that there was 
no f i rm adhesion to Marxist doctrine, but fear and confijsion. There was fear of counter-
revolution, and fear o f the 'great unwashed' of Petrograd, great swathes of unruly workers 
and soldiers that trumpeted their new found voices. To quote Sukhanov again, he says of 
the first days of revolution, 'dreadfiil rifles, hatefiil greatcoats, strange words!'^^ expressing 
the fear and veiled disgust o f the leaders o f democracy for their soldier followers. 
Confusion and uncertainty came from men who had not anticipated a revolution in their 
lifetime, who had no contingency plans, who had only the experience of 1905 to guide 
them. To suggest that they handed over power to the Provisional Government is 
misleading, as though they undoubtedly had a massive support base in Petrograd, this did 
not mean they actually wielded political power. 
A further point to make is that while there was certainly an element of Marxist doctrine in 
their attitude towards power, there were also more practical considerations. Without the 
Chapter 4, pp, 68-69 for details on order no. 1. 
Hasegawa [1972] p. 626 
'^ Sukhanov [1955] p. 69 
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gloss o f legitimacy offered to the new regime by the Provisional Government, the army 
generals may not have acceded to the institution of a new democratic regime. Without the 
support o f the army command at this early stage of the revolution, the authority of both 
Provisional Government and Soviet would have been paper thin. I f not an immediate 
suppression o f the revolution (or insurrection?), then civil war could well have been the 
result. One can argue that the aims of the Provisional Government and the Soviet 
leadership were in relative harmony at a basic level; both desired a restoration o f some sort 
o f order, the establishment of civil liberties, the convocation o f a Constituent Assembly, 
and a successfbl conclusion o f the war. In this context it made absolute sense for the 
Soviet to allow the more politically experienced members o f the Provisional Government 
to accept the burden of administering the state. The difficulty with this suggestion is that 
the Soviet delegates changed both composition and viewpoints quite radically through 
1917, most notably felt at the times of crisis for the Provisional Government, in May, July 
and September. Whilst the leadership o f the Soviet was more stable in composition, it was 
far f rom united on policy lines, the major problems being the war, the Nationalities 
question, and the Agrarian crisis. The Soviet was a body in flux, and its leadership was 
compelled to pay some attention to the demands o f the Soviet delegates, who represented 
worker and soldier opinion in Petrograd. This makes any clear line difficult to draw when 
trying to generalise about common policy areas with the Provisional Government. 
One can suggest that an essential problem for the Provisional Govemment was one of 
image. The Provisional Govemment was increasingly identified as a class based body, 
rather than as a national body^^. The image of the Soviet was as a body allied solidly to 
people's democracy, even though its decision making body was composed o f the same 
narrow group of society as the Provisional Govemment. The use of the word 'bourgeoisie' 
as a term of abuse is interesting, and can be considered in relation to the problems the 
Provisional Govemment faced in consolidating support. Kolonitskii's discussion o f this 
problem focuses on the importance of this term of abuse in the control of power in 1917. 
He points out that the socialists commandeered the most potent symbols of the 
revolution, like the red flag. Though this may seem of limited significance to the control of 
power in 1917, these pervasive details o f life must have taken their toll. As the revolution 
championed the new era, it was difficult for the Provisional Govemment, the vestige of a 
defiinct system, to keep in step. Curiously, this fashion for socialism meant that even the 
moderate liberals found themselves engaging in anti-bourgeois rhetoric, fanning the flames 
Sukhanov [1955] p.60 
Suny [1983] p. 37 
16 
THEORETICAL DEBATE ON 1917 
of the assault on themselves. What the term bourgeois actually meant was subject to a 
wide range of definitions. To some, it was a term describing real people; blood sucking 
capitalists who could be identified by their way of dress and manner of speech. The term 
took on broader connotations as well; anyone behaving in a greedy and egotistical way, 
regardless o f social class, could be described as bourgeois. Kolonitskii concludes that the 
spread of anti bourgeois sentiments was a major contributing factor in the failure of 
coalition politics and dual power in 1917^ '*. 
An instance supporting Kolonitskii's theory was the common perception of Provisional 
Govemment policy on the war. Bolshevik propaganda labelled the war as intimately 
connected with class interests, that the bourgeoisie of all the nations involved were using 
the war as a method of suppressing the proletariat This bore slogans like Troletarians of 
Al l Countries Unite!', a slogan which the Soviet used in its, 'Appeal to the Peoples of the 
World' in March^^. This shows clearly the essential conflict within the dual power 
agreement. Although the Soviet professed conditional support for the Provisional 
Govemment, the wording o f this declaration implies that they accepted that the war was 
continued by the machinations o f the bourgeoisie. This simple idea that worker-soldiers 
linking hands over the trenches could end the war was popular in 1917, and the 
Provisional Govemment seems to fit into this picture only insofar as it was obstructing the 
process^*. 
The coalition govemment formed by Kerensky in May saw the involvement o f leaders o f 
the Soviet in the Provisional Govemment. On one interpretation this can be seen as a 
blurring o f the lines o f dual power; by becoming involved in the Provisional Govemment 
so intimately, it became hard to distinguish between the 'democratic' Soviet and the 
'bourgeois' Provisional Govemment. How then, does one explain the continued calls for 
Soviet power, and the increasing hostility towards the Provisional Govemment? 
Involvement in the coalition increasingly alienated the Soviet Executive Committee from 
its main body in the Soviet, and was symptomatic of the increasing rift between the 
intelligentsia who nominally headed the Soviet, and their supporters in Petrograd. 
In recent debate, there have been fundamental analyses of the foundations of dual power. 
Haimson^^ argues that dual power was nothing more than a reflection of the profound rift 
in society that had emerged between the propertied classes and the workers, particularly in 
Kolonitskii [1994] 
'^Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 942, p.l077 
See chapter 2, pp. 39-43, for the Soviet leaders' attitude towards the war. 
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Petrograd. This view is supported by Suny, who su^ests that dual power was an active 
model of the polarisation within society'*. However, a l thou^ the Provisional 
Government's lack of solid support can be seen as a vote of no-confidence from the 
people i t professed to represent, dual power does not display any neat polarisation o f 
views. A point often neglected is that Petrograd did not represent the views of the whole 
of Russia. I f dual power reflects accurately the r i f t in the whole of Russian society that 
Haimson favours, one must look not only at Petrograd but at the individual areas of 
Russia. This is something which has not been done adequately. Michael Melancon makes 
an attempt to look at mass attitudes towards the Provisional Government and the Soviet, 
but the figures he gained f rom analysis of 350 varied documents, whilst interesting, did not 
provide any significant conclusions^'. Rather, they confirmed that i f one wants to find out 
the mood of the nation, one must do it bit by bit. The only way to get really meaningful 
results is to focus research on one particular region, and scan available material 
exhaustively. When this has been done in a wide swathe of regions in Russia, it will be 
possible to advance more specific hypotheses regarding the connections between dual 
power and the alleged polarisation of society. 
Conclusions 
This brief excursion t h r o u ^ the minefield o f theoretical debate about the study of 1917 
shows that a teleological deterministic view of Russian history must be laid aside i f the 
study is to progress. Social historians have already contributed valuable work in breaking 
down the standard interpretations o f class behaviour, and reallocating identity to the 
peoples o f Russia. This work should be considered within a broad spectrum, in an attempt 
to escape the determinism that tends to creep in. The problem of dual power is a complex 
one, and the simplistic suggestion that dual power is a reflection o f the polarisation in 
Russian society belies this complexity. Finally, while Russia did have a number of unique 
features that merit careful study, the historian should avoid the tendency to view Russia 
and all things Russian in a negative light, particularly in comparison with an idealised 
western model. 
An eclectic approach to the history of 1917 may prove more fruitful by considering all 
schools o f thought and examining subjects which would normally be considered h i ^ 
politics in connection with the work of social historians, exploring the links between, for 
Haimson [1988] 
Suny [1983] p. 36 
Melancon [1993] 
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example, 'high polities', and the workers' movement. I t is intended that this eclecticism will 
bypass some of the pitfalls o f the study of 1917 outlined in this chapter. 
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COMPOSITION AND POLICIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 
CHAPTER TWO 
The composition and policies of the Provisional Government 
Chapters three to five will look at the difficulties the Provisional Government faced in 
1917 Russia. In this chapter the focus is placed on the composition and the policies of the 
Provisional Government. Throu^out , the Provisional Government is referred to as i f it 
were a single entity, when in fact its structure and membership evolved considerably 
t h r o u ^ 1917, as the table opposite shows. The composition of each of the five 
administrations will be commented on, along with an assessment of the locations of power 
in each one. This will enable the reader to gain a better understanding of the sometimes 
abrupt changes o f policy witnessed in 1917. There will then be an assessment of 
Provisional Government policies on the issues where they most conspicuously failed -
bread, land, and peace. The purpose of this chapter is to h igh l i^ t the weaknesses of 
coalition, and the specific ways in which the Provisional Govemment attempted to tackle 
the problems facing Russia. In this chapter, the documents collected by Browder and 
Kerensky are used extensively, as they are a particularly rich source of information on the 
personnel and policies o f the Provisional Govemment. 
A chronological summary of the Provisional Govemment 
The first administration o f the Provisional Govemment was formed from the Provisional 
Committee, an informal meeting o f Duma members, in response to the indications that 
the disturbances in the streets of Petrograd threatened to overturn the Tsarist 
administration. I t was dominated by Kadets and their allies, the Progressives, who were 
moderate liberals. Kerensky was the only socialist, and the only Soviet member in this first 
administration. He was involved in the administration only because he defied the Soviet 
Executive Committee, who forbade their members f rom participating in the Provisional 
Govemment, and appealed directly to the large membership o f the Soviet, who sanctioned 
his membership o f both bodies. The members o f this first govemment remarked on the 
overwhelming spirit o f unity and resolution of purpose^ with all working resolutely for the 
' Kerensky said, 'these people [the first Provisional Govemment], who had taken the full weight of 
authority upon their shoulders at the most critical moment in the history of Russia. . . realised that the 
time had come when they must act only in the name of Russia, deleting from memory all their former 
political doctrines, all their personal interests and the interests of their class. Having assumed the 
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achievement o f the radical reforms demanded by die revolution, including the abdication 
of the Tsar. 
I t was difficult for the liberals to reconcile their position as hangmen of the Tsarist regime, 
as Miliukov's attempts to save the monarchy showed'. This first administration is often 
described as the lioneymoon of the revolution', as the members of the govemment 
basked in the reflected glory of the young revolution. In this short period much valuable 
legislation was passed, particularly by Kerensky in the Ministry of Justice, whose role it was 
to legislate those freedoms that the new era demanded. Russian citizens now had freedoms 
which were denied to the citizens of mature democracies due to the war. This honeymoon 
feeling was only superficial, however, as conflicts brewed between the liberals in 
govemment and the Menshevik led Soviet, who took the role o f super\nsors of what they 
deemed the 'bourgeois' revolution^ The conflict between Soviet and govemment was 
kicked o f f with crisis over who should control the army, and the issuing of order no. 1"*, 
and came to a head over the issue of war aims^. Miliukov's unwavering stance in favour of 
Imperialist war aims alienated the Soviet, and precipitated the first major crisis for the new 
administration, with demonstrations against Miliukov and the war^. The prime minister 
Prince Lvov and Kerensky made overtures to the socialists in the Soviet to join the 
Provisional Govemment, but they were reluctant to do so, both because they wanted to 
remain on the outside as supervisors, and because they feared being associated with a 
potentially unpopular government^. The forced resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov's 
exit f rom the govemment decided the Soviet, however, that they had to enter into 
coalition with the liberals. 
The first coalition involved the leading lights of the moderate socialist parties; Tsereteli, 
the leader o f the Mensheviks, became Minister of Post and Telegram, Chemov, the 
prominent SR, stoked great hopes with the peasantry when he was made Minister of 
Agriculture, and Kerensky took over the post vacated by Guchkov as Minister of the War, 
Army and Navy. This ministry was dominated by the drive for a June offensive, which was 
backed by the whole cabinet. In view of the state of the army\ its failure was unsurprising. 
leadership of Russia at this "its fatal hour", the Provisional Govemment did its duty to its countr}' 
honourably and conscientiously, and gave no thought to any other consideration' Kerensky [1934] p. 
260 
^ See chapter 3, p. 46 
^ See chapter 3, p. 53 
" See chapter 4, p. 70 
^ See below, pp. 39-43 
^ Browder and Kerensky [1961] ,3, pp. 1236-1249. 
^ See chapter 3. 
^ See chapter 4. 
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but left the young coalition in a difficult position. Having given its support to military 
offensive, it was now faced with a rapidly disintegrating army, and falling support. 
Other areas of contention were in agriculture, where Chernov, who proved an ineffective 
minister', was seen to be flouting Provisional Govemment directives on the land issue, and 
following his own line^". This alienated other members of the cabinet. Another area of 
dissent emerged over the Ukraine. An indication of the strength of nationalist feeling in 
the Ukraine was that in the Constituent Assembly elections in December, the Ukrainian 
nationalist party won in excess of 70% of the vote in the Ukraine region". The Ukrainians 
were understandably reluctant to wait until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly 
for the granting of local autonomy, and on June 10* the Ukrainian Rada issued a 
statement which set it on equal terms with the Provisional Govemment in legal and 
administrative matters^^.This declaration was considered a step too far by the liberals and 
socialists alike, as is clear f rom their respective press responses. A compromise was made 
with the Ukrainians by a delegation sent to the RadJ^, but was then rejected by the 
Provisional Govemment. The Kadets were unwilling to accept the agreement which, in 
their opinion, 'abolished all authority o f the Provisional Govemment in the Ukraine''''. 
The six Kadets resigned on July 2"'' , purportedly over this issue. Some commentators 
argue that in fact the Kadets used this issue as a pretext for their resignation, and were in 
truth keen to escape from coalition with the socialists who they felt were not taking their 
opinions into account'^. This political tumult was accompanied by extensive disturbances 
on the streets of Petrograd between July 3"* and 5*, commonly known as 'the July days'. 
The demonstrations were characterised by their forceful demands for 'All power to the 
Soviet', and were regarded by the Provisional Govemment and the Soviet as a Bolshevik 
bid for power. In fact, Lenin had not sanctioned the demonstrations, as he was aware that 
the 'time was not yet ripe', and the disturbances seem to have originated from anarchist 
and Bolshevik splinter groups'*. The Provisional Govemment reacted to the challenge of 
their authority with repressive measures against the chief instigators, and the organised 
' See chapter 3, p. 52 
See below, p. 33 
" See tables 7 and 8 on Constituent Assembly election results, pp. 133-135 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 1, doc. 349 
" Browder and Kerensky [1961], 1, doc. 354 
" Browder and Kerenskj' [1961], 1, doc. 355 
John D. Basil [1984] pp 99-101 
'® Rabinowitch [1968] p. 157, commented of the Bolsheviks in the July days that 'We will not take the 
initiative, but we will not put out the fire', thus confirming that the Bolshevik attitude towards the July 
uprising was circumspect and opportunist. 
23 
COMPOSITION AND POLICIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 
Bolshevik party. Lenin escaped, but Trotsky, Kamenev and other Bolsheviks were 
arrested. 
The crisis was compounded by the resignation of Prince Lvov on July 7*", provoked 
primarily by the policies put forward by Chemov in the Ministry of Agriculture, but also 
by 'numerous differences of opinion between myself and the majority of the Provisional 
Govemment'^^ Lvov recommended Kerensky as his successor, on the grounds that 
'at such times a strong govemment is needed. And to bring it about, a combination of elements of 
authority is needed such as are embodied in the person of Kerensky ' i ' 
To add to the confusion, the news broke on July 9* that the so-called June offensive had 
turned into a rout, and that the Germans had started a counter-offensive. On July 11*, 
Volia naroda reported that the Soviet had decreed that 
' The revolution and the country are in danger. It is necessary to form a govemment to save the 
revolution. Unlimited plenary power must belong to the Provisional Government. Twice a week, it 
must give an account to the Soviets.'^ o 
This granted the Provisional Govemment absolute power, but conversely retained Soviet 
supervision. Kerensky was given authority to form his own cabinet on July 13*. The 
Kadets refused to enter any govemment which involved Chemov. In the meantime, the 
Kadets had mounted a campaign vilifying Chemov in tlieir newspapers. Chemov resigned 
on July 20*, on the grounds that he required 
'fi i l l freedom of action... in order to defend my pohtical honour and to prosecute libeleis who are 
private persons'21. 
Whilst this resignation apparently left Kerensky free to include the Kadets in a new 
coalition, on July 20* Kerensky was told by the Soviet that he should reinstate Chemov. 
Kerensky, placed in an impossible position resigned, in suitably dramatic fashion. This 
forced the hand o f the rest o f the poHtical players, who refiised Kerensky's resignation, 
and held a conference that n i ^ t embracing the five major parties. Its unanimous 
conclusion was that Kerensky be given the plenitude of power, to form a cabinet of his 
choice. Kerensky's resignation had what one imagines was the desired effect; the Kadets 
and Socialists managed to suppress their differences in order to renew the coalition. The 
new govemment was announced on July 25*, and included Kerensky's personal friend 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1184 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1186 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1187 
'"Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1193, p. 1399 
2' Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1201, p. 1417 
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Zarudnyi in the Ministry of Justice, and the SR's Savinkov and Lebedev shadowing 
Kerensky in the Ministries o f War and the Army respectively. Savinkov was an unpopular 
figure, who had been an SR terrorist, but worked as commissar of the southwestem front 
in July, meeting up with Komilov, 'in whom he recognised a kindred spirit'^^, as Savinkov 
was ardentiy in favour of the war^ .^ I f civil war was to be avoided, it was imperative that 
liberals and socialists worked together for a resolution of the problems gripping Russia. 
Ironic, though, that what was the most socialist govemment of the period was also to take 
the most suppressive measures against the press and the Bolsheviks. 
Kerensky set about trying to cement alliances with any political groups that were willing to 
support the Provisional Govemment and, in this spirit of alliance, arranged the convening 
of the Moscow State Conference between August 12* and 14*. This was intended to be a 
vehicle for securing a spirit of national unity and co-operation, and thus strengthening the 
Provisional Govemment. The conference began inauspiciously; the Moscow Bureau of the 
central trade union called a strike, which b r o u ^ t trams and small businesses to a standstill. 
A large crowd met the delegates outside the Bolshoi theatre, and t h o u ^ there were no 
demonstrations, the atmosphere was sullen and hostile^". Once the conference was 
underway, the problems that had dogged Kerensky's attempts at coalition were 
highlighted. The delegates sat in the hall arrayed according to political inclination from the 
left to the rigjit, and remained allied to their 'sides' througjiout the conference. Kerensky 
and his close supporters held the middle ground, but were heavily outnumbered by the 
partisans on either side. The underlying bitterness between the two camps was b r o u ^ t to 
the surface by the confrontational atmosphere of the conference, as this description of the 
scene before the speech of General Komilov, the supreme commander, and figurehead of 
the right, displays, 
' The whole audience, with the exception of representatives of the Soviets of workers' and soldiers' 
deputies, rises from tlie seats and applauds the supreme commander, who has ascended the 
rostrum. Growing shouts of indignation are heard from different comers of the audience, 
addressed to those on the left who remain sitting. . . Shouts ring out: "Cads!" "Get up!" No-one 
rises from the left benches, and a shout is heard from there: "Serfe!" The noise, which has been 
continuous, grows even louder.'^ s 
Radkey [1958] p. 316 
^^ Savinkov would seem to have been a fascinating character. This comment is in Sukhanov [1955] p. 
488 'Boris Savinkov, famous SR terrorist and writer. After the October Revolution worked against the 
Soviet govemment; caught by GPU on secret trip to Russia, tried and sentenced to jail for ten years, 
where he died. Winston Churchill thought him one of the most extraordinarj' men he had ever met' 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc, 1229 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1233, p. 1474 
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Komilov's speech dwelled on the disintegration o f the army, and was met with great 
enthusiasm by the rightist press^^ The Moscow conference did have positive points; it 
showed that the different parties were able to sit down together and discuss Russia's 
problems, and were agreed, apparentiy, that there could be 'no salvation for the revolution 
or for Russia outside the democracy''^ However, there was also a strengthening o f the 
right at the conference, focused around General Komilov, and no resolution of the 
problems facing Russia. 
Russia's rnihtary position continued to worsen, with the loss o f Riga to the Germans on 
August 25*. The military loss was quickly followed by another political crisis for the 
Provisional Govemment. General Komilov's attempts to move troops on Petrograd were 
interpreted by Kerensky as an attempted counter-revolution'*, which inspired a national 
move to cmsh any rightist movement. I t was in this period that the Bolsheviks regained 
power and credibility that they had lost after the July days, as men like Trotsky were 
released f rom prison to help the workers organise to 'protect the revolution'. The most 
serious result o f this so-called 'counter-revolution' f rom the point of view of the 
Provisional Govemment was that the chances for coalition between liberals and socialists 
were crushed. The Kadets were implicated in the affair, as indeed was Kerensky himself, 
which finally alienated the Menshevik-led Soviet from any collaboration with the Kadets''. 
With the chances for successfijl coalition apparentiy gone, Kerensky formed a 'directory" 
of five men to take control of the country in the absence of any other form of 
govemment. As two of these posts were filled with practising military men, it was 
effectively a triumvirate that was to control the affairs of state. Tereschenko and Nikitin, 
the other two men involved in the triumvirate, were both men without strict party 
affiliation, and close colleagues of Kerensky. There was a shift to the left after the 
Komilov affair among the moderate socialists, as well as in popular opinion, which was 
detrimental to any fijrther attempts at renewing the coalition. The Democratic 
Conference, called on September 14*, at the initiative of the Soviets, was a last gasp 
attempt to unite 'all forces of the country' in an attempt to save revolutionary Russia, and 
was attended by socialists of all affiliations, including the Bolsheviks. The proceedings of 
the conference were stormy, and witnessed the same partisan breakdown as at the 
Moscow conference, although the Democratic conference did not have representatives 
'^  Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc's 1254-5 
'^  Browder and Kerensl^ [1961], 3, doc. 1257, from a commentary on the conference in Delo naroda. 
'* See chapter 4, p. 83 
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f rom the right o f political opinion. The conference voted narrowly in favour of coalition, 
but subsequently passed an amendment excluding the participation of the Kadets in any 
coalition. This impasse was renegotiated by an additional resolution presented by Tsereteli 
which proposed the establishment o f a Democratic Council, with members drawn from 
the Democratic Conference, whose purpose would be to assist in forming a govemment. 
The thorny issue o f Kadet participation was bypassed by leaving the decisions in the hands 
of this council. Tsereteli's resolution was passed with a large majority, and the Menshevik 
Chkheid2e was selected as chairman. On September 24* the Democratic Council met, and 
consulted with the Provisional Govemment and with 'representatives of bourgeois 
elements'. The council resolved that the Democratic Council would be reconvened, with 
the inclusion of bourgeois elements, to form a preparliament, with the ri^t to put 
questions to the Provisional Govemment, but with no formal legal responsibility of the 
govemment to the conference. The Bolsheviks, represented by Trotsky, opposed any 
coalition with the Kadets, as did the left SR's, but the vote went narrowly in favour of 
coalition. The moderates had won the day, but it was clear that the coalition hung by a 
thread. 
What was to be the last administration of the coalition forces made its first declaration on 
September 25*. I t included more elements f rom the ri^t than any of the previous 
coalition administrations, yet seemed to inspire the confidence of nobody; 
'The Kadets speak of the new ministry with great reservation. . . On the other hand, the Bolsheviks 
look upon the new coalition as an openly provocative action and strongly advocate the idea of a 
"second revolution". It is curious that even the Mensheviks and SR's, the true spirimal fathers of 
the coalition, did not contribute to it a single outstanding party leader, so little confidence did dieir 
own child inspire in them.'^° 
Although such a comment was harsh, it was apt. The third coalition never came close to 
being a fomm in which liberals and socialists could work together. Rather, the strong anti-
Kadet strain dominant at the Democratic Conference continued in the 'democratic' 
section o f the pre-parliament. Dispute raged over foreign policy aims, with most of the 
Kadets and Kerensky favouring a continuation of the defensive policy they had pursued 
thus far, with the help of the allies, while the Mensheviks clung to their belief that a 
general peace without military victories could be accomplished by the combined efforts of 
socialists o f all nations''. Technical dispute arose over govemment monopolies on grain 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1341, p. 1655, for a clear declaration of this fi-om the leader 
of the Mensheviks, Tsereteli. 
°^ Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1380, p. 1721, from an editorial in Novaia zhizn, a leftist 
paper. The comments made expressed grave doubts in the ability of the new coalition to hold together. 
'' See below, pp. 39-43 
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and fiael, and the debate was turned into an opportunity for the socialists to attack the 
liberals for their money grabbing tendencies, whilst the liberals accused the socialists of 
damaging the economy by trying to cut out private interest. The arguments were 
unproductive by this stage, and where the leaders had promised a 'union of national 
forces' the issues instead turned into political platforms with no prospect of resolution. 
The incidence of peasant unrest increased dramatically in September and October, which 
placed fijrther pressure on the administration. Kerensky's last attempt to salvage 
something f rom the problems in the countryside came with Maslov's land programme. 
This resolution failed, as it was too late to glean the peasants' support, and it was criticised 
f rom all sides o f the political spectmm, as all, with the exception of Lenin, favoured 
waiting for the convocation o f the Constituent Assembly for the resolution of the land 
question. Another major factor in the fall o f coalition politics was the breakdown of the 
Menshevik and SR parties into factional groups. T h o u ^ there had always been a broad 
sweep of opinion in both parties, they remained in nominal agreement from March 
onwards. But by September, the strain o f participation with the liberals was too much, and 
inter-faction squabbling was rife, cuhninating in the leaders of the Mensheviks Tsereteli 
and Chkheidze being rejected by the party. Such disagreements weakened the potential 
for the moderate socialists to be a significant force, and allowed the Bolsheviks greater 
freedom to consolidate their support. 
The Central Committee o f the Bolshevik party made the decision to seize state power on 
October 10*^'. As a result of the collapse of the Menshevik/SR alliance in the Petrograd 
Soviet, the Bolsheviks gained control of that organisation. Lenin's plans for a seizure of 
state power were no secret; in Rabochiiput on October 13*, the editorial declared 
'The moment has arrived when the revolutionary slogan "All power to the Soviets" must fmally be 
realised.''^ 
In retrospect it is remarkable that the Provisional Govemment made no concerted efforts 
to suppress the Bolsheviks in the lig^t o f their open intention to seize power. The 
moderates' unawareness o f their own vulnerability is clearly exposed by this excerpt from 
the rightist paper B^ch, on October 21"'; 
'There is no doubt that Bolshevism is undergoing a severe crisis. Whether action takes place or not 
is now a matter of indifference. I f it takes place, it will be crushed and will cause a severe reaction 
which will bring upon the Bolsheviks the curses of all diose whom they have lured from the [ r i^ t ] 
'^ Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1398 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1399, p. 1764 
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path. I f the action does not take place, they will lag behind the moods which they themselves have 
kindled, and their credit will be undermined.'^" 
The Bolsheviks did their groundwork well. On October 22"'' a Military Revolutionary 
Committee was organised, with the intention of controlling the actions of the Petrograd 
Military District Headquarters. The commander of the troops. Colonel Polkovnikov, 
refused to accept the orders o f the Military revolutionary Committee, so the Bolsheviks 
went over his head and issued a telegram direct to all the units in Petrograd requiring them 
to obey orders only i f they were signed by the Military Revolutionary Committee'^. This 
order gave the Bolsheviks assured military support when they made their move. Yet 
Kerensky's reaction to this, in his drawn out speech on October 25* was that 
'...althou^ there was every reason for adopting immediate, decisive and vigorous measures , the 
military authorities, following my instructions, believed it necessary first to give the people the 
opportunity to realize their own intentional or unintentional mistake.'^ * 
He continued by stating that 
'the obvious, definite, over-all condition of a certain part of the population of Petersburg [must be 
termed] a state of insurrection... This is the situation from the legal standpoint, and I have 
proposed that judicial investigations be started immediately, [noises from the left] Arrests have also 
been ordered, [protests from the leftj 
In retrospect, the myopia of the forces of democracy was remarkable. Kerensky proposed 
'judicial investigations', as i f the situation were nothing more than a court room 
disagreement. The expected sense of desperate urgency is not present; still, the opposing 
factions were bickering, and the internationalists remained sternly unmoved by all 
Kerensky's appeals. By the following morning, the Bolsheviks occupied the stations, the 
telegraph and telephone exchange, and had thrown out the members of the preparliament 
in the Marinskii Palace. The Military District Headquarters were seized, and remaining 
govemment forces in the city were overwhelmed by the Red Guard. Kerensky had gone to 
the front, but the rest of the Provisional Govemment were in the Winter Palace, and were 
arrested in the early hours of October 26*. The preparliament dissolved itself 'in protest 
against the use o f violence''^ that day, thus eliminating the last source of organised dissent 
to the Bolsheviks in Petrograd. Lenin and the Bolsheviks had control of Petrograd, and 
the seat of Russian govemment. The Provisional Govemment had been vanquished. 
'" Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1405 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1406 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1407, p. 1775 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1418 
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Kerensky's article on the policies o f the Provisional Government'* identified the tasks o f 
the Provisional Govemment as threefold; to re-establish the destroyed state 
administration, to continue the war, and to bring about the radical social and political 
reforms demanded by the revolution. The chief object of all Provisional Govemment 
internal policy was to prevent civil war. Civil war could only be averted by coalition 
govemment, keeping the divergent sides of political thought around the same table, 
working for the good of Russia. He concluded that the Provisional Govemment 
successfully carried out its threefold objectives, and that only the tteacherous coup d'etat 
o f Lenin's Bolsheviks prevented Russia f rom escaping the threat of anarchy, and moving 
towards stable democratic mle. This study of the Provisional Govemment suggests that 
Kerensky was unrealistic. As early as July 1917, it became increasingly clear that coalition 
politics were not lasting the political storm they faced, despite Kerensky's best efforts to 
hold things together. The study of Provisional Govemment policies on the main issues of 
1917 reveals that whilst the govemment had enormous problems in certain areas, there 
were areas where more could have been done to prevent civil war, most notably on the 
issue o f peace. 
The slogan on which the Bolsheviks based their successful bid for power was 'bread, land, 
peace', and it dominated 1917. The issues hi^lighted by this slogan can be seen as the 
issues on which the Provisional Govemment failed most obviously. This chapter studies 
the problems the Provisional Govemment faced in these areas, and the policies which 
they proposed to combat them. This chapter will show that Bolshevik promises to solve 
these three essential problems were empty, as they were issues that were not soluble in the 
short term. 
The land question 
There was a widespread land redistribution in the Russian countryside in 1917, which 
satisfied the peasants' age old aspirations. Keep estimates that in 1917 96% of the former 
estates were liquidated and redistributed^'. Whilst the size of this figure may be accounted 
for in part by the Bolshevik decree on land on November 8* declaring that private 
ownership was abolished"*, i t is an indication o f the strength o f the movement to 
repartition the land in 1917. Gill asserts that the peasants' actions in 1917 were not 
Kerensky [1932] 
Keep [1977] p. 406 
Note that the Bolsheviks actiially adopted an SR draft on settlement of the land question, but reneged 
in Febraary 1918, when they declared that all land was the property of the state. 
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politically motivated''^ but whether or not this was the case, their actions had major 
political repercussions. 
The Provisional Government's task with regard to the land question can be seen in two 
ways. In one sense it was straightforward; as the peasants saw the issue, land could not 
truly be owned, but should be in the hands of the toilers, of those that worked it. In this 
strai^tforward sense, the path for the Provisional Government was clear; it should satisfy 
the peasants' demands, and supervise the transfer of state and privately held lands into 
peasant hands, with no remuneration made to the private owners who lost their land. So 
much for the straightforward view. The difficult approach, which was the one which the 
Provisional Government took, was that the reallotment of land, whilst it seemed inevitable 
and would benefit the toiling peasantry who had suffered much in the hands of arbitrary 
Tsarism, was a serious matter and had to await the convening of the Constituent Assembly 
for a decision. Another consideration in the land question was that while the army was still 
mobilised, it would be almost impossible to distribute land fairly, and conversely, to 
prevent the already dispirited troops f rom deserting en masse to return to their homes for 
their allocation o f land. A final and serious consideration was the essential difficulties of an 
equitable redistribution o f land. The geographical diversity of Russia meant that there were 
different agricultural problems in different areas. In the most land hungry areas, the 
redistribution o f all lands would have led to nothing more than a general poverty, as there 
was patently insufficient land to go round. Studies of the land problem in Russia 
concluded that massive resettlements to virgin soils would be required from some areas i f 
all the toilers were to get a viable portion o f land. Such complexities were not brushed 
aside by the Provisional Government, which was anxious to remain true to liberal 
principles. 
Further hold-ups were caused by individuals within the Provisional Government. X '^Tiilst 
the Russian intelligentsia evinced great affection for the peasantry, whom they viewed 
naively, as the salt of the Russian earth, people simple and worthy'*^, they often had little 
understanding of the aspirations of the peasants. Men like Prince Lvov typified the 
patriarchal role 'enliglitened' Russian landowners took towards their peasants. He was an 
active ^^emstvo man, who worked to improve peasant welfare in education, health and 
housing. Radkey asserts, however, that for all this good will, he did not wish to see his 
great estates dispersed into peasant holdings, and was very circumspect about the issue of 
GiIl[1978B] p. 64 
See Koulomzina [1991] p. 52 
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land redistribution''^. There was then, a confijsed response in the Provisional Government; 
whilst the general feeling accepted the need for land redistribution, there was litde practical 
understanding o f the peasants, and individuals within the government were concerned to 
retain owners' ri^ts o f property. One must remember that the first Provisional 
Government was drawn f rom the State Duma, on which there was a property qualification 
for entry. The Kadets had substantial mfluence throu^out the Provisional Government's 
tenure, and though they accepted the need for redistribution of land, they were firmly 
committed to the policy o f remuneration for dispossessed landowners, a policy that was 
fiercely resisted by the peasantry. 
The means by which the Provisional Government attempted to implement its land policy 
was a range o f land committees, set up at wlost [district], ne^ [county] and gubeniiia 
[province] levels, with a central land committee based in Petrograd to supervise the whole 
structure. The role of these land committees was to prepare for coming land reform''^ by 
studying the problems of land reform in the given area and drawing up plans and estimates 
for their solution. The committees were also to be responsible for the 'settlement of 
questions, disputes, and misunderstandings arising in the field of land and agricultural 
relations, within the limits o f existing statutes and laws of the Provisional Government, 
[and] setting up, i f necessary, chambers of mediation and conciliation for the adoption of 
measures to regulate relations which may arise as a result of the arbitrary violation of 
anyone's r i ^ t s and interests'"^. They were also charged with lialting the acts of private 
persons leading to the depreciation o f land and agricultural properties'. The exact 
composition o f these committees varied according to their level, but at vobst level, the 
lowest o f the committee levels, the members were elected by the volost ^emstvo assembly. As 
the ^emstvo assemblies were little regarded by the peasantry, and in some areas broke down 
altogether after the revolution, they may well have been overruled or ignored. 
This description o f the functions of the land committees makes the duality of their 
position clear immediately. Whilst they had been elected by local people, and were called 
upon to settie local disputes, and to prepare for the incipient land reform, they were also 
expected to prevent the peasants' seizure o f the land, and to uphold Provisional 
Government policies. This effectively meant that the committees were to carry out policies 
that were unpopular with the peasantry, but were formed of the peasantry. I t is 
unsurprising that the land committees became increasingly unmanageable as 1917 
" Radkey [1958] p. 255 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 478 
'^ ^ Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 471 
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progressed. The demands of the peasantry, with regard to the flinctions of the land 
committees, make this clear. 
'prior to the solution of the land question by the Constituent Assembly...the Soviet of Peasants' 
Deputies deems it necessary... to transfer to the management of the vobst committees all plow lands 
and i\€i.d&,pomeschik, state, udel, monastery, church, Kabinet, and municipal lands.''*' 
The peasantry demanded nothing less than that all land should be placed in the hands of 
the local land committees. The Provisional Govemment was committed to protecting the 
principle o f private property, and to waiting on the decision o f the Constituent Assembly, 
which made this demand absolutely untenable. 
The problem was made more complex by the chain of command and authorit}' involved in 
the hierarchy of land committees, f rom the central committee at the top, to the volost 
committee at the bottom. T h o u ^ the higher level committees were meant to have their 
decisions followed by the lower level committees, they had no power to enforce their 
decisions'* .^ From the outset there was confusion as to the roles and authority of the land 
committees. This confusion intensified as 1917 progressed. Chernov's circular to the land 
committees in July offered them wide ranging powers, including the authority to release 
timber for the local population where necessary, to place land in 'suitable hands', to fLx 
rents, and to detail prisoners o f war for land work. In short, the land committees were to 
regard themselves as organs of state authority'**. This circular was directly contradicted by 
other Provisional Govemment circulars'", and was a reflection of Chernov's isolation in 
the govemment. Although there were other SR's in govemment, Chemov was by far the 
most radical, and clung to SR populist policies on the land question, that the land must be 
redistributed without compensation. This view was in no way representative of Provisional 
Govemment policy. Such contradictions inevitably led to frustrations for the committees, 
who in the absence of any clearly defined policy on the land question, often took matters 
into their own hands. This resolution f rom the Kuznetskii ue^d land committee effectively 
summarises the problem; 
'The absence of guiding instructions from the Provisional Govemment that correspond clearly and 
explicitly to the abrupt change., in the peasants' relations to landowners and their land... the 
Provisional Government's indecisive policy on the land problem, and the vaguely defined powers 
of the guhemiia land committees, have placed the committees in an impossible position, because the 
frameworks and standards established by the old pre-Revolutionary laws have now been outgrown. 
It is impossible for the land committees to work...between the frying pan and the fire. When the 
peasants become convinced that the land committees cannot answer to their aspirations, they will 
' Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 509, p. 586 
' Gill [1978A], p. 249 
' Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 487 
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then lose confidence; if, on the other hand, the committees carry out the general will of the people 
that is authoritatively confirmed by the resolutions of the All Russian Congress of Soviets of 
Peasants', Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and all the socialist parties, and thus adopt a realistic 
course, they will violate the letter of the dead law and will be held legally responsible...The 
Kuznetskii ue^id land committee believes that since the passage of land laws throu^ the 
Constituent Assembly would require at least two years, it is the duty of the government to hasten 
with the publication of temporary laws .'5" 
I f these temporary laws were to have gained any popular support, they would have had to 
ride rou^shod over private property ri^ts, and set a precedent that the Constituent 
Assembly would have had extreme difficulty in revoking. Their commitment to the 
absolute authority o f the Constituent Assembly to make any final decisions meant that the 
Provisional Government had their hands tied in this matter. In their meticulous approach 
to the question the Provisional Government lost their already tenuous support in the 
countryside. The peasants looked to lawless but more productive means of acquiring land. 
As 1917 progressed, agrarian disorder intensified, and was expressed in the seizure of land, 
refusal to pay rent, the theft of animals, wood and equipment, and in some cases 
destruction o f owners' property. In the Tambov provmce. Prince Viazemsky's estate at 
Lotarevo was overrun by local peasants who broke into his cellars, got drunk, and then 
called the prince to 'justice', declaring that he o u ^ t to be sent to the front. Whilst at the 
station at Gria^i he was captured and killed by deserting soldiers^'. Figes, in his 
commentary on the Volga region, remarks that there were relatively few such lawless 
appropriations, a pseudo-legal gloss being given to many seizures^ .^ The regional variation 
in actions must be taken into account when considering peasant disturbances. Gill asserts 
that the peasant unrest was primarily a result of land hunger^^. This is substantiated by the 
fact that the agricultural unrest was most pronounced in the areas where pressure on land 
was most severe; the central agricultural region, the middle Volga, little Russia and the 
southwest, Belorussia and Lithuania^\ The most common forms of unrest were land and 
wood seizure. 
The Provisional Government's response to peasant unrest altered as 1917 progressed. On 
March 9*, in relation to disorders in Kazan, it was resolved that 'the use of armed force 
for the suppression of agrarian disorders is at the present time inadmissible'^^. Rather than 
attempt to use the already malcontent peasant army to put down peasant risings, which 
'° Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc, 495 
'^ Account taken from Moynahan [1992] pp. 223-4 
"Figes [1989] pp. 51-55 
Gill [1978A] p. 258 
Gill, [1978B] p. 69 
" Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 504 
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was a dangerous prospect, the Provisional Govemment instead tried to appeal to the 
better nature of the peasant, and condemned arbitrary land seizures in the press, whilst at 
the same time appealing for compliance with Provisional Govemment policy, and patience 
to wait for the convocation o f the Constituent Assembly. There was a rapid tumaround in 
the policy o f not using troops however. On April 8*, it was resolved that 'the gubemiia 
committees would be responsible for suppressing immediately with the use of legal means of any 
kind any kind o f attempt in the sphere of agrarian relations against the person or property 
of citizens i f such attempts have taken place'^ ^. 
This decision to use troops where necessary to put down agrarian disorder further 
damaged Provisional Govemment credibility in the countryside, as forced suppression was 
intimately connected with the old regime. In this the Provisional Govemment could not 
win. When they issued only appeals, this was regarded by the peasantry as a sign of 
weakness. When they were forcibly suppressed, however, the peasants immediately 
bemoaned the retum of strong-arm tactics. The only way the Provisional Govemment 
could have won support in the villages was to allow the land committees total jurisdiction 
over all land, thus forestallbg any decision the Constituent Assembly m i ^ t make, and 
ensuring breakdown of the coalition. Whilst rational and lawful solution to the land 
problem lay, as Provisional Govemment policy dictated, in waiting for the convening of 
the Constituent Assembly, the situation in the countryside became neither rational nor 
lawful. Perhaps the members o f the Provisional Govemment should have been concemed 
less with the letter o f the laws that they proposed and more with the political realities 
surging around them. I f they did not sanction the reapportioning of land, well, then the 
peasants would take it anyway. The govemment had no means to prevent them, and so its 
lack o f authority and o f support was exposed. 
The Grain crisis 
A major factor in the Febmary revolution was the grain shortage afflicting the u r b ^ areas. 
In 1917, Petrograd received by rail only 44.1% of the grain it had received in 1913. These 
shortfalls became even more marked as 1917 progressed". The overall crop yield was not 
much down on former years, but problems arose because the yield increased in Siberia and 
the north, but decreased markedly in European Russia. Russia's transport system was 
unable to cope with the demands o f 1917, which meant that the good crops in the north 
were not accessible to the major conurbations of Petrograd and Moscow. Peasant unrest 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 506 
" Gill [1976] p 47 
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and reluctance to surrender grain a^avated the problem. The Provisional Government 
had to tackle this problem i f it was to survive. The inadequacy of the measures which it 
took are illustrated by the potency o f the Bolsheviks' promise of bread. 
The Provisional Government responded to the food crisis in a number of ways. On 
March 9* they set up a central food supply committee to guide the Ministry of 
Agriculture^l This was replaced by the Ministry o f Food, established on May 5*, whose 
role it was to supervise the nascent local food supply committees^'. Bread rationing was 
introduced in Petrograd on 24* March, and was unpopular. The rationing did not go 
smoothly. The state committee on food supply reported, 
'The rationing of bread went into effect on March 24*. However, misunderstandings are occurring 
in certain areas of the city, and soldiers, as well as persons who have not received their ration cards, 
are demanding that bread be released to them without ration c?itds...Bread shall not be received without 
ration cards...xht procedure of standing in queues should apply to the distribution of bread..^Wit State 
Committee on food supply is appealing to the citizens to remain completely calm and to abide by 
the regular procedure of bread sales, since it is only under these conditions that everyone will be 
able to receive his required amount of bread'*" 
This statement reveals a note of extreme concern. For them to have had to state that 
queues ought to be formed when waiting for bread would rather suggest that the onset of 
rationing had seen no queues. This suggests the scene of a scrum of people outside the 
bakeries. Similarly, the stem note that 'bread shall not be received without ration cards', 
coupled with the gloomy appeal for calm, mdicate that rationing got o f f to a very poor 
start. 
A grain monopoly was established in an attempt to prevent grain merchants from driving 
prices up, and to assure the supply of grain to the cities and the army. All grain produced 
was to be at the disposal of the State. A fixed price was set for grain, and the peasants 
were obliged to surrender all grain that was not for their own needs. To ensure the 
effective local organisation of the monopoly, food supply committees were established. 
These had wide ranging duties, f rom ensuring the appropriate use of land, and protecting 
the land f rom damage and destruction, to ensuring that the peasants were adhering to 
Provisional Government policy, and surrendering all their grain. The food supply 
committees were difficult for the Provisional Government to monitor, let alone control. 
Volobuev asserts that they were created in only half the provinces, and that they were 
usually in food consummg provinces, rather than producers^'. Where they did exist, they 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 530 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc 544 
^ Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 532, p. 617 
Volobuev [1962] p. 393 
36 
COMPOSITION AND POLICIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 
were under the same pressures as those other troublesome bodies, the land committees. 
Where they flouted peasant desires and carried out Provisional Govemment policies, they 
were ignored or even assaulted. T h o u ^ this report comes from the conservative Russkie 
vedomosti, it may be taken as an indication of the problems the local food supply 
committees had, 
'The officials and food supply delegates report from everywhere about their helplessness to do 
anything. The popxJation refiises to listen to them, throws them out, beats them unmercifully, and 
hides the grain' [August 24*]«2 
The fiinctions with which the local food supply committees were burdened would have 
been onerous even for well established administrations. These ad-hoc delegations of locals 
could not possibly fulfil l these fiinctions. On April 29*, a h i ^ l y detailed pronouncement 
placed grain o f all kinds under rationing. The distribution of these grains was determined 
by local food supply committees in the mral regions. A proviso was added that those in 
work involving heavy labour were to receive extra rations. Such a procedure was a 
challenge to the long established British administration; it had no chance in 1917 Russia. 
The most serious difficulty in persuadmg peasants to relinquish their grain came from the 
trade imbalance between town and country. Because Russia's manufacturing strength had 
gone into the war effort, and exports were halted by the war blockade, there was a 
shortage of all manufactured goods. The peasantry had no access to the manufactured 
goods they needed. In 1917 the price o f nails was five times what it had been in 1914, the 
price of boots five times the 1914 equivalent. A resolution from the All-Russian Soviet of 
peasants' deputies in May, whilst supportive of the grain monopoly, and of fixed prices on 
grain, clearly requested a solution to this problem; 
' The peasantry surrenders all the produce of its labor and economy at established prices. Without 
further delay fixed prices must be introduced on manufactured goods to correspond with the prices 
on grain...This must be done to correct the injustice, also to prevent the ruin of the working 
peasantry'^ 3 
The Provisional Govemment was aware of this problem, and proposed an attempt to fix 
prices on the goods required in the countryside, and make them available, in order to 
facilitate the exchange of goods between town and country*''. This monumental enterprise 
required nothing less than control over the whole economy, and never got beyond 
committee stage*^ .^ There was popular socialist hostility towards all capitalists, and the 
'^^  Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 552, p. 640 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 545, p. 631 
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speculators had been excluded f rom the monopoly process. I t was to be entirely state run. 
The Provisional Government were proposing effective state control of agriculture and 
industry. This was a step way beyond the potentials of the Provisional Government, who, 
as Kerensky pointed out, had no state mechanism of control available. Also, the regime 
was essentially liberal in character, and had no ambition for state control. This was 
symptomatic of the ad-hoc measures that the Provisional Government took, without 
having the means or the motivation to make the measures effective. Mau points out the 
essential dichotomy between the use of anti-market, administrative levers to stabilise the 
economy, and the use o f democratic norms and procedures to implement them**. 
In an attempt to stimulate the release o f grain, the Provisional Government doubled the 
frxed price o f grain in August, despite having vehemendy denied that such an action would 
be forthcoming. I t was a desperate measure, but Prokopovich, the Minister of Food, 
reported in October that the doubling of prices had been the only alternative to coercive 
measures; 
'...our reserves became entirely depleted... owing to this desperate simation, and to the complete 
depletion of grain reserves both at the front and witliin the country, the Provisional Government 
was forced to resort to a desperate measure; namely, it was forced to double the price. We were 
confronted by a dilemma: either we could attempt to obtain grain by voluntary means, by means of 
this doubling of prices, or we could mm directly to repressive measures, to the use of armed force, 
and confiscate the grain from the people...We could not bring ourselves to use armed force.'*' 
The government and the Petrograd Soviet tried to coerce the peasants by reminding them 
of their important national role, and their duty to protect freedom and the new Russia*'. 
But these were not norms the peasants easily identified with. The peasants were essentially 
opportunist; just as they saw the fall of the Tsar, and the physical weakness of the new 
regime as an opportunity to seize land, so they saw no reason to surrender grain for 
money that could not buy them anything they needed. Another factor was the old gap 
between the town and the country; the peasants tended to see the doings of the town as 
of little interest to them, and felt that they had no obligation to feed the townspeople, who 
were, to their minds, living in great luxury. What did the town know of the life of the 
peasants? In this context the peasants' behaviour, hiding and distilling spare grain, and 
feeding themselves and their animals better, in the midst of a national grain crisis, was 
perfectly logical. The stark alternative was to seize grain, as the Bolsheviks did in the civil 
war. Lenin passed a series o f ad-hoc emergency measures, but when these failed, as the 
** Mau [1994] p. 36 
*^  Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 561, pp. 648-9 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 542 
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Provisional Govemment's had done, armed detachments were sent into the countryside to 
forcibly extract grain*'. The Bolshevik promise of bread was a fallacy. 
Any chance for peace? 
The Bolsheviks owed much of their rapid rise of popularity, particularly amongst the 
armed forces, to their promise of peace. Why did the Provisional Govemment not match 
that promise? In an interview taped at Mills College, America, Kerensky said that that was 
one o f the questions he faced most often f rom students of the revolution™. His response 
was simple; that a separate peace was not possible, both because of Russia's commitment 
to her allies, and because the Russian people would not have countenanced a shamefijl, 
separate peace. This response is typical of liberal Russian politicians with regard to the war. 
Before the revolution, the liberal politicians were keen to gain westem support for a 
ministry enjoying public confidence. In pushing the line that 'the nation' was absolutely 
behind the war effort, but absolutely opposed to the Tsarist administration, the liberals 
convinced themselves that the revolution was a response to the Tsar's inadequate handling 
of the war effort. This was the view put forward by Kerensky in a number of his writings; 
'Our revolution broke out in the very heat of military operations, and psychologically the most 
immediate occasion for it was the fear of a separate peace, that is, it was bent on die continuation 
of the war in the name of national defence''* 
Such are the doubts surrounding this view that the editor felt compelled to add a footnote 
that the historical accuracy of this view was 'more than open to question'. Reports from 
Petrograd and the provinces confirm that there was increasing war-weariness among the 
workers, peasants and rear soldiers. Banners proclaiming 'Down with the War!' were seen 
on the streets o f Petrograd as early as January^ .^ Allied residents of Petrograd noted that 
even i f anti war slogans were not prominent in the first days of revolution, there was 
certainly no enthusiasm for the war". This evidence confirms that Kerensky's belief in the 
Russian people's enthusiasm for the war was gravely misplaced. 
Joining the coalition was difficult for the socialists while Miliukov remained part of the 
govemment. Miliukov continued to cherish expansionist desires for Russia, eaming him 
the nickname 'Miliukov-Dardanel'ski', f rom his ardent desire to secure the straits of the 
Dardanelles and Constantinople for Russia. Miliukov's stmggle was to retain his stubbornly 
Sheila Fitzpatrick [1982] pp. 74-5 
™ From audiotape of an interview with Kerensky, taken at Mills College, America, 1965 
Kerensky [1932] p. 3 
Morris [1972] pp 31-33 
" Moms [1972] p 36 
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Imperialist war aims, whilst appearing to submit to Soviet war aims. When Miliukov was 
forced out o f the Provisional Government as a result of his resistance to Soviet war aims^ "*, 
the socialists reluctantly agreed that the only way to ensure their policies were being carried 
out was to join the government themselves. 
Socialist enthusiasm for the war was always more muted than the liberals, and ranged from 
cautious defencism to o u t r i ^ t pacifism. There was a strong commitment to the belief that 
the war was a machination of the exploiting capitalist classes, both in the allied nations and 
in Germany. This uncompromising view was clearly stated in the Soviet's declaration on 
the war on the 14* March. Their demands became more moderate; the definition of Soviet 
war policy in April stressed the importance of the Provisional Government in securing 
revised war aims. In order to be a part o f the new govemment, the socialists had to offer 
their support o f the war as a defensive measure. Kerensky was an ardent supporter of the 
war, and managed, with his lawyer's tongue, to convince the cabinet that a military 
offensive could be part o f a war o f defence. Al l the socialists, by being involved in 
govemment, were implicated in these war policies, which damaged their credibility. 
The socialists intended that by entering the coalition, they could facilitate the ending of the 
war by pressure o f international public opinion. This notion betrayed the naivete of the 
Russian socialists, both in their over-estimation of the influence of socialists in the allied 
nations, and their underestimation o f the power of the allied governments to suppress 
unwanted pacifist propaganda, and pursue their own line. Their actions in trying to secure 
a peace agreement were under the aegis of the Soviet, but as they were in the Provisional 
Government's coalition, their efforts can be considered within die context of this chapter. 
The allied governments sent sociahst representatives to Russia to liaise with the new 
administration. The Russian socialists considered themselves very distinct from the west 
European socialists, particularly with regard to the war, but were nevertheless very cordial 
towards their guests^ .^ Whilst the Russian view continued to hold that the capitalists of all 
nations were responsible for the war, the allied socialists believed that they were victims of 
German attack. Thomas insisted that a condemnation of German war guilt would be 
necessary i f any talks with German socialists were to go ahead. Tsereteli refijsed to accept 
any delineations of guilt, as he held all the capitalist governments equally responsible^*. 
Despite these differences, the Mensheviks Tsereteli, Skobelev and Dan sought to utilise 
See chapter three, pp. 47-49 
" Basil [1984] p. 74 
'* Basil [1984]p. 76 
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the allied socialists, and involve them in a peace conference. Participation of German 
socialists in the conference proved the major stumbling block, with the British delegate, 
Henderson, and the Frenchman Thomas both expressing grave caution, whilst the 
Belgians, whose soil was occupied by the Germans, were openly hostile to the conference. 
Henderson was keen to wrest control o f the peace conference from Russian socialist 
hands, as he had serious doubts about the abilities of the Soviet leaders in intemational 
affairs^^. Henderson proposed a meeting of allied socialists in London later in the year. 
Tsereteli, however, refused to involve the Soviet in what he considered to be a partisan 
conference, as it omitted the Germans. As a conciliatory measure he agreed to send an 
observer to the London conference, which was eventually held at the end of August. The 
London conference was not a success, although the Soviet supporting It^estiia described it 
as 'a complete moral victory for the platform of the minority'^*. This attitude reflected the 
Russian socialists' unhelpful resistance to any form of compromise. By determinedly 
voting against the common draft on peace terms, the conference ended in 'complete 
failure'. 
Despite this disparity between the Russian and the allied socialists, the allied socialists 
retumed to their home countries on good terms with the Russians, and with some revised 
perceptions. This was a source of some alarm for the allied govemments. The Stockholm 
conference, set for September, was the focus of this concem. The Americans refused to 
attend, and while the French socialists were initially willing to participate, their govemment 
later reneged and withdrew the participants' passports. The effect a socialist peace 
conference might have on the war wearied French troops was not something the 
govemment wished to consider. Petain wamed that he could no longer maintain his hold 
over the army i f the socialists were allowed to go to Stockholm^'. The Soviet persisted 
despite this setback, but with Italians, Americans and the French refusing to attend, the 
conference looked increasingly thin. Arthur Henderson, a British Socialist and member of 
the war cabinet, was left out on a limb by the withdrawals. Tereschenko authorised that 
the text o f a telegram he had sent to Nabokov be issued to Lloyd George, in which he 
stated that, 
'although the Russian govemment does not deem it possible to prevent Russian delegates from 
taking part in the Stockliolm conference, they regard this conference as a party concem and in no 
ways binding upon the liberty of action of the govemment.8°' 
" Basil [1984] p. 78 
''^  Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 1032, p. 1187 
•''Morris [1972] p 44 
°^ Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, notes to document 1030 
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In addition to this damning report, an o f f the cuff remark that Kerensky made to a French 
ambassador Petit that he did not support the Stockholm conference was reported, via 
Thomas, to Lloyd George, who then told the Commons that Kerensky had personally 
communicated his opposition to the Stockholm conference. T h o u ^ this was untrue, and 
Kerensky later published a statement o f sympathy for the Stockholm Conference in the 
Manchester Guardian, this withdrawal came too late for Henderson''. Henderson's position 
was made untenable, and he was forced to leave the cabinet. The Third Zimmerwald 
conference did meet in Stockholm at the start of September 1917, but without the 
participation of the allies, its results were negligible. 
The Russian socialists had their hopes confounded by the harsh reality of how litde 
influence the socialists had in the other allied nations, and by their refusal to compromise 
with the allied socialists. Their efforts to secure a peace engendered by popular 
international pressure were noble; they tapped the widely felt desire to end the terrible 
conflict, and in the Stockholm conference offered an opportunity for reasoned discussion 
of the problem. Their own inexperience o f intemational diplomacy, however, and their 
unwillingness to compromise, b r o u ^ t the plans to nothing. 
Browder and Kerensky document the indirect approaches that Germany made to Russia 
on the subject of a separate peace, or of initiating talks on a forthcoming general peace'^ . 
These seem to have been added more as an addendum then anything else. There is no 
report of Russian responses to these approaches, apart from the occasional note to say 
that, o f course, they were not welcomed. Kerensky's hand in this is probable; in all his 
writings, he liked to emphasise that Germany did make approaches to Russia, but that 
Russia, as a loyal ally, never even considered such propositions. This reveals a blind spot in 
Kerensky's attitude towards the war. Buchanan, in a letter to the Foreign office on July 12* 
recognised that the Russian army was no longer in a fit state to continue the war'^. Had 
Kerensky accepted this gloomy reality, he would perhaps have been more willing to 
consider the possibility o f that 'shameful separate peace'. The first time any member of the 
Provisional Govemment declared that 'we cannot f i ^ t ' was General Verkhovskii on 
October 19*. The response to his declaration was outrage from Tereschenko, and 
Verkhovskii left the govemment not long afterwards, pressured, one suspects, by his 
declaration against the war'"*. Whilst Russia would indeed have made territorial losses, and 
'^ Abraham [1987] p. 241 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc's 933-940, and doc's 1006-1015 
Buchanan [1923] pp. 150-1 
84 Abraham [1987] p, 309 
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lost intemational prestige, the altematives were stark. Russia lost a lot o f territory at the 
separate peace which was concluded at Brest-Litovsk on 3"* March; 62 million citizens of 
the old Russian empire were lost, and land including 32% of Russia's arable land and 75% 
of the iron and coal mines, t h o u ^ Poland and Finland had already broken away. Lenin 
recognised, however, that peace at any price was what the Bolsheviks needed to stabilise 
their regime, so he was willing to make great concessions to get Russia out of the war. 
Conclusions 
The coalition govemments were marked by relatively petty disputes and wrangles among 
its members, but also by profound differences between Kadets and socialists on war aims 
and the nationalities question. 
The three issues o f 'bread, land and peace', were not easily solvable by any administration. 
I t is hard to see how the Provisional Govemment could have improved its policy on the 
land question, short of authorising the random redistribution of land that was already 
going on. 
The grain monopolies were not a big success, but, like land, it was hard to see how the 
Provisional Govemment could have improved matters without resorting to the measures 
that the Bolsheviks were forced to employ; the forcible extraction of grain from the 
peasants. 
Finally, the issue o f peace was not adequately addressed by the Provisional Govemment, 
and t h o u ^ the socialists' efforts to secure a general peace were worthwhile, without the 
involvement o f the Provisional Govemment, they were futile. Kerensky and the liberals 
failed to consider the interests o f Russia before the interests of the allies. The socialists' 
efforts indicate that securing a general peace by intemationalist methods was viable, but 
that the allied govemments were too powerful to be seriously influenced by their minority 
socialist colleagues. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The moderate political parties in 1917 
The actions o f the moderate political parties in 1917 are critical to the shape of events and 
arguably, to the Bolshevik seizure of power. The three best known moderate parties; the 
Constitutional Democrats [Kadets], the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries 
[SR's] will be focused upon. This trio of parties held a plenitude of power in the Soviet 
and in the Provisional Govemment, and were all involved in the coalition to some extent. 
I t is essential to assess their contribution to the failure o f the coalition, in order to see i f 
such a failure could have been avoided. Any success the moderate parties may have found 
in 1917 tends to be deflected by the success of the Bolsheviks in seizing, and holding, 
power. Whilst this is understandable, it diminishes the role the moderates played. The 
moderates, not the Bolsheviks, were supported by the majority of the Russian population, 
and they played a significant role in consolidating the February revolution, and in 
legislating its central tenets. How they failed to lead Russia forward into some form of 
constitutional democracy is an essential question in understanding 1917. In this chapter, 
the Kadets, Mensheviks and SR's will all be assessed, on their organisation and leadership, 
and their policies towards the war, the Provisional Govemment, the Constituent 
Assembly, and the future o f Russia. 
The Constitutional Democratic Party[Kadets] 
The Kadets consisted o f a wide association of individuals who were committed to the 
same basic political aims. This basic programme was a commitment to a constitutional 
democratic regime, wide ranging social reforms to raise the living standards of the lower 
classes, broad based nationalism, and the creation o f a civil society based on social justice'. 
The concern o f the Kadets was for political rather than social change, and they 
disregarded the class based politics of the socialists. Party theory regarded the Kadets as 
representative o f all Russia, regardless o f class. The theory o f a party which superseded 
class boundaries was attractive but, in the case of the Kadets, unrealistic. Their 
membership was made up almost entirely of educated professionals; doctors, lawyers. 
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professors. Kerensky described them as a 'faculty of politicians'^. The rank and file Kadets 
can be categorised as "urban intellectual types" who were "quite poorly informed about 
the peasant and mral population, and quite uninterested in them"^. 
The party was loosely organised, and based around a series of provincial and urban 'clubs', 
which were groups of local people, not usually more than 12, who joined together and 
declared support for the BCadet programme. There were no formal requirements for 
admission, and the Central Committee o f the party, based in Petrograd, rarely issued any 
directives on the Kadet programme and tactics. This club stmcture reflected the middle-
class, professional membership of the Kadets, and was not accessible to peasants and 
workers, despite PCadet intentions. In the downturn of political activity after 1907, only the 
St. Petersburg Kadet group retained strong political affiliations, and the provincial clubs 
faded; in 1911, there existed less than 50 provincial party organisations'*. The tenuous 
stmcture o f party organisation meant that the support of the Kadets was difficult to assess 
accurately, and made it difficult for the party to organise their 'membership' into an 
effective political force. 
The Kadets had their heyday as staunch opponents to the Tsarist regime in the State 
Duma, and were instmmental in the weakenmg of the Tsar's position^. Anin* suggests that 
the collapse of Tsarism, by taking away the ICadets' main opponent, also took away their 
cohering element. He implies that the Kadets were not radical enough to have looked 
beyond Tsarism. Certainly, they failed to adapt their long held policies and staunch liberal 
beliefs in the face o f a rapidly changing political system. Their political beliefs were so 
incompatible with the fashion for socialist ideals in 1917 that they were condemned to 
political irrelevance. 
An example o f the Kadets' patent inability to reform their policies rapidly can be seen by 
their response to the Febmary Revolution, and their policy towards the succession. When 
the members of the Provisional Committee went to Grand Duke Michael offering him the 
Regency on March 3"*, Miliukov was the most ardent advocate of a continued monarchy. 
He pleaded with the Grand Duke, suggesting that the new regime needed the legitimacy 
and authority ensconced in the Royal figurehead. This argument was entirely consistent 
^ Galai [1992] p. 90 
' Rosenberg [1974] p. 20 
' Rosenberg [1974] p. 22 
" Rosenberg [1974] pp. 22-24 
' For example, Miliukov's 'Is it stupidity or is it treason?' speech in November 1916 sent Shockwaves 
through Russia. For fiill text see Golder [1964] pp. 154-166 
* Anin [1967] 
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with the Kadets political philosophy, but confirms that the Kadets had not comprehended 
the onset of a new era. The mood of the Petrograd masses clearly eluded Miliukov. 
Trying to sweep the class issue under the carpet did not in any way make the Kadets 
classless. By refiising to acknowledge Marxist analysis of class relations, the Kadets 
sidestepped the fijndamental collision of interests between 'the exploiters and the 
exploited'. The Kadets did not seek any fiondamental social change, yet it is hard to see 
how this fitted in with, respectively, their vision of a democratic Russia and the huge mass 
of ill educated land hungry peasants, with whom they did not seriously concern 
themselves. The land issue was heavily demarcated by class. The Kadets were cautious 
about wide scale reallocation of land, but where it did occur, they insisted on 
compensation for the landlords. Compensation was resented by the peasants as an 
unbearable strain on themselves, and an unacceptable sop to the wealthy landlords, who 
would, one way or another, make the peasants pay. I t went against the peasants' most 
fiindamental belief about the land, which was that those who worked the land should own 
it. 
The BCadets were determined that the major issues facing the country, that is, the land 
issue, self determination for national minorities, and Russia's new form of govemment, 
could not be finally decided until the Constituent Assembly was convoked. There were 
long delays in the convening of the Constituent Assembly. The special council elected on 
March 25* to draft an elections statute did not meet till May 25*. The actual date of the 
elections was delayed repeatedly f rom the initial date of September 17* to the actual date 
of November 12* -14*. This two month delay must be cited as the deciding factor in the 
failure o f the Constituent Assembly; it was broken up by the Bolsheviks after a single 
session on January 5* 1918. Chemov identifies the decision to allow postponement of the 
Constituent Assembly as the Provisional Government's most serious mistake. 
In the light o f such urgency, it is surprising that the Kadets' attitude towards the 
convening o f the Constituent Assembly was rather haphazard. Lionel Kochan claimed that 
the Kadets were guilty o f deliberate delaying techniques, with the intention of benefiting 
their own party cause, and inadvertentiy opened the door for the successfijl Bolshevik 
coup^. Kochan implies that the Kadets felt that the delaying of the Constituent Assembly 
would be of benefit to them, without actually specifying what that benefit would be. Other 
accusations of this kind are broadened to include some right of centre SR's. Vishniak 
^ Kochan [1967] 
46 
MODERATE POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1917 
condemns such accusations as Bolshevik slander*. The account o f Miliukov, however, 
indicates that there is some validity in these accusations. In his memoirs Miliukov claimed 
that the Constituent Assembly was held back to allow for a lull in army operations, and to 
give the peasantry time to assimilate their new politically responsible condition'. The 
Kadets had no support amongst the peasantry, but were inclined to believe that the 
peasants were inherently conservative, and that once the peasants understood the political 
system, they would surely support the Kadets. The results of the Constituent Assembly 
elections show quite clearly that the Kadets gained no benefit f rom the delayed holding of 
the Constituent Assembly'". The charge that the Kadets deliberately delayed the 
convocation of the Constituent Assembly would seem to hold some validity, and as such is 
perhaps the most serious charge against any of the moderate parties in preventing Russia's 
transition to constitutional democracy. 
Miliukov's political maneuvering within the Provisional Government in his tenure at the 
foreign office accentuated his inability to comprehend Russia's new political climate. 
Miliukov's discordance with the popular mood culminated in the April crisis, sparked by 
his secret note to the allies regarding war aims, assuring them of Russia's unchanged 
position. Miliukov was unswerving in his determination to see Russia gain the strategically 
important Dardanelle straits and Constantinople. Goldenweiser" points out that 
maintenance of the war aims was strictly in accordance with allied treaties, and to forsake 
them would break the statesman's codes of diplomacy. Miliukov was following another 
central tenet o f Kadet belief, that Russia was a great power, and that Imperialist policies 
were perfectly acceptable in world affairs. Germany's only crime had been to resort to 
violent methods to pursue these legitimate policies*^. This theory did not sit easily with 
popular attitudes towards the war. One of the most potent weapons of the Bolsheviks was 
their attacks on the Provisional Government as motivated in the war by interests of 
financial gain to themselves and the bogachi, or wealthy, of the allied nations. This 
accusation held great w e i ^ t with the soldiers, who were heartily sick of the war, and 
enraged at the thought that they might be suffering and losing their lives for the sake of 
lining the pockets o f the rich'^. The imperialistic capitalism that was implicitly embraced 
by the Kadets was rejected by many of the seven million soldiers that fought the war. Not 
only were annexationist policies unpopular; they also ignored the perilous state of the 
' Radkey [1958] p 356 
' Miliukov [1967] pp.68-69 
'° See tables 7 and 8 summarising results of the Constituent Assembly elections, appendix, pp. 133-135 
" Goldenweiser [1957] 
Rosenberg [1974] p. 39 
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Russian army, which made even defence of Russia's borders problematic. I t was clear to all 
the men intimately connected with the Russian army that the war o u ^ t to be concluded 
as soon as was reasonably possible, i f the army was not to collapse altogether". 
Miliukov became something o f a thorn in Kerensky's side after his forced resignation at 
the end of April. I t is ironic that Miliukov, who repeatedly claimed to be a real statesman, 
did not see that the despised figure of Kerensky was not the major threat to constitutional 
democracy. Whilst Kerensky struggled to bring together in coalition the divergent forces 
of left and right, Miliukov continued to snipe at Kerensky and the coalition, thus damaging 
any attempts at uniting the moderate front against the forces of extremism. Whilst Kadets 
continued, in varying degrees, to form a significant proportion of the Provisional 
Govemment^^, their refusal to make any significant political compromises with the parties 
of the left was a major contributing factor to the failure of the coalition govemments'*. 
Despite remarkably similar policies to the moderate left on all areas except the land 
question, Miliukov castigated the parties of the left, and accused them of bringing Russia 
to ruin'^. Radkey categorises the second coalition as one of opportunities lost, when 
constructive measures could have secured the situation, but with the Kadets acting as i f 
there was no revolution^'. 
The Kadets remained staunchly committed to the policy of political legitimacy throughout 
1917, continuing to cling to it even after the Bolshevik seizure of power in October. The 
arrest o f Panina, a leading and very popular Kadet, and her public trial in which the ICadets 
felt themselves thorou^ly vindicated, only heightened Kadet confidence that it was only a 
matter o f time before the temporary aberration of Bolshevism gave way before political 
legitimacy and the force o f public opinion. They simply did not grasp that the Bolsheviks 
were no longer paying any heed to the legal restraints that the Kadets so revered. Only the 
murder o f Kokoshkin and Shingarev in Bolshevik custody, and the dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly on 5* January, persuaded the Kadets to reject flirther constitutional 
attempts at influencing power, and instead to turn to what was by then the only 
alternative; civil war. 
" For example VOSR, avgust, doc. 121. 
'''For evidence, General Alexseev and General Lukomskii's reports on the state of the Russian army in 
mid-March, Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc's 809-10, pp. 923-5 
" See table 1 on Provisional Government membership, p. 20 
'* Rosenberg [1968] 
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The Kadets seriously considered support of General Komilov in his plans to put down 
the insurgent Bolsheviks, and establish a new 'strong' government. Chernov maintained 
that Miliukov was 'the centre of all political and civic support for the Komilov plot' ' ' . 
Whether or not this is the case, the Kadets gave the matter considerable thou^t , and it 
opened fissures in the party. In a meeting on August 20*, the issue was discussed, and 
whilst Shingarev pointed out the danger o f polluting the party's record by association with 
a military coup, Tyrkova said, 'there is no way out; only t h r o u ^ blood'^". The Kadets did 
not really resolve this key issue, and remained ambivalent, with the result that Komilov 
acted with the expectation o f some political support, but received very little. The blank 
page on the Kadet newspaper Recb the day after the attempted Komilov rising indicated 
that the editorial was to have been a triumphant one, which was not appropriate to the 
climate after the failed rising. This was taken as evidence by the socialists of Kadet 
complicity. 
The Kadets can be fairly viewed as the dinosaurs of the Russian political scene. They did 
wield considerable influence in the political scene of 1917, as we can see from a cursory 
glance at the composition o f the five Provisional Govemments". Their rigid adhesion to 
the principle o f legitimate authority, however, meant that they failed to acknowledge the 
sense of urgency in 1917 over the land question, the war and the minority nationalities. 
This is best shown in their stalling o f the Constituent Assembly, coupled with their 
determination that the major issues could be decided only by that body. Their weakness in 
1917 was inherent, and came f rom their rigid liberal-capitalist policies, and their inability to 
be acceptable to the Socialists that were'their bedfellows in the Provisional Government. 
The Socialist Revolutionary Party 
The Socialist Revolutionary Party originated in the populist movement of the 1870's, and 
existed as a party f rom 1904, but did not adopt a party programme until 1906, at the first 
party conference in Finland. This programme, formulated by Chernov, was never more 
than a declaration o f principles, and did not go into the detail of how the programme was 
to be implemented. The basic tenets of the programme were socialisation of the land, 
expropriation o f the land without compensation, and a federal republic state. The 
organisation of the party was based in the provinces mitially, with the Saratov Peasants' 
" Riha [1967] p. 118 
^°Riha[1967]p. 118 
'^ See table 1 on Provisional Government membership, p. 20 
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union its first head^ .^ The party organisation expanded very rapidly, and a Central 
Committee was established as the head of the party. There were no oganisations, however, 
to bridge the gap between the local committees in the provincial capitals, and the Central 
Committee at the top. This made the party organisation very weak, and almost impossible 
to mobilise and control effectively. The breakdown of the SR Party organisation in 1917 is 
unsurprising in this respect. 
The disunity and heterogeneity that was to be inherent in the SR party was spelt out by the 
party's chief theorist Chemov in 1901, 
'Every vital developing social movement which comprehends reality according to local conditions 
of strength cannot expand without certain programmatic and tactical disagreements. Moreover, 
these disagreements may rightly be called the moving force to develop a party programme. A party 
must be able to guarantee to its members in each given moment freedom of opinion, fiill freedom 
of speech in defining their tactics [while] uniting with this fiill discipline to act in the completion of 
those [tasks] accepted by majority decision. The party must be organised democratically.'^ 
In 1917, this moving force o f disagreement was to crush the party's chances of being a 
significant force. The range of political opinion within the SR's was bewildering; they went 
f rom the staunch defensists and moderates on the r i ^ t like Mark Vishniak and 
Breshkovskaia, to the extreme left who drifted to the Bolsheviks from the First Party 
Conference in March onwards. The focusing issue of this discord was the war. Many of 
the far left favoured more extreme internationalism, that is, that the working people of all 
nations should unite, and reject the war effort outright. They saw the war in essentially 
class terms, as the wealthy capitalists o f all nations abusing the toiling masses. This view 
was essentially irreconcilable with the centre and the right of the party, where views ranged 
f rom patriotic defencism to moderate international defencism, which accepted the 
involvement of the class issue, but maintained the need to defend Russian soil. 1917 saw a 
desperate struggle on the part of the party apparatus to keep these conflicts under wraps, 
and prevent an open party split. 
The other main defining issue for the SR's was the land issue, on which their party's 
support was based. The SR's are commonly described as a party for the peasants; its 
origins were in populism, and the linchpin o f the party and of its popularity was its 
championing o f the cause that the land should belong to those who worked it. The 
Bolsheviks claimed that this policy was forsaken in 1917, for the sake of a share in the 
'bourgeois' Provisional Government. The schisms wi thb the SR's make this claim hard to 
deny. Certainly those on the r i ^ t had accepted the coalition as an end and not just a 
Radkey [1958] p. 53 
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means, and had concomitantly postponed the idea of a social revolution which would 
come about by the reapportioning of land. Many others within the SR party remained 
committed to the principle o f social revolution and the fulfilment of a radical land policy. 
Chernov is an example of one who remained committed to these principles, though this 
did not translate into action when he was a member of the Provisional Government. 
The SR's had been crushed by the activities of the Okhrana after 1905, and many of their 
activists were in exile, where some of them became more remote from the realities of 
Russia. They lacked leaders that possessed the levels of charisma and political acumen 
required to guide them t h r o u ^ 1917. This is reflected in the tendency of the SR Soviet 
deputies to follow the lead o f the gifted Menshevik Tsereteli. Radkey described Gotz, 
Boldyrev, and Livshits, the SR leaders in the Soviet, as 'hopelessly outclassed' by the 
Menshevik leaders^ '*. The SR's lacked a suitable individual to lead the discordant party. 
Chernov's abilities were considerable, but he lacked the political acumen necessary to 
capture both public affection and political loyalty. One could forward Kerenskj' as a 
potential popular leader of the SR's. His fat Okhrana file shows that he was a very active 
worker for the SR's before the revolution^. He had shunned party restrictions, however, 
in his attempts to create a cross party union, and as a result lost a good deal of his 
influence with the party; the loss of his seat on the party's executive body at the Third 
Party Congress was symptomatic o f the personal feuds raging within the SR's and also o f 
Kerensky's loss o f influence within the SR's. Also, both Kerensky and Chernov were the 
figureheads o f the rig^t and left of the party, respectively. I f the SR's were to remain one 
party, they needed a leader that could embrace both ends of the political spectrum. 
The centre and r i ^ t o f the SR party gained nominal authority over the rest of the party in 
1917, and theirs were the policy statements issued in the name of the SR's. Their 
commitment to the coalition, and to the war effort, meant that they turned to moderation 
on the land question, repeating Provisional Govemment policy that the peasants must wait 
until the convocation o f the Constituent Assembly for the reallocation of land. This was 
seen as betrayal by the peasantry, whose support for the SR's was based on their desire for 
land. Chernov's involvement in the govemment as Minister of Agriculture raised 
expectations, as Chernov was regarded as the peasants' champion. Chernov proposed 
three measures; the suspension o f the Stolypin reforms, the prohibition of all land 
transactions, and the placing o f all land under the control o f the regional land committees. 
Cross, [1967] pp. 356-357. 
''Radkey [1958] p. 136 
Abraham [1987] pp. 81-2. 
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The first was accepted, the second turned down on the grounds of economic disruption, 
and the third was not even considered by the Provisional Govemment. This exposed the 
weakness of the coalition; where changes were proposed that called for fijndamental 
alterations o f society, the more conservative elements resisted. Changes in land 
distribution would fundamentally alter the nature of Russian society, and this was 
something that the Kidets were unwilling to approve. 
Ministerial office exposed Chernov's limitations. Whilst he was clearly a talented theorist, 
he had little aptitude for the mechanics of legislation. He was active in writing articles and 
editorials, but devoted himself to this occupation, rather than to the business of 
govemment, even to the point of writing in cabinet meetings; 
'Sometimes Tsereteli would nudge him and say, 'Tlease listen Victor iVIikhailovich; this is 
important," to which Chemov would answer, "The editorial must be written, and, anyhow, I shall 
vote the way you do."^^ 
This casual attitude to the business of legislation did SR credibility serious harm. His 
impotence whilst a member o f the Provisional Govemment, t h o u ^ partly due to his lack 
of political allies within the govemment, was also a result of his inability to deal with 
practical politics. As well as the failure to implement any meaningftil land policy, Chemov 
was damaged when it emerged that the vote on the reintroduction of the death penalty 
was unanimous. The measure had caused constemation amongst the Petrograd Soviet and 
a broad swathe of SR's. By failing to vote against it as the party supporters might have 
expected, Chemov implicated the SR's directly in the death penalty's reintroduction. 
The SR Party enjoyed a level of popular support which gave them a significant majority in 
the elections for the Constituent Assembly^^. Because of this, they are the party looked to 
by wistful democrats as a potential alternative to the Bolshevik seizure of power, and 
subsequent civil war and authoritarian regime^'. What then, prevented the SR's fi-om 
utilising their phenomenal support and ushering b a new constitutional democracy for 
Russia? The Bolshevik seizure o f power doomed the Constituent Assembly from its 
inception. In theory, the SR's coalition with Kadets and Mensheviks in the Provisional 
Govemment should have assured its success until the convocation of the Constituent 
Assembly, on which it waited. This question raises a number of issues, among them the 
commitment and depth o f SR support, the disproportionate influence of the major 
Radkey [1958] pp. 333-4. This anecdote is the product of an interview Radkey had with Tsereteh in 
1949. 
See tables 7 and 8 showing results of the Constituent Assembly elections, pp. 133-135 
28 Anin [1966] p. 457 
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Russian cities on political events, and the wisdom of the SR decision to participate in the 
coalitions. 
The SR party won extraordinary support in the rural areas. I t is here that the problem of 
their actual influence becomes clear. Whilst the peasantry was immensely strong 
numerically, making up some 80% of the Russian populace, they were notoriously weak in 
political influence and awareness. Though it has been well documented^' that the peasantry 
had the capacity to act collectively and rationally in order to fijlfill their local political 
requirements, they tended to have less understanding o f and interest in the national 
political scene. Levels o f literacy were low in the villages, and the capacity to question, and 
to think in non-material concepts even lower'". Whilst the peasantry had the potential to 
make an enormous impact on national political life (the grain crisis being the most obvious 
example), it is difficult to find much evidence of the rural peasantry organising in an 
attempt to influence more abstract political life. The shortsightedness of the peasantry in 
relation to matters not directly concerning them is well known; they were unlikely to 
organise in an attempt to empower their political favourites. 
Further, one can begin to question i f the SR's were political favourites. Unlike the 
Bolsheviks, whose attempts to win the rural peasantry were relatively new, the SR's were 
descendants o f the Populist movement, which had worked in the villages since the late 
IBOO's, giving them a strong advantage in terms of familiarity. I t is easy to suggest that 
their support came f rom their long standing promise to give the peasants land, and from 
their long association with the village. There are reports, too, of crude recruitment 
techniques, whereby the whole village would be signed up as SR members, on the promise 
that 'When we get power, you shall have the land'''. Despite the apparent depth of 
support for the SR's in the villages, there is evidence that party ties were forgotten when it 
came to the crunch. Some reports tell of the peasants rapidly removing delegates on local 
committees i f they did not do exacdy what the peasants wanted. I t was less a matter o f the 
parties manipulating the peasantry, and more a matter of the peasantry manipulating 
individual party members'^. I f the peasants had been recruited to the SR banner by the 
promise o f land, then with the participation of the SR's in the Provisional Govemment, 
with no apparent progress on the land question, one can envisage that their support would 
melt away. 
' ' For example Figes [1989] pp. 30-61, Bukhovets [1988] 
°^ For example Gill [1978B] and Haynes [1997] 
Radkey [1958] p. 236 
32 Gill [1978B] p. 82 
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Because o f Russia's vast size, weak communications network, and large ill-educated rural 
population, the influence of the populations of Petrograd and Moscow on national 
political decisions was extraordinary. The difficulty for the SR's was that it was in Moscow 
and Petrograd that their support was lowest. They polled only 12% in Petrograd and 
Moscow in the Constituent Assembly elections, far lower than in any other region, whilst 
the Bolsheviks, conversely, had their greatest concentration of support in those cities. 
Having said this, while the SR's remained in coalition with the Mensheviks, as they did for 
most o f 1917, they retained joint control of both the city Soviets. The Bolsheviks gained 
control o f the Petrograd Soviet only when the alliance between the SR's and Mensheviks 
collapsed. The first all Russian Soviet conference cemented the alliance at the end of 
March, and there was very littie conflict between Mensheviks and SR's until the alliance 
finally foundered at the end of September. This offers another altemative to the Bolshevik 
seizure o f power. Even i f the alliance with Kadets in the Provisional Govemment was 
unviable, this socialist-popuhst alliance within the Soviet added an altemative dimension to 
the slogan o f Soviet power. For this to have been successful, however, the leaders of both 
parties would have had to initiate the transfer of power to them. The crisis for the 
Provisional Govemment in July showed that the means for a transfer o f power were 
available. But the SR leaders were committed to following the path of collaboration with 
the Provisional Govemment, and can be seen to have avoided power in 1917. There was 
an infamous incident during the July days when Chemov was seized by an angry crowd, 
and the cry was heard, 'Take power when its offered to you, you son o f a bitch!'. 
Chemov's life was saved by the quick actions of Trotsky, who retained composure, and 
released him f rom the mob^^. This incident sums up the reluctance of the SR leaders to 
take the political power their popular support made available to them. 
The Menshevik Party 
The Mensheviks were the leading force in the Soviet in 1917. Thougji the SR's 
overwhelmed them numerically, the exceptional leadership of Tsereteli, Chkheidze and 
Dan ensured that their policy was predominant. The organisation of the Menshevik party 
was however plagued with the same weaknesses and vagaries as the other moderate parties. 
The Mensheviks were originally part o f the Marxist Social Democrat party. At the second 
party congress in 1903, Lenin introduced a number o f measures aimed at restricting 
membership o f the higher echelons o f the party, and of preventing the membership from 
challenging the decisions o f the party leadership. These measures were vehemently 
See Sukhanov [1955] pp. 444-7, for an eye witness account. 
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opposed by the prominent Russian Social Democrat Martov, who was followed by the 
majority o f the Social Democratic party. Lenin had his proposals approved by the 
remainder o f the party at the truncated second conference, but astutely labelled his own 
group the Bolsheviks, meaning the majority, and those in the party who did not support 
him the Mensheviks, meaning the minority. The split in the Social Democrats was not to 
be healed, and each faction became a party in its own right. The Mensheviks had been 
formed in opposition to centralisation o f power, and became champions o f free discussion 
and decentrahzation. Whilst such sentiments were admirable the Mensheviks, like the SR 
Party, failed to construct a cohesive party structure, or to have significant cohesion in 
policy. This lack of cohesion was to afflict the Mensheviks with disunity and impotence as 
1917 progressed. 
The Mensheviks did have more cohesive policy lines than the SR's. They were agreed in 
the belief that Russia was an exceptional model, and dominated not by class struggle but 
by bureaucracy. The Russian peasant was underdeveloped, and was not ready for socialism 
in 1917. Any attempt to introduce it was premature, as the bourgeoisie had to develop 
politically and economically before socialism could be feasible. For this reason, Februarj' 
was regarded as a bourgeois revolution, and it was imperative that the Socialists did not 
attempt to gain power. The Mensheviks essentially stood by this belief in 1917, 
consistently refiising on the behalf of the Soviet the power that was offered it. Dual power 
was their acceptable interim measure, as reflected in the writings of Martov, Plekhanov and 
Axelrod' ' . 
Initially, they pledged that the Soviet should not be involved in the Provisional 
Govemment, as its role was to supervise the bourgeoisie, and not to become entangled 
with them. They also held a long-standing antipathy towards the liberals, as a result of their 
Marxist origins, which had them view the liberals as their imperialist enemies. This made 
any collaboration difficult. The demonstrations provoked by the April crisis over war aims 
decided Tsereteli that the Provisional Govemment could not stand without assistance 
from the socialists, and in view of the extemal threat facing Russia, there was to be a 
temporary alliance o f enemies against a foreign enemy. This attitude was at the heart of the 
difficulties faced by the Provisional Govemment. 
The main problem with their attitude towards the Provisional Govemment was that the 
compromise with the liberals was always tenuous, and when placed under any strain, it 
disintegrated into open hostility. The irony of this was that the basic policies of the Kadets 
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and the Mensheviks often had similar aims. On the Nationalities question, for example, 
which caused the fall o f the first Coalition govemment with the Kadets' resignation on 
July T^, the basic aims of Kadets and Mensheviks were similar. Neither wanted a 
splintering of Russia, but were aware of the need for stronger local govemment, and both 
wanted to await the convening o f the Constituent Assembly for such matters to be 
decided. Yet these common aims could not prevent the respective party's factional 
attitudes f rom coming to the fore. The Kadets resigned in frustration, and Tsereteli tried 
to exclude them from the next coalition. Closer collaboration with the Kadets could have 
improved the viability o f the coalition, but this was a step that both sides seemed unwilling 
to make. 
The Komilov affair sealed the iU will between the coalition members. The apparently stark 
choice between a military coup for the restoration o f order, and continuation of the new 
revolutionary freedoms caused a polarisation between the parties. The Mensheviks fled to 
the political left, where aided by Bolsheviks and SR's, they hastened to defend the 
revolution^^. The Kadets, as we have already discussed, responded uncertainly, which 
created even greater mistmst amongst the socialist camp. From being dubious bedfellows, 
the Kadets became untenable ones, and the Provisional Govemment coalitions after 
August were in name only, as the Mensheviks shied clear of any collaboration with the 
Kadets. The Komilov affair resulted in making the coalition quite unfeasible. 
Tsereteli, who was the leader o f the Menshevik party in 1917, was an exceptional politician 
in many ways. He was an outstanding orator, and had the ability to mix with men of 
different political loyalties. He was the defining factor for the Mensheviks in 1917, and 
held the Menshevik party together, ensuring that it led the Petrograd Soviet. In some 
respects one can see that he shared some of Kerensky's more worthy characteristics; he 
was relatively young, yet understood that the coalition was essential i f Russia was to avoid 
civil war. Unlike Kerensky, though, he was calm and thoughtful, and his oratory carried 
intellectual clout. He had a number o f weaknesses as a political leader however. There were 
no real efforts made to strengthen the party organisation and to combat factionalism, or to 
increase mass membership. This meant that they lacked a solid support base from which 
to work effectively. The Mensheviks effectively disregarded the peasantry, but in Moscow 
and Petrograd, which should have been their stron^olds, they polled only 2% of the vote 
Basil [1984] p. 35 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, doc's 1284-1286, describe the Soviet reaction to the Komilov 
affair, the arming of the workers, and the release of Bolsheviks arrested for their part in the July days, 
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in the Constituent Assembly elections'*. Tsereteli's steadfast determination that Socialists 
should not have power in 1917 was not to be shifted by the changing political scene in 
Russia, and displayed a dangerous remoteness from the real political situation. 
The reaction of the Mensheviks to crises displayed a certain political naivete. Despite 
Lenin's open professions that he intended to seize power, they could not stomach any 
really harsh measures against the Bolsheviks. This is typified by their reaction to the July 
crisis. T h o u ^ they launched a bitter campaign in their papers against the Bolsheviks, many 
Mensheviks were reluctant to see Lenin punished, and could not accept that there was a 
danger f rom the left. Their attitude towards the working classes, their apparently natural 
followers, was ambiguous. Though they encouraged the working class to press for 
improved conditions and wages, and castigated factory owners, they chided those involved 
in the workers' control movement, sbce this was beyond what could be permitted within 
their theoretical structure. 
As with the SR's, Menshevik party disunity focused around the war. One can categorise 
four main streams of t h o u ^ t regarding the prosecution of the war. On the far r i ^ t was 
Plekhanov's group, which called for defeat of the Central Powers. Potresov's group 
favoured self-defence, encouraging socialists to support all defensive measures. The 
moderate Zimmerwaldists accepted that defensive measures were necessary, but called for 
a socialist peace. The extreme Zimmerwaldists, led by Martov, opposed all measures, like 
the war industry committees, that prolonged the war, even in the name of defence of 
Russia''. The Soviet 'Appeal to the Peoples of the World' was a compromise measure, 
which succeeded in uniting a wide swathe of Menshevik support. Whilst laying 
responsibility for the war on the shoulders o f the Imperialists, and calling for a prompt 
peace, it also emphasised the need for the defence o f Russia, which made it acceptable to 
the defencists and the moderate Zimmerwaldists. This apparently successftil compromise 
on war policy was only ever a veneer. The followers of Martov who confijsingly called 
themselves Menshevik internationalists became increasingly errant, and though they didn't 
actually break away f rom the body of the Menshevik party until after Lenin's seizure of 
power, theiy were a constant irritant to Tsereteli. The Mensheviks did pursue 
internationalist aims throughout 1917, though they met with scant success. The plans for a 
'* See tables 7 and 8 showing results of the Constituent Assembly elections, pp. 139-141 
Basil [1984] p. 36 
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Stockholm peace conference foundered, as Menshevik intemationalism proved inadequate 
to its task'l 
One begins to get a real feel o f the Mensheviks and their peculiar halfway position when 
studying the proclamations o f the Soviet. On the one hand, they congratulated the 
workers, soldiers, or whoever, on their new freedoms and dignities, but on the other, 
chided them, and asked for their obedience to the Provisional Govemment. And while 
they accused the liberals, or the capitalists, of being partiy to blame for the problems the 
country faced, they were co-operating with the self same liberals and capitalists within the 
Provisional Govemment. There was always a note of reserve in the Soviet support for the 
Provisional Govemment, as indeed the policy of the Soviet and the Mensheviks was that 
the Soviet should take the role o f a critical supervisor^'. Though Tsereteli saw that the 
Provisional Govemment could not survive without the support of the socialists, he 
perhaps overestimated the buoyancy of the Provisional Govemment and its ability to be 
criticised. Kerensky said of the pressure the Soviet exerted on the Provisional 
Govemment; 
'Conscientiously executing the part of a kind of responsible opposition to the govemment, the 
Soviets never measured their own pressure by the weakness of resistance both of the broken 
administrative machinery and of tlie bourgeois classes, crushed by the weight of the fall of the 
1 > 40 
monarchy . 
The Menshevik Party programme was unimplementable in 1917. They desired the 
development o f the bourgeois phase o f the revolution. They recognised that the bourgeois 
liberals required the support o f the socialists i f the revolution was to continue at all. Yet 
they did not take the next step, which was that i f Russian democracy was to have a chance 
there had to be an agreement amongst the forces of society that were working towards 
that goal. And for all the differences in philosophy between the Kadets, the Mensheviks, 
and the SR's, they all wanted to have a Constitutional Assembly summoned, that would 
debate and resolve the issues facing Russia. I f this had been placed before empty theory 
and party affiliation, perhaps the coalition would have fared better. 
See pp. 39-43 on Menshevik led attempts for peace. 
Editorial in Izvestiia, March 29**", on the question of dual power, Browder and Kerensky [1961] 
[1961], 3, doc 1052, pp. 1218-9. Another excellent example of the confused stance of the Soviet with 
regard to Provisional Govemment policy is the Izvestiia editorial which urges that economic demands be 
made by labour with the resumption of work. This combined encouraging worker militancy with a 
request to retum to work. [Browder and Kerensky [1961], op cit, 2, doc 609, pp. 709-10] 
Kerensky [1932] p. 14 
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Conclusions 
The three moderate parties all foundered partly as a result of their lack of coherence and a 
firm party organisation and discipline. I t is clear that for the socialists, the effects of years 
of underground organisation damaged their chances of proving an effective force in 1917. 
As for the Kadets, their organisation o f gentlemen's clubs could not possibly provide the 
sort of assertive leadership and unity required to challenge the Bolsheviks. All three parties 
lacked experience o f coalition politics, and in compromising their principles. The two 
socialist parties saw the need for coalition politics in 1917 i f civil war was to be avoided, yet 
were unable to reconcile their differences constructively. One gets a feeling from all three 
parties that there was too much doctrine and not enough practical politics. A more 
unforgivable aspect, though, was the degree to which personal enmity interfered with 
political life in 1917 and obscured certain political necessities. 
This brief study of the moderates does offer some alternatives to the Bolshevik coup. The 
SR-Menshevik alliance, which was strong between March and September, had the 
potential to prevent the Bolsheviks f rom gaining control of the Soviets, and to bring 
together the popular support of the SR's and the mature leadership of the Mensheviks. 
The inability o f the moderate socialists to recognise or respond to 'a threat from the left' 
made them very vulnerable to Lenin's machinations. 
Miliukov and the Kadets emerge as a real spanner in the works of effective coalition. 
Although they had the greatest political experience, their policies were so far from those of 
the socialists that reconciliation on certain key issues seems impossible. They would not 
accept radical social change that was surely inevitable in 1917, preferring to cling to their 
old principles of legitimacy and constitutional democracy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Military Crisis in 1917 
The Provisional Govemment's most significant inheritance from the Tsarist regime was 
the war. The war had bearing on every conceivable area o f pohcy, and severely restricted 
the Provisional Govemment's scope for making any immediate improvements in the lives 
of most Russians that could have afforded the new govemment a measure of goodwill. 
Instead, a l thou^ ground breaking legislation in terms of human r i ^ t s were enacted, 
Russia's new govemment spent most o f its time tussling with the problems that the war 
burdened Russia with including, critically, the legacy o f the previous administration and the 
composition and political mood of the army. The govemment was essentially at an 
impasse between the demands f rom the newly revolutionized army to retain its new found 
rights and freedoms, and the expectations of the general staff that the govemment had to 
take stem measures to restore military discipline. To step too far from either set of 
demands was to risk plunging into the mire o f civil war that Kerensky and his govemment 
sought to avoid. 
Logistical problems of the war 
Britain declared war on Germany on 4* August, and Russia, as her ally, promised a 
mobilisation of unprecedented speed. This was achieved, but at the expense of the recruits 
receiving in many cases only the most perfijnctory training. There were a number of 
serious logistical problems associated with the running of a modem war that were peculiar 
to Russia\ 
Russia faced a total blockade on trade. With the westem frontier and the Dardanelles 
closed, Russia had no ice-free sea port in the first months of the war. The railway link to 
Murmansk was not constmcted until autumn 1915, so until then all foreign trade had to go 
through Vladivostok. In autumn of 1914, exports fell by 99%, and imports by 97.5%^ All 
domestic industry had to be converted for military production in order to flimish the war 
' Kerensky [1930] pp. 503-507 
2 Kerensky [1930] p. 504 
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effort, and this led to a trade break between town and country'. Unable to buy the goods 
they wanted, the peasants were increasingly reluctant to part with their grain. The evidence 
shows that the peasants ate more grain and fed their animals better in the years 1915-17. 
This food crisis in the towns was exacerbated by army consumption; in 1916 the army 
consumed 17 million tons of grain, a figure which was two thirds of total pre-war 
consumption"*. One can estimate a similar proportion o f consumption in meat, fats, sugar 
and leather. The prohibition of vodka sales deprived the treasury of one third of its 
revenue, as vodka sales were a state monopoly, and gave the peasants fijrther cause to keep 
their grain. With no vodka to buy, the peasants, and even the soldiers, in one account^ 
used their grain in illicit stills to assuage their thirst. 
Russia's weak infrastructure was accentuated by the blockade. The railways, althougji 
greatiy expanded since the 1880's, were limited, and the amount of rolling stock was 
insufficient for transporting vast numbers of troops and supplies around Russia. As the 
rolling stock was wom out, there was no way of acquiring replacements. An extra strain on 
the rail network was the fijel shortage. Pre-war, Petrograd metal factories had fijnctioned 
on coal imported f rom England. Supplies were utilised f rom the Donets basin to evade the 
blockade, but the transportation o f this coal only placed fijrther strain on the rail network*. 
There were no telephone Imes established, and few telegraph lines, making rapid 
communication between commanders very difficult, and as the roads were very patchy, 
commanders often had to rely on dispatch riders to get their messages t h r o u ^ . This was 
slow and unreliable. These very simple factors were major problems for conducting a large 
modem war over a very broad front. The difficulties with the railways meant that 
movement o f troops was slow and inefficient; troops often had to cover great distances on 
foot, which sapped morale and strength. Just as critical was the movement of supplies for 
the troops and fodder for the horses, which was seriously impeded'. 
Profile o f the Soldiers 
Whilst these logistical considerations are important factors in assessing the difficulties 
faced by the Provisional Govemment in administering the war, their problems focused 
^ See chapter 2, pp, 35-39, for details of the consequences of the trade break. 
" Kerensky [1930] p. 506 
^ Wildman [1987] ,2, p. 144 
* Kochan [1966] p. 171, details figures of coal production in Russia, and states that prior to the war the 
govemment had run down rail expenditure, so that by 1916 there were fewer locomotives than at prewar 
levels, and carriage production was at 60% of pre war levels. 
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around the response of the soldiers involved in the war to the situation they faced. In 
order to assess this adequately, it is important to know who these soldiers were, and what 
motivated them in 1917. 
The sheer numbers o f men mobilised during the Russian campaign are mind boggling. 
Estimates vary, but Wildman estimates a total mobilisation figure of 15.3 million^ Another 
estimate puts the figure at 13.7 million mobilised by April 1917, adding to a peacetime 
army of 1,423,000 ,^ making a total of 15.123 million. O f these troops, the casualties, 
including those captured, are estimated at between 6 and 7 million. This casualty rate was 
unprecedented in any o f the other combatant armies'". The rapidity and relative ease of 
the mobilisation has been cited as evidence of peasant enthusiasm for the war". The 
weight of evidence, however, suggests that the general attitude to the war was sullen 
resignation, with Oskin characterising the young soldiers as lighthearted and indifferent, 
and the older men as depressed. There was no open rebellion, but there was a general 
reluctance'^. 
There are inherent problems in trying to categorise the motivations and mentalities of over 
15 million men. The 'grey masses' were not after all, a single homogenous mass, but men 
drawn f rom all over the empire, holding a bewilderingly wide range of desires and 
opinions. Despite this difficulty, one can establish some common ground amongst the 
mobilised men, and look for the basic driving forces within them that were to shape their 
reactions to 1917. This chapter will deal with factors with direct bearing on the events of 
revolution, and avoid the factors which , though significant in the decline of Tsarism (such 
as the Rasputin affair) did not effect the Provisional Govemment's tenure. 
I t is clear that the First World War was an unprecedented drain on Russia's manpower, 
and that it drew not just on the youth one traditionally associates with call up, but on the 
older generation, men who were veterans of the Russo-Japanese war, and did not, perhaps, 
expect to be called up again. The figures below show that reservists, territorials and 
exemption holders were in a substantial majority of the mobilised men. 
^ Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, pp. 647-652, doc. 561, as one example 
^ Wildman [1987], 1, p. 52 
'Meyendorff[1932] p, 16 
'"Wildman [1987] ,l,p. 84 
" For example Ferro [1972] p. 4; describing the mobihsation in glowing terms, with the Russian 
soldiers 'as one in their desire to defend their native soil'. 
''Wildman [1987] ,1, p. 76. 
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Table two, showing ages of enlisted men 
Age range Class number 
24-26 peacetime- pre 1914 1,400,000 
18-24 enlisted 1914-1919 4,200,000 
27-40 Reservists 8,100,000 
20-43 Territorials and exempt 6,400,000 
One can reflect that Japanese war veterans were particularly threatening to the morale of 
the troops; they had been involved in Russia's major and humiliating defeat, and no doubt 
carried tales o f inept leadership and defeat. There was widespread dissatisfaction amongst 
the older men about having been called up. In the protests in Petrograd in the first few 
days o f July, there was a specific contingent of 40 year old servicemen demanding 
discharge^\ In May, the Provisional Government authorised leave for the over 40's to help 
in the fields, and released the over 43's^ '*. For Kerensky to have released them on the eve 
of the great planned offensive is an indication of the persistence of their demands, or of 
senior incompetence. This measure had potential to win the Provisional Government 
some measure o f support, but was frustrated by the placing of restrictions on the number 
of men who could be away from any company at one time. The chaos of competitive 
demands to be released must have caused a nightmare of administration for the officers, 
and no doubt fostered ill will at the inequity o f the measure. 
Due partly to the speed of the mobilization, the training of the new recruits was skeletal. 
New recruits were given just six weeks o f training, and reservists, even the older ones, were 
often simply issued some equipment and put in marching order. This had a number of 
implications. Bushnell'^ suggests that the Tsarist army was ineffective as a militarising 
force, and that in the garrisons one could see echoes of the peasant communities the 
soldiers had come from. The perfunctory training men underwent in the First World War 
meant that the already sketchy militarisation, which was critical in forming the peasant 
Browder and Kerensky [I96I], 3, p, 1336 
Wildman [1987] ,2, p. 367 
Bushnell [1980] 
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masses into soldiers that would obey orders unquestioningly, was impaired. This alone 
places serious doubts on the arguments of scholars like Ferro" and Ashworth*' who argue 
that the actions o f the soldiers in 1917 were defined by their militarized, coherent nature. 
A second implication was that men were going into battle ill-prepared, unaccustomed to 
military drills and orders, with boots that were not yet worn in, and without the narrow 
mind required of a professional soldier in obeying orders and ignoring his own discomfort. 
There were instances o f soldiers being trained and sent to the front without rifles*'. The 
lack of formal militarisation was a major factor in the rapidity of the deterioration of 
military discipline. 
The first few months of the war betrayed the Tsarist government's absolute incompetence 
and lack o f fores i^ t in the requirements of a modem war. There were very serious supply 
problems, with armaments, with food and supplies, and with boots and clothing. Thougji 
the voluntary organisations, headed by the War Industries Committee, did much to 
remedy the situation, so that by the June offensive of 1917, the army had unprecedented 
amounts of weaponry and ammunition, the mental scar left on soldiers asked to figjit with 
only one round of ammunition, or with no gun at all, must have been severe. The 
relationship between command and the troops had to be based on an element of trust; the 
troops had to believe that the command would care for their needs, and ensure that they 
received what they required to live, and fight the war. The breakdown of supply so early in 
the campaign seriously damaged this trust relationship. An additional strain on this 
relationship was the numerous incidents of senior incompetence. The disastrous 
campaigns o f 1914, so poignantly described by Solzhenitsyn*', undermined faith in the 
abilities and the motivations o f the senior command. There were widespread rumours 
about the treasonous actions o f 'Germans in h i ^ places', a reference to Tsarina 
Alexandra and her coterie^". Although the abdication of the tsar removed 'that German 
woman' fi-om positions o f influence, the rumours of treason in higji places persisted when 
the actions o f officers or senior command were perceived to be deliberately 
incompetent^'. 
'*Ferro[1971] 
" Ashworth [1992] 
''Wildman[1987],l,p. 87 
Solzhenitsyn [1974] 
This suspicion was widespread, but can be typified by Miliukov's famous speech to the Duma, in 
which he repeatedly asked, 'Is this stupidity or is it treason?', a loosely veiled assault on the palace 
coterie. Full text of speech in Colder [1964] pp. 154-166 
'^ Wildman [1987] ,2, p. 191 
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The influence o f the national minorities in the army is difficult to quantify, but as 45% of 
the Tsarist empire was non-Great Russian, the inclusion of non-Russians must be 
considered. White suggests that an attempt was made to distribute the national minority 
groups widely^^, but this was balanced by the volunteer forces formed from exempt 
nationalities, including the famous Caucasus Wild Divisions, which became a Bolshevik 
hotbed. There were also two Latvian brigades, and a Polish division, all of which became 
staunchly Bolshevik^^. Ferro comments on the demands o f the national minorities to be 
drafted into their own divisions after the revolution^'*, which supports the notion of local 
allegiances superseding garrison ties. Further evidence for the maintenance of local ties 
may be seen in the results o f the Constituent Assembly in November^, where the national 
minority parties gained in all some 14% of the vote f rom the armed forces. 
Regional mixing went on at an unprecedented rate as a result of mobilisation. There were 
twelve military districts, and each district had a huge network of garrisons usually centred 
around conurbations. Villagers were billeted in towns, ethnic minorities brought into 
urban centres, and Great Russians into the ethnic regions. Considering the basically static 
state o f Russian society in terms of people's movement^*, even in 1914, with 
industrialization progressing steadily, this was a tumultuous change to Russian society. 
Members of the garrisons brought their own local cultures, beliefs and grievances to the 
communities in which they were billeted, along with the bustie of military life. A two way 
social exchange went on, with the garrisons affecting the towns in which they were 
billeted, as the populations affected the members of the garrison. This factor must be 
given due consideration when considering the rapidly changing political climate and 
attitudes o f Russia in 1917. 
The Petrograd Garrison 
The interplay between garrison and host town was nowhere more significant than in 
Petrograd. Because o f the exceptional influence that this garrison had on national events in 
1917, its composition and motivations will receive special attention. A critical point for the 
H. White, [1992] p. 153 
Wildman [1987],I, p. 103 
Ferro [1971] p. 486 
See tables 7 and 8 showing results of the Constituent Assembly elections, pp. 133-5. 
Waldron [1997] p. 80 claims that the rural community was not static, citing the growth of cities and 
the migrations to Siberia. This interpretation is open to debate however, as the percentage of the 
community moving was still small when the 1897 census was taken; only one in seven was found to 
have been away from their birth town. Note too, that it was often difficult for peasants to break their 
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Provisional Govemment was whether it could have better secured the support of the 
Petrograd Garrison, which was to prove so influential in the power broking of 1917. 
Shliapnikov predicted that the key to success or failure of the workers' riots in Petrograd 
lay with the soldiers. The widespread mutinies of the Petrograd Garrison on Fehm^ry 27* 
were a turning point o f revolution; f rom being another hunger bunt, or riot of the 
Petrograd workers, the movement in Petrograd became a shifter of nations, toppling 
Russia's autocracy, and ushering in a new era in Russian history. Refusal of the troops to 
fire on the protesting .workers and mutinies in the barracks sealed the fall of Tsarism. 
Wildman estimates that the Petrograd Garrison numbered 180,200, with an additional 
151,900 stationed in the suburbs. O f the 180,200, the overwhelming majority [117,000] 
were reservists, made up mostly o f new recruits and recuperating veterans^ .^ Ashworth 
suggests that 30,000 o f these reserves were recovering veterans^', making the vast majority 
of the reserves new recruits. Several authorities refer to the large numbers of new recruits 
that had come f rom the ranks of the workers who had lost their exempt status through 
strike action^'. Thougii this element is hard to quantify, it was an example of the political 
shortsightedness o f the authorities. Placing radicalised workers into the garrison was surely 
the quickest way of ensuring a spread of radical ideas within the garrison, and enhancing 
soldier sympathy for the striking workers. 
T h o u ^ no accurate figures are available, the presence of the over 40's in the reserves is 
commented on frequently enough to make it a factor worth consideration. This age group 
were notorious for their hostility towards the war and their h i ^ desertion rate'". I t is 
important to note that many of the veterans were in Petrograd from the front to recover 
f rom wounds and illness''. Their low morale may have affected the new recruits, and 
increased their fears o f what lay ahead at the front. Ashworth's argument that the mutiny 
of the garrison was based upon military responses, the use of wartime tacit truce 
experience, and o f the strong bonds felt between men training and fitting together, is not 
supported by these figures. The camaraderie and group co-operation that Ashworth cites 
links with the commune; in 1902, roughly 90% of industrial workers in Moscow were legally peasants, 
(in Johnson [1976] p. 652 ) 
Wildman [1987] ,1, p 124-5 
Ashworth [1992] p. 457 
Wildman [1987], 1, p. 157, and Sukhanov [1955] p. 37, claimed that' there were great numbers of 
politically conscious and party elements in all the units of the Petrograd garrison'. Though there is no 
direct reference to formerly exempt workers, here, I suspect it was an allusion to it, for the party 
elements were chiefly to be found among workers. 
'° Wildman [1987] ,l,p. 157 
'^ Schapiro [1984] p. 37 
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as evidence for his theory can be explained by group mentality and the mutineers' fear of 
reprisal causing them to cling together in large numbers, as a sort of collective 
responsibility. 
Some commentators^^ have su^ested that had the officers acted decisively and boldly, 
widespread mutiny could have been averted. The evidence rebuts this proposal. There 
were strong reasons for the partiy trained peasants in greatcoats to have refijsed orders to 
fire on unarmed civilians, and to rebel against the discipline which held them in place only 
nominally. The ease and rapidity with which the mutiny spread is a reflection on the fallacy 
of discipline in the corps. I t demonstrates that any show of obedience and discipline was a 
facade, which when threatened by orders the troops were unwilling to obey, simply 
crumbled away. The actions of individual officers were ineffective against this tide of 
revolt. The heroic, but ultimately doomed stand of the Bicycle Battalion does not, as 
ICatkov^^ su^ests, display the potential for the success of brave and f o r t h r i ^ t officers; 
rather, it shows that such gestures were gestures alone, and fiitile m the face of the flood. 
Further evidence o f the ineffectiveness o f good leadership in the midst of the mutiny was 
that o f General Kutepov who, fresh f rom the front, was sent by Khabalov, the district 
commander, to restore Petrograd to order. He started the day with a group of disciplined 
men, and when he saw large groups o f soldiers milling about, clearly undecided about the 
course o f action, he successfially enjoined them to accompany him. As the day progressed, 
however, his new recruits melted away into the swirling crowds, and he saw the necessity 
to return to barracks at once before his own men, t h o u ^ t to be loyal, succumbed to the 
temptations of joining the milling crowds^ "*. 
The Petrograd garrison's mutiny was important on the basis that it led the workers' 
demonstrations f rom insurrection into revolution. The garrison's importance took on a 
whole new aspect, however, when considering its influence on the political decisions taken 
in Petrograd. Kerensky was unique among the Duma members, in that he recognised 
immediately the significance of the soldiers, both in the making of the revolution, and its 
maintenance. I t was Kerensky that called on the troops to assemble at the Winter Palace, 
thus identifying the Duma with the newborn revolution. T h o u ^ other Duma members 
were rather sneering, asking him throu^out the 27* February, when Tiis' troops would 
For example Katkov [1967] pp281-2, p. 277; states that the officers did not act, the impUcation being 
that had they acted, the mutiny could have been averted. 
Katkov [1967] p. 275 
Wildman [1987] ,1, pp. 148-50. Full account in Katkov [1967] pp. 278-80, taken from the memoirs of 
General Kutepov. 
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arrive, arrive they did, albeit on the following day'^. Their presence was to give the 
Provisional Govemment a good measure of its authority. The events had shown, after all, 
that the power brokers, for a few hours at least, were not the politicians and the generals 
desperately negotiating with the old regime, but the 'grey masses', the people of Petrograd 
in the streets. In this sense, for a short while, the Petrograd Garrison can be said to have 
truly made this revolution a revolution o f the people. That said, the soldiers who cluttered 
the once exclusive halls o f the Winter Palace were not reliable guardians of the young 
revolution. Kerensky, quick to seize on the moment when he greeted the first surge of 
troops, welcomed them as the protectors of the revolution, and selected some to guard 
the Palace" ,^ but they were soon swept away by the incoming waves of soldiers. 
The concern that the revolutionary troops would not be disciplined enou^ to protect 
their revolution prompted Kerensky to enlist the help of Sokolov in the newly formed 
Soviet, who recommended Mstislavskii and Fillipovski as SR officers that could organise 
some sort of defence'^.The Petrograd Garrison wielded its political mig^t at an early stage. 
The Soviet, initially called the Soviet o f Workers' Deputies, quickly came alive to the need 
of the support of the soldiers, causing them to call for the election of soldier deputies to 
its ranks. The hostility towards the officers expressed by these deputies, along with the 
need o f the Soviet to win support and to have some military backing for the new 
revolution saw the rapid evolution o f order no. 1. This order legitimised the radical 
changes that had taken place m Petrograd, and initiated a new era of soldier-officer 
relations, including the abolition o f saluting and formal address, the recognition of the 
soldiers' rights to form committees and be treated respectfijUy by their superiors, and their 
fiill citizens' r i ^ t s when o f f duty. A critical factor, though, was that it was addressed solely 
to the troops o f Petrograd, and stated that they would not be sent to the front, but that 
they would remain in Petrograd as guardians of the revolution. This, essentially, granted 
the Petrograd Garrison its primary demands, something that was perhaps necessary to 
gain the political support the Soviet required. What made order no 1 earth shattering 
however, was that it was printed in large numbers and sent t h r o u ^ the whole army, which 
despite Order no. 2 trying to limit its content to Petrograd, legitimised the revolutionary 
changes in the whole army. 
Kerensky [1927] pp. 8-14 for a rather breathless account of events as Kerensky saw them. Whilst 
lacking breadth of vision, this account serves to give some insight into the heated pace of events. 
36 
31 • 
Kerensky [1927] pp. 14-15 
Mstislavskii [1988] pp. 33-34 
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Provisional Government policy 
The Provisional Government faced a difficult situation from the very beginning. They 
were aware o f the general need for peace, but were compelled, by their commitments to 
the allies, by the real external threat Russia faced, and by the demands of patriotism, to 
continue the war until victory. From the earliest days, there was pressure over what terms 
this victory should be under. This conflict precipitated the first real crisis for the 
Provisional Government in April , over Miliukov's note to the allies assuring them that 
despite the Provisional Government and Soviet declarations on revised war aims, Russia 
would hold firm to the secret treaties agreed with the allies. The publication of this note 
provoked a flurry o f demonstrations in Petrograd. I t was particularly significant for the 
soldiers, since it was the first mistake on the part of the Provisional Government, and left 
them wide open to Lenin's claims that the Provisional Government was using the war for 
the pursuance of their own gains, at the expense of the toiling masses^ *. This encouraged a 
move o f soldier loyalty towards the Soviet, which , as the body instigating order no. 1 and 
issuing the statement of revised war aims, 'without annexations, indemnities or 
contributions', was increasingly identified as the body which protected soldiers' interests. 
The 'Soviet Appeal to the Peoples o f All the World, and the Resolution of War Aims^'' is 
a useful illustration of the way in which political statements were misunderstood. The 
declaration was taken by some to mean that the Soviet had declared defensive warfare 
only, leading to mistrust o f the officers, who the men felt were misleading them in 
attempting to get them to make any advance''*'. Whether this misreading of the meaning 
was deliberate or inadvertent is hard to assess, but one must bear in mind that the peasant 
population had generations o f experience in interpreting official measures to their own 
advantage. 
The most notorious piece of legislation credited to the Provisional Government is, o f 
course, order no. V\ This legislation was actually published before the Provisional 
Government was in formal existence on March 3"^ ; it was issued by the Soviet on March 
r ' , and was intended to apply only to the Petrograd Garrison. Whilst one cannot deny that 
the contents o f order no. 1 were far reaching, it was not as significant as the generals 
VOSR, avgust, doc. 121, for example. 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, p 1076, doc. 941 
40 Gaponenko [1968] p. 42 
See Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc's 744-7 for details of order no 1 
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asserted. The generals and the r i ^ t wing generally''^ blamed the order for the collapse of 
discipline in the army, but the only way of preventing this collapse of discipline at the 
front would have been to totally isolate the front from the news of the new situation at 
the rear. This was patentiy not possible. The situation at the front was already demoralised, 
with levels of fraternisation and desertion rising, and the news of the revolution, once its 
fijU implications were established, could not fail to revolutionize the relations between 
officers and men. The officers, after all, were the representatives of the Tsar in the field, 
and the war that they fought was widely recognised as the Tsar's war. When the potent 
symbol of Tsarism fell, what was left to keep the soldiers in obeisance to the officers? 
Study of Provisional Govemment legislation in the early months of the revolution sees an 
attempt to ride the mood of the times, to harness support by legitimising the existing 
situation. The bill o f soldiers' rights is an adequate example of this damage limitation 
exercise; whilst saying littie that did not already exist about soldiers' r i ^ t s , it attempted to 
place restrictions on the freedom the soldiers enjoyed, leading the Bolsheviks to coin the 
phrase that it was the 'Declaration o f soldiers' ri^tiessness''*'. For example, article 14 
stated that in times of active engagement with the enemy, the officer had the r i ^ t to apply 
armed force i f necessary to ensure that his orders were carried out. That such a measure 
should be so fiercely resented in a time of active war is a reflection of the problems the 
Provisional Govemment faced in continuing an active war campaign. 
The decision abolishing the death penalty, however, was one which fitted not only the 
mood of the nation, but also the mood of the intelligentsia that framed it. For men like 
Kerensky, who had spent much of his adult life campaigning against barbarity of all kinds, 
it was highly satisfactory to have removed the death penalty. The problem was, of course, 
that this measure removed an element of compulsion from military discipline, which from 
a human r i ^ t s standpoint was a positive thing, but f rom the point of the generals was 
seen as a direct cause o f the deterioration of discipline. And certainly, i f the demoralisation 
of the troops was as bad as some sources suggest'^ , it would take nothing short of the 
death penalty to force the men to obey orders. 
''^  See the conference at Stavka on July 16* in which the commanding staff express their views, for 
example. Though the generals, particularly Denikin, refer to a number of matters, the general trend 
opposes the committee system and the relaxation of old measures of discipline embodied in order no. 
l.Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 875,pp. 989-101. Also, General Knox [1921] pp. 567, 572, 574-
6, and Tereschenko in Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, p. 1420 
Wildman [1987] ,2, p. 23 
VOSR, mai-iiun, pp. 336-7; a soldier's letter describing the troops' utter alienation, and the 
overwhelming demand for peace. 
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The committee system, which was legitimised by order no. 1, involved the election of 
soldier representatives to committees intended to monitor the wishes o f the troops, and 
took on a far more significant role than was intended by the Provisional Government, in 
some cases superseding the authority of the commanding officer. Initially, there was a lot 
of senior command hostility to the committees, which were felt to intrude on the 
prerogatives o f officers. Denikin, for example, claimed never to have cooperated with a 
committee, and was staunchly hostile to them'* .^ General Alexseev, however, was 
perceptive to recognise the committees as a source of support for the command structure, 
and suggested that officers, instead of resisting them, actually participate. This strategy was 
to prove remarkably effective in the months leading to the offensive in June, and the 
committee system became one o f the staunchest supporters of the June offensive. 
When Kerensky took over the portfolios of the War and the Army and Navy on May 5*, 
and Tereschenko replaced Miliukov as Foreign Minister, there was a definite change of 
tone, i f not of actual policy content. Kerensky played a double game, trying to reassure the 
allies that Russia would remain a leading force, the officers and the generals that he would 
strive to restore order, and above all, the ordinary soldier that the Provisional 
Government, embodied in Kerensky, was acting in their best interests, and appealed to 
them to defend her new Government and Russia, with their lives i f necessary. There are 
some real contradictions here, not least that the restoration o f army discipline that the 
military command required was at loggerheads with the needs of the soldiers to have their 
new ri^ts protected. These new r i ^ t s were precisely what the command objected to, 
attributing the collapse o f army discipline to the new regime. 
The June offensive was the linchpin o f Kerensky's policies as Minister o f War. The 
offensive had been promised to the allies, and was initially part of a plan for a joint 
offensive with the French. The big question was whether the disparate Russian troops 
would be capable o f reforming and going on the attack. Reports from the generals 
varied''*. Kerensky himself is widely attributed with having made the offensive possible at 
all. His tours o f the front, and tireless oratory, gave many officers the capacity to give their 
troops orders at all. Denikin suggested that Kerensky was in a state of 'self hypnosis'''^, 
not recognising the true rocky state of affairs. This is not altogether fair. He turned up. 
Wildman [1987], 2, 177 
''^ Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc's 808-814, pp. 921-928. These anomalies may be due in part to 
different generals reporting on different fronts, and also a political element; Katkov asserts that Brusilov 
foolishly supported Kerensky's bid for an offensive as he was anxious not to break with the government. 
(Katkov, [1980] p. 26) 
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gave his speech, won the apparentiy undying devotion of the men he addressed, and 
moved on''*, except in a few exceptional cases where there was organised Bolshevik 
dissent"*'. From the response he received, he would have every reason to believe that he 
had succeeded in galvanising the Russian front for an offensive. He was not fijUy aware 
that the power o f his oratory to sway the soldiers was only skin deep; the overwhelming 
drive for an end to the war overwhelmed his rhetoric. 
The offensive began on June 12*, and after initial success was hailed as a great victory. 
This was premature, however, as reserves refiised to relieve the men in new forward 
positions, and the endless meetings endemic on the front were renewed at every officers' 
order^°. I t is difficult to categorise the soldiers' resistance to the offensive, as it took many 
forms, but it is clear f rom the generals' reports and f rom the results of the offensive that 
resistance was widespread. There was some outright mutiny, while some units were 
unworkably rowdy. The only form of punishment available to the soldiers was 
disbandment, which was rarely used, and besides only distributed the rebellious elements 
more widely^'. The barrage o f disorder and mutiny in early July after the failure of the 
offensive initiated wide scale disarming operations, a real irony when only a month before 
the Govemment had pushed for offensive. 
The evidence shows that men were reluctant in the extreme to make any advances, citing 
the Soviet declaration on war aims as evidence that they had no business on foreign soil. 
Also, when retreating men hit Russian soil, they showed much more willingness to dig in 
and defend their motherland, than some unknown place. Here, Ferro's suggestion that the 
soldier masses were basically patriotic, in the sense that they wanted to defend their 
country against invaders, is supported. This essential patriotism conflicted in the soldier 
with suspicions that the war was not essentially about defending Russia, but about lining 
Heenan [1987] p. 104 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 851, pp.962-966, Sukhanov, p. 362-3 
Kerensky [1966] p. 282, for a poignant account of Kerensky confronting a so-called Bolshevik 
agitator, and successfully winning over the man's comrades, and shaming the agitator himself. Knox 
[1921] pp. 638-9, tells of a more unnerving incident when Kerensky, visiting the Southwestern front, 
addressed 6,000 of the 10,000 men of the 2°'' division of the guard, while the other 4,000 held a rival 
meeting, refused to listen to Kerensky, and chanted anti-war and anti-bourgeois slogans. 
°^ See Heenan [1987] chapter 8, for a detailed account of the offensive, and Wildman [1987] ,2, chapter 
3, for in-depth analysis of the forms of soldier resistance against the offensive. 
'^ Wildman [1987] ,2, pp. 73-104 
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the pockets of the rich^^ and that the senior command was not to be trusted as the 
organisers of the defence of Russia. 
The use o f Shock Battalions, that is, individuals or regiments who volunteered to lead the 
attack, had mixed results. Thougji the concentration of loyal forces did enable them to 
spearhead attacks effectively, they faced unusually h i ^ casualty rates because they were 
leading the assaults, which meant that the core of the Provisional Government's most 
loyal forces were wiped out. Kerensky had hoped to inspire a move towards the shock 
battalions by offering a special insignia to be worn on the sleeve, but there was littie real 
enthusiasm for the scheme; many shock battalion personnel were loyalist officers eager to 
escape the pressures o f their unruly troops. This policy is a good example of a Provisional 
Government initiative which was misguided; though aiming to strengthen the war effort, it 
actually had a negative effect in the army overall. 
The June offensive can be seen as a real turning point in the fortunes of the army. Its 
resounding defeat, and the criticism the soldiers faced in the bourgeois press, served to 
alienate them and look away from the committees, who had supported the offensive and 
the Provisional Government initiatives. This contributed to the disenfranchisement o f the 
soldiers, whose interests were no longer represented by the bodies that they had elected to 
represent them. Many examples o f this conflict can be seen in the literature on the period, 
where the delegations f rom the front spoke in Petrograd with resoundingly patriotic and 
upstanding tone, whereas the letters f rom the trenches imparted a tone of defeatism, 
bitterness and even despair". 
Army disintegration 
The response to the new legislation that hit the army after the February revolution has 
already been studied. The creeping insubordination of 1916 gave way to open refusal of 
orders, and the 'organising' o f the soldier masses. This statement may seem too broad; 
some regiments did remain loyal to their commanders, and maintained discipline. Those 
unchanged by revolution were in a minority however. Kerensky's vision for the army was 
that the army would be transformed, on the model of the French revolution, into the 
VOSR, avgust, doc. 244, p. 260; a soldier's letter accusing the Provisional Government of being in 
league with other European capitalists to gain whatever they can from the war. 
VOSR, avgust, doc. 244, p. 260. Compare this with reports of improved morale in the army in 
August, in Browder and Kerensky [1961], doc's 890-893, pp. 1026-1029. One may infer that the 
commissar sending such a report was being unduly optimistic. 
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great, free, Russian revolutionary army, with every man giving his all in the defence of 
Russia's newly won liberty. The evidence shows that Kerensky's optimism was misplaced. 
Heenan reports that on average, of drafted reinforcements trained in the rear in April and 
the first half o f May, between 137 and 215 out of 250 deserted^". This meant that few 
drafted reinforcements actually reached the front, though the transfers were a cause of 
great unrest and even mutinies in the rear. The rate of desertion is estimated to be much 
lower at the front than at the rear, but even there, based on General Lukomskii's estimate 
of 5-7 men per day per division deserting, i f extended to the whole army for March 1917 
this would amount to 100-150,000 men out of a front army of 7,500,000^^ In the early 
stages o f 1917, there was still a lot o f hostility felt by the men remaining at the front for 
deserters, where the mood was definitely defensive but not defeatist. There are accounts, 
too, o f deserters who returned to their village being beaten and sent back to their 
regiment. One can surmise that the attitude towards desertion became more lenient in the 
latter half o f 1917, when persistent rumours spread of imminent peace. What of the 
significance of these mass desertions? While they do indicate the mass dissatisfaction with 
the war, particularly at the rear, one should attribute them too much significance. After all, 
the revolution had engendered a massive turnaround in staff, which surely led to 
considerable administrative confusion. This made desertion for individuals relatively easy. 
I f the opportunity was there, it is hardly surprising that it was taken, and it reveals nothing 
exceptional about the Russian troops, except that they were reluctant to go to their deaths. 
Ferro asserts that individual desertion numbers are exaggerated, and that the desertion of 
whole regiments in order, while classified as desertion, was in fact a mutiny^^. He argues 
that group solidarity held firm, with the defence of mother Russia every man's foremost 
tiiou^t". 
Though the front initially saw littie desertion, Wildman points to the unusually hig^ rate of 
Russian prisoners of war, and suggests that surrender m i ^ t have been a form of desertion. 
There were some 2.4 million Russian prisoners of war, which make categorisation of exact 
numbers o f deserters difficult. He also points out the use of self mutilation and the 
overstaying of leave, which are not categorised as desertions but o u ^ t perhaps to be 
considered in the figures. This would make the overall rate of desertion from the front 
much higher. 
Heenan [1987] p. 72 
Wildman [1987] ,1, 235 
^*Ferro[1971]p. 511 
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The Germans made significant efforts to establish fraternisation and a 'virtual peace' on 
the Russian front. Accounts of how successflil they were vary; germanophobia restricted 
the success o f some of their initiatives, but in other areas of the front there was a cease-
fire o f sorts, particularly in April and May. There are numerous accounts of German 
agitators sent to Russian troops to negotiate with the troops and to try to convince them 
that the war was not for their beneflt^^ Bolshevik support of fraternisation is a 
controversial point as a l thou^ there is evidence that the mood of the troops was still 
defensive prior to the June offensive, other sources say that Pravda's declaration in favour 
of fraternisation on June 6* caused a stir, because it was a Russian paper, which gave its 
claims more legitimacy^'. I t is very difficult to quantify fraternisation, but from accounts of 
officers, letters f rom the soldiers, and German accounts of events, it was clearly a factor at 
the front prior to the June offensive. There are numerous examples of conflicts between 
the infantry and the artillery, as the artillery were used to disperse fraternisation*". I t took 
the Soviet some time to reach a position on fraternisation, as there was considerable 
appeal in the idea o f the working men linking hands over the trenches, but eventually the 
Soviet declared itself strongly opposed to fratemisation, as its commitment towards 
support o f the war hardened*\ 
The Provisional Govemment did frame a response of sorts to the problems of 
fraternization and desertion. In their 'Appeal to Deserters and Shirkers'*^ so characteristic 
of the many appeals for goodwill issued, the Provisional Govemment offered an amnesty 
to aJl deserters returning before May 15*, terms which were generous, and displayed the 
impotence o f the Provisional Govemment to actually do much about the problem. As, 
Kerensky said, the mechanics o f the state had crumbled along with the Tsarist regime, so 
that the Provisional Govemment had to 'replace police compulsion by moral conviction'". 
The soldiers at the front felt increasingly disenfranchised as 1917 wore on; the bodies that 
purported to represent them, the soldiers' committees, were increasingly dominated by 
defencist soldiers and officers who supported Provisional Govemment policy in 
continuation o f the war, yet in the trenches support for an immediate peace grew all the 
time. This ideological gap between soldier and committee fostered the growth of a 
" Ferro [I97I] p. 509 
Heenan [1987] pp. 92-95 
^'Heenan[1987]p.96 
*" Browder and Kerensky [1961] ,2, doc. 793 
*' Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 796, 'Appeal of the Soviet to the army to cease fraternisation'. 
Full text in Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 791 
Kerensky [1932] p. 12 
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phenomenon Wildman describes as trench bolshevism; that is the bowdlerized form of 
Bolshevism that became popular in the trenches. This form of Bolshevism was far from 
the doctrine of Lenin and Krylenko; rather, it adopted the motto for peace, and the 
hostility against the bourgeoisie, in which categorisation the Provisional Govemment and 
the coalition Soviet members were included. That the Bolshevism in the trenches was a 
hybrid can be seen by the wordings of declarations and letters from the front, which often 
included the doctrine and wording of the more traditional peasant party, the Socialist 
Revolutionaries. Heenan su^ests though that SR co-operation with the Provisional 
Govemment, and their support o f the continued war, was a major factor in the turn of the 
soldiers f rom them to the Bolsheviks, the only party apparentiy prioritising peace*''. The 
Command blamed reinforcements from the rear for spreading propaganda. Woytinsky 
suggests that the efforts to involve the men of the Petrograd Garrison in the June 
offensive was a major factor in the bolshevisation of the troops, as the Petrograd 
reinforcements arrived at the front full of Bolshevik rhetoric, and bitter about what they 
perceived as the broken promises of the Provisional Govemment and the Soviet. The 
disenfranchisement the front soldiers felt was mirrored in the Petrograd Garrison's 
relationship with the Soviet. 
Soldiers' Pravda ran some 50-60,000 copies, and was the staple influence of trench 
bolshevism. Rather than getting involved in detailed political argument, which was hard for 
the average soldier to understand, it addressed simple issues like 'The Land Question', and 
explained the situation and its Bolshevik solution simply. These articles encouraged class 
hostility, as they blamed the war on the machinations o f the hogachi, or the wealthy, in all 
the hostile nations, and in fraternisation saw an alternative to the bourgeois posturing on 
peace; let the working people on both sides o f the trenches lay down their guns and come 
to a sensible agreement. Such suggestions made sense to men exhausted by war and 
mistrustful o f their commanders. Accusations have been made that the Bolsheviks were 
financed by German money, and that Bolshevik activities were run in co-operation with 
the Germans. Though no doubt the German high command recognised an ally of sorts in 
Bolshevism, the evidence for German finance of the Bolsheviks has been questioned. 
Bolshevik action certainly weakened the Russian war effort; but it is difficult to establish 
proof o f any direct alliance with the Germans.*^ 
64 Heenan [1987] p. 128 
''^  Kerensky devotes a whole chapter to the Bolsheviks' German connections [1934], ch. 16. Lyandres 
[1995] has since constructed a detailed argument againsts these accusations. 
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The Officer Corps 
The officer corps faced a truly fearsome challenge when revolution rent the army in 1917. 
The new administration placed much emphasis on the abilities of the officers to come to 
terms with the new situations. In Yanushkevich and Filonenko's report on their tour of 
the front, conducted in March, they concluded**. 
In general our impression is excellent, and i f only the officers will manage to reorganize relations in 
accordance with the new principles- which is absolutely necessary- matters will be settled. In our 
opinion, the way in which the officer corps accomplishes its task is the most critical issue at the 
present moment.' 
I t is difficult to categorise the officer corps, not least because it changed its face so rapidly 
in the course o f the war. Russia began the war with 50,300 officers, and 30,500 reser^ -^ es*'. 
By 1917 there were 145,916 officers. There were an estimated 107,000 casualties amongst 
the officer corps during the war, which means that by subtracting the number of pre-war 
officers f rom the total o f casualties and number of officers in 1917, one can estimate a 
figure of 172,116 officers trained in wartime. This massive and rapid influx of new recmits 
brought in by the war changed the landscape of the officer corps dramatically. 
The truly frightening casualty rate, much higher than that of the men they led, is 
accounted for by the old fashioned practice which was continued in the Russian army of 
the officer leading his men on attack. I t was his role to lead the way, brandishing his 
useless sword and shouting 'Hurrah!' in a heartening fashion to inspire his men. Whilst 
such imagery has considerable romantic appeal, it meant the officers were slaughtered, 
open targets for enemy bullets, thus depriving the men of leadership and assistance, and 
the attack as a whole f rom any planned strategy. Subalterns in the British army in the First 
World War took on a similar role, and also suffered very h i ^ casualties. 
The professional military academies tried to maintain their pre-war standards, though even 
they had to reduce the formal education requirements to six years. This educational 
requirement kept these schools the preserve of the educated classes. Approximately 50,000 
officers were trained at these academies during the war, making up approximately 1/3 of 
all officers. Graduates f rom these academies could count on rapid military promotion. The 
majority of wartime trained officers were trained in hastily set up schools, whose recruits 
one can surmise were often soldiers recommended from the front for good service. Their 
requirement was for four years o f education. Kenez has a sample of 488 trainees from five 
** Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, p. 862 
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schools in the years 1914-17. The breakdown of their social background is quite revealing. 
O f this sample, only 13 had had more than six years of schooling, and most were aged 
between 20 and 25. The preponderance o f the lower classes is striking, and evidence that 
war offered prospects for social mobility as well as for death. The career of General 
Denikin is a good example of this, as he rose to the rank of general f rom humble peasant 
, 6 8 
origins 
Table three, showing social standing of officers trained in wartime schools 1914-
1917" 
Social category Number of trainees Percentage of whole 
Nobles 27 5.5% 
Honoured citizens 19 3.8% 
Merchants 2 0.4% 
Clergy 14 2.8% 
Meshchanstvo 134 27.5% 
Peasants 285 58.4% 
Cossacks 7 1.4% 
The poor showing of the nobles and middle classes is also notable. Although one may 
have expected them to have entered the military academies and not these schools, this still 
leaves them in a minority in the officer corps. Wildman points out the discrepancy 
between the 1,200,000 gentry and bourgeois sons available for service, and the mere 
200,000 in the officer corps. He suggests that many were involved in the administration 
machinery and the work of the voluntary sector™. These figures showing the background 
of the officers in 1917 illustrate that the popular image of an elitist upper class officer 
corps is thoroughly misleading. The officer corps had changed very rapidly in the war 
Jones [1976] p.21 
For more detail on Denikin, see Kenez [1974] 
69 Kenez [1973] 
Wildman [1987] ,l,pl02 
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years. Large numbers o f the junior officers were from a strata of society which was 
associated neither with the intelligenti traditions nor the professional officer schools, nor 
the old aristocracy. A significant proportion of the officers were of peasant stock. 
To further muddy the waters when attempting to categorise the officers and their actions 
by class is study o f which side the officers and NCO's joined when civil war broke out. 
The figures show that class analysis is clumsy here, as of 2,682 officers and NCO's in the 
volunteer army of Alexseev and Denikin, more than 1,976 had the rank of captain or 
lower, which meant that they were almost certainly recruited during the first world war. 
The some 8,000 officers recruited by the Red Army meanwhile, included a number of pre-
1914 men^\ This is further confused by the practice of both red and white armies of 
conscripting officers as well as peasants during the civil war. Sheila Fitzpatrick reports that 
'by the end of the civil war, the Red army had over 50,000 former Tsarist officers, most of 
them conscripted; and the great majority of its senior military commanders came from this 
group. To ensure that the old officers remained loyal, they were paired with political 
commissars, usually communists^^'. The element o f coercion brought in here makes the 
figures o f officers joining Red or White in the Civil War rather meaningless in terms of 
interpretations o f political allegiance o f the officers. 
The dramatic changes in officer-soldier relations, described above, and stated clearly in 
new legislation like order no . l , threw a real challenge to the officer corps. Whilst the 
habitual response of the officers was caution, this only damaged their prestige in front of 
the men they commanded'^. This excerpt f rom a report o f Duma members Yanushkevich 
and Filonenko, who toured the front, illustrates this, 
' We have noticed that the officers who endeavoured to explain to the soldiers the change that has 
taken place were forgiven their past errors....; but when things were hushed up, when the soldiers 
were not called together, when the events were not explained or where the explanation was biased, 
the ground for dreadful distrust has been created.'^ " [March 13*] 
The officers were essentially in a no-win situation. The choice they had was clear enou^; 
they either identified themselves as servants of the new regime, and amenable to the gains 
of the revolution, or risked the wrath o f their troops. This could take various forms, from 
revolutionary arrest, to beatings, lynching and murder. The officers, regardless of their 
political orientation, lived in the shadow of danger to their own persons. This can be seen 
'^ Jones [1976] p. 22 
'2 Fitzpatrick [1982] p. 68 
" Heenan [1987] p. 77, 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, p. 861 
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in Denikin's speech on July 16* at the military conference at Stavka, discussing the failure 
of the June offensive. Whilst Denikin is a somewhat unreliable witness, as he was prone to 
exaggeration, this passionate statement gives an idea of what the officer corps faced. 
'The officers' corps is in a terrible position... Sokolov, after touring the army, said: " I could never 
even have surmised that the officers would be such martyrs." Yes, they are martyrs...They are 
abused...they are beaten. Yes, they are beaten. Hiding in their tents, they sob, but diey will not tell 
about this. They are being killed. There is only one honest way out for officers- it is death . 
Many officers sought to accommodate the changes facing the army and to work in concert 
with the soldier committees at various levels in order to restore fitting strength. The 
development of events after the failure of the June offensive, however, disassociated the 
officers f rom the soldiers they commanded still further, and created even greater 
difficulties. 
The changing face - stem measures post July 
The collapse o f the June offensive put new pressures on Kerensky. The generals, who had 
called repeatedly for measures to restore discipline, now had well publicised evidence to 
support their claims. The conference o f the senior generals at Stavka in July produced a 
catalogue of demands for the restoration o f the death penalty, the curtailing of the 
committees to solely domestic regimental matters, an apology from the Provisional 
Government to the officers for the distress they had been caused, and the censorship of 
all Bolshevik publications, along with a concerted effort to weed out agitators in the ranks. 
The Russian defeat at Tamopol was frequently cited as evidence of the cowardly and 
undisciplined behaviour of the troops, and contributed to Stavka's argument for stem 
discipline. Study of the military documentation suggests that the treatment of the Russian 
troops in this instance was unfair; the Germans had mustered nine new divisions that 
Stavka was unaware of, and had far superior firepower'^. There was increasing concern 
about the influence o f the Soviet over policy. In short, the demands encapsulated the 
belief that only a 'strong arm' could restore the army to a batdeworthy state. This view did 
not take into account Kerensky's political position. As he told them himself, i f he were to 
introduce such measures, he would be unable to stand in the chaotic civil war that would 
surely sweep the country. And here we see the nub of the matter; the generals were 
proposing a range o f changes that would not stop short of civil war. Kerensky, meanwhile, 
was absolutely committed to avoiding civil war, and to keeping politics within civilised 
" Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc, 875, pp.995-6. 
Wildman[1987] ,2, 114 
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spheres. To do this however, he had to accommodate some of these generals' demands, in 
order to keep them within a legitimate sphere. 
The reintroduction of the death penalty, and the stem censorship of Bolshevik papers at 
the front, were then, essential i f Kerensky was to gain any good will f rom the generals. The 
reintroduction o f the death penalty on July 12* can be considered to be the focus of 
soldier concem about the repression o f the soldier masses, and though command reported 
an immediate improvement, as one would expect them to, there were reports of an 
intensification of unrest in areas that were already volatile. There was also a more 
systematic attempt made to disband any thoroughly rebellious regiments. There was 
certainly need of some measure o f discipline in the troops, i f any measure of coherence 
was to be retained. The difficulty was that the indiscipline inherent in the troops was not 
of a sporadic, localised nature; rather it was a malaise inherent in the troops at the front 
and the rear. One could not propose the shooting of whole regiments, so the ringleaders 
or in exceptional circumstances even the whole regiment was disbanded. 
These measures of stemer discipline could not possibly address the deeper malady in the 
troops that was setting in by August. Wildman talks of a 'truce' between officers and 
soldiers in July, with no open reflisals, but plenty o f tacit disobedience. This 'tmce' is 
attributed to the cessation of fighting operations and the hot weather". As autumn 
approached the main issues o f discontent were focused on livmg conditions, food and 
clothing. There were also rumours of imminent peace, and the mood which was seizing 
the soldiers was that there was no way the war could continue through that winter. There 
were efforts of deliberate sabotage, like the discovery that the local peasants were wearing 
the newly issued winter boots, and refiisal o f the men to make any preparations for the 
winter campaign'*. The conditions the troops faced by the autumn are eloquently 
described by Louise Bryant, a young American woman who travelled to Russia in 1917, 
'Conditions at the front were alarming. There was a shortage of ammunition, of food, of clothing. 
Soldiers stood, knee-deep in mud, muttering. Many had no coats and the rain came down in a cold, 
miserable drizzle; many had no boots. . . One regiment had been without food for three days 
except for some carrots they had dug from a field behind the lines. When an army gets to such a 
pass anything is possible. This was in October.''' 
" Wildman [1987] ,2, p. 144 
Wildman [1987] ,2, p,225, p, 229 
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The Komilov affair 
The Komilov affair is a period which has many interpretations, usually according to the 
political affiliation o f the historian writing about it. The r i ^ t saw Komilov as a chance for 
Russia to escape Bolshevism, and the only way forward*". Kerensky viewed it as an ill 
considered r i ^ t wing coup attempt, which threatened the progress of Constitutional 
Democracy in Russia*\ The left saw it as an attempt by the bourgeois Provisional 
Government, joined by the forces o f the r i ^ t , to put down once and for all proletarian 
influence. Al l this is not helpful to the student of the revolution. What matters is less the 
'what could have been's', and more the actual result of the Komilov affair, which was to 
erode further the support o f the Provisional Government, and to strengthen the left. The 
sketch that follows of the affair is cursory, but is an attempt to see why the affair had such 
serious implications in 1917. 
Kerensky appointed Komilov commander in chief on July 10*, replacing Brusilov, who 
had not been popular with the other generals. Komilov, reputed to be firm but fair, had 
won some success in the June offensive and was a popular candidate. Kerensky had been 
particularly attracted to him by what he saw as his political tact, when he issued quite 
moderate demands, unlike the other generals, at the Stavka conference in July. Komilov 
immediately belied this confidence, however, by issuing a list of conditions of his taking 
the post. These included the reinstatement of the death penalt}', an increased role for the 
commander in chief, with full authority over all army appointments, and thirdly, perhaps 
most importantly, that he be responsible only to his conscience and the nation. 
On the 30* July, Komilov reported to Yurenev and Peshekhonov that the rail network 
was incapable o f supplying the army. Komilov insisted that only 'harsh measures' could 
save the country f rom total collapse. He was supported by the other generals on his 
proposed harsh measures, including an apology to the officers for their suffering, flill 
control o f the army to the commander in chief, a ban on politics in the army, and the 
nullification o f the declaration of soldiers' r i ^ t s . The Moscow conference in August 
turned into a parade of rigjht-wing support for Komilov, which disconcerted the left, and 
steeled them with fear of a rig^t wing coup. 
The reforms demanded were clearly not acceptable to the coalition government. Kerensky 
had promised Komilov that he would consider his proposals, but Savinkov intimated to 
°^ Strakhovsky [1972] is a good example of this view 
Kerensky's articles and books all express this view in various forms. 
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Komilov that the measures were sure to be passed. This caused Komilov to offer his 
support for the Provisional Government. Even at this early stage, there was a web of 
confusion and deceit spreading round the whole affair. The involvement of V N Lvov 
further complicated matters. The former procurator of the Holy Synod had been replaced 
by Kartashev in July, and harboured a deep grudge against Kerensky. His role in this affair 
is critical, but rather difficult to fathom, as his highly subjective accounts of the events 
vary. In fact, there is every indication that he was verging on insane when he initiated his 
strange role. On 22"'' August Lvov approached Kerensky, and very mysteriously asked him 
i f he would consider entering into (unspecified) negotiations with (unnamed) persons. 
Kerensky refused, responding that i f somebody wished to negotiate with him, they should 
come forward openly. On 24* August Lvov went to Komilov, and intimated that 
Kerensky was willing to accept his proposals. Komilov assumed Lvov was a genuine 
mediator, and was understandably agreeable. 
On 26* August, Lvov returned to Kerensky and made proposals to him 'from Komilov'. 
These proposals included the establishment of martial law m Petrograd and the transfer of 
all civil and military authority to the Generalissimo. Kerensky responded to this as a 
declaration of a right wing rising. Matters went f rom bad to worse here as Kerensky 
confusingly contacted Komilov on the Hughes apparatus, impersonating Lvov, and asked 
him to confirm [unspecified] proposals. Komilov, without attempting to clarify what these 
proposals were exactly, agreed that he had transmitted 'proposals'*'. Without identifying 
himself, Kerensky terminated the conversation, so that Komilov was dismayed and 
astonished to receive his note of dismissal the following day, having understood that he 
had come to a sensible agreement with Kerensky. Indeed, the shock was such that he fell 
ill that day, and active duties were taken over by Lukomskii. On the 27*, Kerensky, against 
the advice o f his cabinet who sought a private settlement of the affair with Komilov, 
issued a telegram to the whole country, branding Komilov as having attempted to seize 
power, and issuing his dismissal". On the 28* , Komilov responded angrily, denying that 
he had conspired to bring down the Provisional Government, and 
' I , General Komilov, the son of a Cossack peasant, hereby declare to all and sundry that I myself 
seek nothing except the preservation of Russia's greatness, and that I vow to guide the people 
through victory over the enemy, towards a Constituent Assembly so that they may determine their 
own destiny and choose their new form of Government.' 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, pp. 1568-9, doc. 1268 offers a full text of this bewildering 
conversation. 
" Browder and Kerensky [1961], 3, p 1572, doc 1270 
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Komilov's subsequent move o f troops on Petrograd were a dismal failure. General 
Krymov, who was in charge of the movement of troops towards Petrograd, allegedly to 
halt a Soviet demonstration that was scheduled for the 28* August, was put in a difficult 
situation. The first echelons o f his troops reached lamburg, Luga and Vyritsa by the 28*. 
His ability to get his troops to obey his orders depended on their belief in his story of the 
demonstration, and that they did not get wind of Kerensky's wild proclamation about the 
attempted right wing coup, issued as a circular telegram on 27* August. The troops, 
however, could hardly fail to hear the news, as the Soviet had mobilised its forces, and the 
railroad workers, telegraph operators and local Soviets quickly disseminated the news. 
Krymov was faced at Luga with government troops, and in the ovemi^ t holdup, his 
Cossacks discussed matters with the troops who opposed them. By the morning, though 
the Cossacks were not openly rebelling against Krymov, they refused to believe his version 
of events, and said they would move only on direct orders from Kerensky. Krj 'mov had 
no alternative but to go to Petrograd himself and report to Kerensky. After this meeting, 
which ended with Kerensky refijsing to shake hands with Krymov, Krymov went to a 
friend's apartment and shot himself''' 
The significance o f the Komilov affair lies not so much in these rather muddled events as 
in the response it evoked in the soldiers and the populace. The Soldier Committees were 
ready to combat any right wing coup, commandeering communications and halting 
movement o f the troops to the rear, but the July measures restricting the power of the 
committees assured their transfer o f allegiance from the Provisional Govemment and the 
Soviet jointiy to the Soviet alone. Later revelations of Kerensky's involvement in the affair 
discredited both him personally and the Provisional Govemment as a whole. The 
authority o f the Provisional Govemment, which had always been tenuous, was irrevocably 
eroded by the apparent confirmation of Bolshevik accusations that it was intimately 
connected with the rig^t. The Moscow conference and the fall of Riga confirmed soldier 
suspicions that the counter revolution was centred not solely with Komilov, but with army 
headquarters at Stavka. The affair provoked new hostility f rom the troops towards the 
Browder and Kerensky [1961],, doc. 1282, pp. 1586-7, for Kerensky's version of this last meeting 
with Krymov. Katkov [1980] p. 106, describes Krymov thus; 'Krymov, a very gallant officer, was one of 
the most enigmatic figures of 1917. He was tall and burly in appearance, well educated but rough 
spoken, impulsive and given to fits of depression.. After his meeting with Kerensky he seems to have 
abandoned all hope for Russia's survival'. His death, though only one of the many personal tragedies of 
the revolution, is particularly affecting as he retained the strong personal code of honour which was torn 
by the confusion between Kerensky and Komilov. 
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officer corps. There was a resurgence o f votes of no-confidence and arrests, though given 
the strength of feeling there were remarkably few lynchings*^. 
Katkov's portrayal of Kerensky in his book on the Komilov affair is thoroughly unfair and 
does not give his character and his abilities sufficient credit**. To be sure, Kerensky, by 
proclaiming so rapidly and with such hysteria that there was a counter revolution, 
contributed to the strength of feeling generated, and to the resurgence that the extreme 
left enjoyed after the Komilov affair. Had the matter been dealt with quietiy as the other 
cabinet members had proposed, some of the hyperbole could have been avoided. The 
intrigue o f the communications with Komilov, too, indicate that Kerensky, i f not actually 
supporting Komilov's moves, was certainly making his own position very ambiguous. 
However, the activities of the r i ^ t indicate that there was some threat to the capital from 
a right movement, giving Kerensky's dramatic response to the r i ^ t threat more credibility. 
He was understandably on edge at the t h o u ^ t of defending 'his' revolution. 
Conclusions 
The problem of the military crisis was very complex. The Provisional Government faced a 
seemingly impossible task; there was an implicit contradiction in giving soldiers rigjits to 
ensure their goodwill, and restoring order in the army as the generals desired. The force of 
patriotism is awkward, and does not fit easily into the template of 1917, at least as one 
would ordinarily define patriotism. 
Soldiers made their own political decisions and formulated very definite demands in 1917. 
The significance o f the older generation as a part o f the soldier body was considerable as a 
unsettiing influence, as was the lack of basic training for recmits, and the profound supply 
shortages. The mobilisation engendered by the First World War initiated unprecedented 
societal mixing, and was a catalyst for change in society, and for its bmtalisation. Study of 
the officers shows that they were not a class based homogenous body, but that many were 
newly promoted as a result of the first world war, and o f humble origbs. 
Wildman [1987] ,2, p. 212 
Katkov [1980]. The subtitle of this book given inside the jacket gives Katkov's approach away from 
the start. It is 'Kerensky and the break up of the Russian army'. In his introduction, Katkov explains that 
there is already ample published material giving Kerensky's 'side of the story'; he is referring here to 
'Prelude to Bolshevism', Kerensky's first book. Choosing to accept the evidence of other protagonists in 
the affair is acceptable, Katkov, however, is not content with that, and adds nothing less than a character 
assassination of Kerensky into his analysis of the affair. 
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Kerensky erred seriously in 'blowing the whistie' on the Komilov affair, as by doing so he 
helped to engender a massive national reaction, and new mistmst of the moderate 
govemment. The response of the Provisional Govemment to the growing crisis in the 
army was to follow some of the advice of the generals, and attempt to restore old 
fashioned discipline. The generals were on the whole unwilling to recognise the tme nature 
of the changes afflicting Russia, and clung desperately to their outdated concepts on 
maintenance o f discipline, and unwavering support for the war. Old fashioned discipline 
and the new Russian army of 1917 were not compatible. In retrospect it is difficult to see 
any alternatives to rapid withdrawal f rom the war, and demobilisation of the army i f 
breakdown of society was to be avoided. The Provisional Govemment could not control 
the insurgent troops, or satisfy their most fundamental desires, without an end to the war. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The workers of Petrograd in 1917 
The Petrograd workers were an essential force in 1917, and their shift to the left was a 
major factor in the Bolsheviks' successful coup in October. The relationship between the 
Provisional Govemment, the Soviet and the workers of Petrograd will be investigated in 
this chapter. When assessing the failure o f the Provisional Govemment and the success of 
the Bolsheviks, the question of political and economic motivations of the workers is 
central to a better understanding. This chapter will examine the economic crisis in 1917, 
what characterised the working classes in Petrograd, what their aims were, and the 
processes they used to achieve those aims, most notably the strike movement. Finally, 
development o f factory committees and the significance o f the worker control movement 
will be assessed. This chapter will demonstrate the difficulties the Provisional Govemment 
faced in winning the workers' support in 1917. 
Economic crisis in 1917 
The Russian economy faced collapse in 1914. The crash was averted by tlie war, which 
b r o u ^ t a boost o f work, a growth o f foreign capital investment, an extension of credit, 
intensification o f production, and perhaps a workforce made more malleable by the 
sudden patriotic msh. The war also had the effect of lowering the workers' standards of 
living, by increasing the worker population so rapidly; in 1914 there were 242,600 industrial 
workers in Petrograd, but by 1917, this had increased to 417,000'. By February 1917 
Rabochaia gat^eta reported large increases in profits, which the workers used as vindication 
for their pay rise demands. This apparent recovery was to cause problems for the owners 
later in 1917, when workers, basing estimations o f profits on 1916, were increasingly 
sceptical about owner claims that they were forced to close factories due to lack of profits. 
Flenley^ demonstrates that the actions o f the owners and workers were made incompatible 
' Gill [1976] p. 44 
^ Flenley [1991] 
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by the economic crisis, but that the owners, contrary to general assertions, were logical in 
their actions. 
The revival was very narrowly based, and was dependent on foreign capital, credit from 
the banks, and the ability of the government to pay for their orders. The upheaval of 1917 
frightened foreign investors and the banks, and concurrently allowed the workforce to 
place new demands upon factory owners. The e i ^ t hour day was pressed upon the 
grudging factory owners of Petrograd by threat of more strike action and disruption, 
which the owners could not afford. In addition to a shorter day, the workers within the 
war industries also gained significant pay rises throu^out 1917. However, from the 
summer of 1916 onwards there was decline in the real wages even of the metal workers, 
who were among the better paid groups of workers. Comparing wages to the cost of 
living show that the workers were actually worse off in real terms, as this table shows^; 
Table four, showing the reduction of workers' actual wages in 1917 
Nominal monthly 
wage 
Real wages [in roubles of pre-war buying 
power] 
First half 1917 70.5 roubles 19.3 roubles 
Second half 1917 135 roubles 13.8 roubles 
Factory owners faced serious problems with supply of fuel and raw materials, as well as 
workers' wage demands. The cost of raw materials and fiiel rocketed, caused by increased 
running costs. An additional problem was transportation of goods, and the supply of fuel 
and raw materials. Russia's infrastmcture was unable to deal with the extra pressure placed 
on it by a mobilising army. The rail system floundered under the pressure of military use, 
the roads were inadequate, and the sea routes were cut o f f by the Germans. This also 
affected the producers o f raw materials. Industrial unrest and the difficulty of procuring 
supplies decreased the yield of Russia's main coal supplier, the Donets. Workers suspected 
that the owners were deliberately withholding materials in order to sabotage production. 
Where workers took control o f the plants; they sent out special task forces, 'pushers' to try 
to acquire the raw materials and fuel they needed to run the factory. The difficulties the 
salvagers had in procuring materials showed that in many cases the difficulties of supply 
Table in Gill [1976] p. 44 
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were genuine". There is also evidence, however, that the owners were in some cases 
apathetic, and reluctant to continue operations^. 
The owners responded to the crisis by calling on the state for regulation of prices of raw 
materials and fuel, and for subsidisation. The state failed to fiilfiU these demands. On May 
21", Shingarev, the Minister of Finance, declared that the state coffers were empty. 
Govemment attempts to control workers' demands and to set up channels for debate 
between owners and workers faced major problems. The most serious of these was the 
long-standing attitude o f hostility and mistmst that existed between the working class and 
the mdustrialists^ The initial success of moderation was quite remarkable given the 
habitual hostility of relationships. The agreement between owners and workers in 
Petrograd on March 1 1 * ' was a real victory for conciliation, and indicated that the owners 
were willing to make some necessary concessions. The agreement was drawn up by the 
Soviet in association with the Petrograd Association of Manufacturers. I t secured an e i ^ t 
hour working day, with no reduction o f workers' wages, and overtime only with the 
factory committee's consent. Factory committees were to be elected to represent the 
workers, settie inter-factory problems and formulate opinions, and conciliation chambers 
were established, with equal membership f rom management and workforce, to settie all 
misunderstandings arising f rom labour-management relations. Where agreement was not 
made, a central chamber settled the matter. The main demand of the workers, the 8 hour 
day, was conceded immediately, within a proviso that wages would not be reduced with 
the hours. This was a significant gain. The workers achieved their primary goal in March, 
yet unrest and accelerated demands continued throu^out 1917, culmmating in October. 
The Petrograd owners sou^ t a conciliatory style o f industrial relations. This attitude of 
consent rather than coercion accorded well with the early policy of the Provisional 
Govemment. Smith*, however, comments that there were deep divisions amongst the 
industrial bourgeoisie, and that the owners in other areas were outraged at the concessions 
the Petrograd owners had made, which they feh set unacceptable precedents. The 
Provisional Govemment and the Soviet hoped to use trade unions and factory 
committees as a safety valve for labour discontent, and a stepping stone to conciliatorj'^ 
industrial relations. The owners' response to the legislation on 8 hour days', however. 
' Smith [1983] p. xviii 
^ Gill [1976] p. 46 
' Galih [1989B] p. 240 
^ Browder and Kerensky [1961] ,2, doc 622. From Izvestiia. 
^ Smith [1983] 
' Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 627 
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displayed the difficulties the Provisional Government and Soviet faced in mediation. They 
stated that far f rom the working day being shortened to 8 hours, it should be lengthened 
'in view of the unusual circumstances prevailing'. In trying to identify both with the 
workers and the owners, the organs of state were in an untenable position. A letter from 
the management of the Nevskii shoe factory to the Minister of Labour on June 6* 
indicated that the difficulties of mediation did not lie only with the industrialists. The 
writers claimed that the workforce would not accept the Provisional Government's new 
legislation on factory committees, as the ministers who implemented it were no longer in 
government. They requested, therefore, that a new law be issued which the workers would 
accept. This sort of obtuseness f rom the workers caused owners and Provisional 
Government alike considerable difficulties, and indicated a reluctance on the part of the 
workers to co-operate with the regime. 
Conciliation chambers, formed at factory level, and with one central conciliation chamber, 
apparently settled most local disputes, but could only solve disputes that were resolvable 
by mutual agreement, and i f the workers were willing to act upon their findings. The 
problem of establishing basic rates of pay for industry in order to establish norms for pay 
disputes remained unresolved, as both workers and owners were unwilling to submit. The 
Provisional Government failed to set the precedent of extensive use of conciliation 
chambers in the state run factories; most state managers preferred to resolve problems 
individually". 
The absence of basic rates of pay meant that owners were very resentful of wage demands, 
which were chaotic. The owners argued that any base rate not linked to productivity was 
unworkable. The Metalworkers' Union attempted to set up a collective basic rate for 
metalworkers, but negotiations were halted by the refusal of the Trade Union to accept the 
principle of a wage linked to productivity. Eventually the Union conceded to the request, 
but by this time the July days intervened, ushering in a new climate in worker/owner 
relations. The greatest tension came in negotiations over pay rates for the chemorabochie, the 
unskilled workers. The Union was anxious not to disappoint this group, as it was the 
largest, but the owners were unwilling to concede too hig^ a rate for the unskilled, as it 
would give a wage platform for the more skilled workers to base their demands upon. 
Negotiations finally broke down on July 12*. The owners were anxious to keep channels 
of conciliation open, and asked for state intervention, but rejected the government plan, 
even though it tended towards the owners' proposals. The Union offered a further 10% 
'"Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 632 
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cut, but the offer was still refused. The failure of conciliation was to play a vital role in the 
development of the militancy of Petrograd's working class. The general strike that 
threatened was deterred by the Union, aware that such action would be a grave threat to 
the Provisional Govemment. I t is understandable that the workers lost faith in the ability 
o f conciliation to improve their conditions, and of the Provisional Govemment to protect 
their interests. Moderation had failed them, and the Bolshevik proposal to end the war and 
for workers to take over control o f production was increasingly appealing. 
The result o f the owners' refijsal to accept the proposals was a dangerous stalemate, but 
this stalemate was symptomatic of the fundamental crisis affecting Russian industry. In 
order to maintain profitability, there was actually a need to reduce wages, which was wholly 
incompatible with the practical needs o f the workers. The contraction o f production that 
resulted f rom loss o f profitability was a body blow to the workers' movement, and the 
Unions called for govemment intervention, but the govemment tried to exercise a policy 
of non-interference with failing businesses. Both workers and employers saw the 
intervention of govemment as critical to the resolution of the crisis, but in actual fact the 
crisis was unresolvable. I f the state was to try to enforce a solution, it required the 
appropriate power to do so. The Provisional Govemment did not have this power. 
Who were the Working Classes? 
The defining factor o f the working classes of Petrograd was age; the younger workers were 
traditionally more radical, and made up the bulk of the membership of the Bolshevik 
party. The younger workers were more likely to be literate, and less hkely to have the 
responsibilities o f a wife and children. The younger generation grew up in the shadow of 
'the flight o f the intelligentsia'; that is, the compromise of the liberals with the Tsarist 
regime in 1905, which took impetus out o f the working class movement, before it 
obtained the goals it had set. This caused a deep sense of bitterness and irreconcilability 
towards the intelligentsia and liberalism. This tendency of youth to be radical does not 
exclude older people f rom radicalism, but it is a tendency which is borne out by studies of 
membership of the revolutionary parties". The employment of apprentices was 
commonplace, and the apprentices were taken on early, in some trades as young as ten* .^ 
This gave the young recruits ample opportunity to be ftiUy assimilated into urban life, and 
to learn some level of self awareness. Though evidence indicates that ties to the village 
" Flenley, [1991] p. 198 
Mandel [1983] p. 40 
Bonnell [1981] p. 358 
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were retained, there is other evidence to suggest that some of the skilled workers kept up 
these links unwillingly, and under duress f rom the village elder". 
Mandel^^ categorises workers simply, as skilled and unskilled, and suggests that these two 
groups should be studied quite separately. There are other definitions of how to categorise 
the workers; Koenker and Rosenberg" study the actions of a group they define as semi-
skilled, and place a great deal o f significance upon their actions. They identify this group as 
the workers involved in new technology, working in mechanised plants and on assembly 
lines", who required a modicum of training, but did not possess the h i ^ levels of skill 
associated with the skilled workers. Such distinctions of skill levels between workers 
however, are imprecise, and difficult to categorise exactiy. Only limited reference to the 
Koenker and Rosenberg study will be made in this section because, as the authors admit 
themselves, conclusions drawn from their study are tenuous, even hypothetical. While 
their conclusions are interesting, there is insufficient solid factual base to support them. 
There was a connection between skill, literacy and social concem. That the skilled workers 
were mostiy literate is unsurprising, as skilled factory work often required workers to show 
initiative, and to work on their own from plans and technical drawings. In the 
metalworking industry, for example, the workers involved in machine constmction had to 
use plans and constmct the machinery accordingly, a task involving a h i ^ level of skill, 
which encouraged free t hou^ t . Metalworking was the highest paid industry, and it is 
generally agreed that the best paid workers are those with the security and free time 
required to be involved in political activity. A factor that surely influenced the political 
stance of the skilled workers was that many of them were in demand because their skills 
made them difficult to replace, with the result that they were better paid, and i f they lost a 
job, had a good chance of securing another quickly'*. Their abilities would contribute to 
their feeling o f self worth, and a proud awareness of belonging to that particular class. This 
factor contrasts starkly with the easy replacability of the chemorabochie. 
Mandel points to skilled workers as the source o f 'conscious workers'; that is, the group of 
workers conscious of their own oppressed economic and political position in society. He 
points to their rejection of the foundation principles of the Provisional Government, that 
is, conciliation and liberalism. He points out that Russia's political and social system was 
'"^  Bonnell [1981] p. 360 
"Mandel [1983] pp. 9-33 
Koenker and Rosenberg [1986] 
Koenker and Rosenberg [1986] p. 608 
'* Koenker and Rosenberg [1986] p. 607 
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based upon a complex system of estates, which gave rise to very rigid feelings, both of 
belonging to one particular body, and o f isolation and hostility towards other groups''. 
The desire for class unity was fundamentally linked to the desire for polarisation of the 
classes, and separateness f rom the bourgeoisie. There was strong social pressure towards 
unanimity in the factories, linked no doubt to the unanimity expressed in peasant actions. 
Mandel also proposes that the aspirations of the wealthy in Russian society were 
fijndamentally opposed to the interests of the working class, making attempts at 
conciliation unworkable, and that there was a deep psychological shame on the part of the 
workers towards the humility they were accustomed to show towards the mling classes^ ". 
The hostility towards liberalism was rooted in the feeling that liberalism was politics for 
the upper classes. The Provisional Govemment policy o f co-operation and coalition was 
intimately linked with liberalism. This gives one reason for the problems the Provisional 
Govemment faced in winning support f rom the workers, even when their programmes 
accorded with much that the workers had been demanding. The workers saw their 
position as essentially different. The Soviet, on the other hand, immediately enjoyed a 
strong level of support f rom the workers, representative o f the fact that the Soviets had 
their roots in the workers actions in 1905, and were therefore identified as representing the 
working classes. Rosenberg pomts out that in the sphere of worker relations, dual power 
was something of a misnomer, as both bodies had the same aims, to improve the 
conditions o f the workers, and to prevent the economy from collapsing^'. 
The skilled workers were centred in the Vyborg district, where 84% of the workers were 
involved in the metal industry. There was a great deal of pride associated with being a part 
o f the Vyborg; far f rom being an anarchist mass as it is sometimes portrayed, the Vyborg 
prided itself on organisation and order. In a demonstration on June 18*, the Vyborg 
contingent turned up in order worthy o f an army battalionFiges uses a case study of a 
young peasant Kanatchikov, who though newly arrived from the village, longed to shed his 
mral past, and who later becomes a member of the Bolshevik party. Figes emphasises the 
need o f the conscious workers to divorce themselves f rom their peasant past, and to shun 
' ' A useful discussion of this can be found in Freeze [1986] 
2° Mandel [1983] p. 20. 
Rosenberg [1989] p. 269 
Mandel [1983] p. 18 
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vodka, smoking and rural manners. This picture accords with Mandel's, of the ordered, 
literate, skilled workforce^'. 
The exception to the radicalism and separateness of the skilled workers came in the form 
of the printers, and certain elements o f workers in the state sector. Mandel describes them 
as 'the worker aristocracy', who saw themselves as above the mass of workers, and were 
often recmited f rom a h i ^ e r social strata than the mass of the workers. Printing retained 
many of the features of a craft industry. The printing centres were small and widely 
spread, which lost them the sense of power which comes with membership of a large 
organisation. There was an absence of irreconcilability with the liberals; printing was a 
traditional Menshevik s t ron^old, and paternalism from owners was common; wages and 
conditions were better than average^ "*. This categorisation of the working class should be 
applied cautiously however. Bonnell's study indicates that they were far more 
heterogeneous than the literature leads one to expect. She points out that only 25% of the 
workforce in Petrograd were attached to factories, and accords great significance to the 
artisans^^. She also points out that the big factories were broken up into workshop type 
constmctions, which contributed to the highly concentrated nature of the Russian work 
force, 
"A large engineering works is like a wodd in miniature. Some factories contain up to 200 different 
workshops. Large factories are usually broken up into several divisions,,.Working conditions are by 
no means the same in different workshops"[Timofeev, contemporary worker]^^ 
The unskilled workers are commonly cited as the least politically active element. In labour 
circles they were referred to as bo/oto, or the swamp. Strike statistics show that unskilled 
labour was more likely to respond to short term goals than to long- term goals. In contrast 
to skilled work, which encouraged initiative and freedom of thou^ t , unskilled work was 
deadeningly repetitive, and initiative was actually discouraged, even i f it increased 
productivity^'. The table overleaf, drawn from Koenker and Rosenberg^*, illustrates the 
reluctance o f the unskilled workers to strike. 
Figes [1996] pp. 112-8, Though the portrayal of this character is rather whimsical, and some of the 
details surely diflhcuU to substantiate, it is still a usefiil illustration, and as it accords with the impression 
given by a highly learned study, seems reasonable, 
Koenker and Rosenberg [1986] pp, 618-620 
Bonnell [1981] p. 362 
Bonnell [1981] p. 376 
Mandel [1983] p 24 
Koenker and Rosenberg [1986] p 626 
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Table five, showing percentage of work force striking according to skill categories 
Percentage of Labour force Percentage of Strike force 
SkiUed 34 43 
Semiskilled 24 55 
Unskilled 37 2 
The unskilled workers were drawn heavily from the countryside. They were known as 
chemorabochie, or the black workers, and were often prishlye, or new arrivals. These uprooted 
country people had a number of characteristics rooted in their peasant origin. Their 
peasant origins lent them a close awareness of class separateness, and a characteristically 
peasant 'closing of ranks'. There are a number o f features of peasant mentality which 
contributed to the chemorabochie's lack o f political consciousness. They tended to be less 
able to generalise in social life; every issue was only relevant i f it could be directly linked to 
their own lives. Even the minority o f the rustics that were literate tended to lack analytical 
skills, and to accept what they read unhesitatingly^'. The patterns of unrest of the unskilled 
workers echoed the unrest of the peasants; it was exploitation of opportunities, with no 
concern for consolidation. Unlike the skilled workers, who produced agitators from their 
own ranks, the unskilled workers depended heavily on outside leadership, and did not like 
explanations o f their situation; they wanted only answers^". 
The unskilled labourers were predominantly women. Their literacy levels were lower than 
those o f men, especially in the older women. Women generally worked very hard, since as 
well as doing a day's work in the factory, they came home to face their domestic chores of 
washing, cleaning and the increasingly difficult task of procuring food. This proliferation of 
duties is cited as a reason for women's lack of contribution to public life, and their 
apparent disinterest in politics. A senior doctor wrote in 1913, 
'one cannot help but note the premature decrepitude of the factory women. A woman worker of 
fifty sees and hears poorly, her head trembles, her shoulders are sharply hunched over. She looks 
about seventy. It is obvious that only dire need keeps her at the factory, forcing her to work beyond 
her strength. 
^'Mandel[1983]pp. 29-30. 
^°Mandel[1983] p. 32 
31 Figes [1996] p. 113 
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Such a testimony gives ample reason for women's lack of interest in politics. The 
attribution of a lack of political consciousness should not be applied based on gender 
however; it was background, literacy and trade that determined political participation. 
Women in the skilled needle trades were reported to be literate, educated, and involved in 
public affairs, showing the characteristics one associates with the male skilled workers^^. 
Accusations that women were particularly timid and reluctant to strike ignores the critical 
role of women workers in February. Whilst it is evident that the addition of household 
chores to factory work left women with littie personal time, it did expose them to an 
opportunity to discuss grievances and mix freely with other women in the same situation; 
the bread queues. The events of February 23"* were started by the demonstration of 
women workers celebrating International Women's day, and calling for bread. Even 
thougjti tlie motives behind these women's action can be identified as economic and not 
political, this should not discount the importance of their actions. Much of the strike 
action o f 1917 was economic rather than political in motivation, but was organised and 
determined, and had major political repercussions. 
Workers' demands 
Figures of workers' demands in 1917 support the idea that worker mobilisation was bom 
primarily o f terrible economic hardship, and of want, want for bread, want for rest, and 
the desire to see an end to the war which crippled the country. However, it begs the 
question o f how one can adequately assess the real wants and demands of the workers. I t 
is tempting to over-simplify the complex motivations lying behind the workers' choices. 
Rosenberg estimated that there were some 250 strike demands through Russia in 1917, and 
though some of these can be easily categorised, m other cases, in categorisation they lose 
some of their value^ .^ 
In the survey reproduced overleaf, economic and practical demands have by far the 
greatest weig^iting. The 8 hour day, for example, was mentioned in 52% of the sur\^ eyed 
motions, whilst formation of a democratic republic was mentioned in only 14%. This 
emphasis on pay and working conditions would seem to be representative of the demands 
of the working class in the early months of the revolution. The implication that workers' 
demands and aims were primarily economic and not political cannot be used without 
qualification, however. I t is important first to be aware of the limitations of this survey, 
dealing as it does solely with March, and secondly to balance such attempts to sample the 
Mandel [1983] p. 27 
Rosenberg [1989] p. 277 
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vast number o f worker demands with study of the workers' actions. Sukhanov reported 
that the dominant slogan o f the workers in the first days of the revolution was 'Down with 
the war!'''*, yet this demand is mentioned only in a muted form in the table of demands, 
and in only 3% of the motions. To take another example, only 3% of the motions 
mention measures against the old administration, yet r i ^ t t h r o u ^ March, members of the 
old Tsarist administration, particularly the police, were rooted out mercilessly by workers 
and soldiers, and brought to the Provisional Govemment or Soviet as prisoners of the 
new regime'^ This was perhaps not an issue many meetings voted upon, but clearly many 
had strong feelings about the fate o f the old administrators. 
Table six, showing factory workers' demands^* 
(Based on 100 motions voted on in March 1917) 
Workers demands % mendoned Workers demands % mendoned 
Eight hour day 51 Universal suffrage 5 
Pay raise 18 Worker administration 4 
Sanitary conditions 15 Measures against the old 
administration 
3 
No overtime 14 Confidence in govemment 3 
Formation of a democratic 
republic 
14 Free education 3 
Factory committee role 12 Defence proclamations 3 
Hasten meeting of 
constituent assembly 
12 In favour of peace without 
annexations 
3 
Guaranteed wages and social 
security 
11 Foremen and choice of 
foremen 
2 
Distrust of govemment 11 Measures against the Tsar 2 
Land for the peasants 9 Elimination of professional 
army 
1 
Hiring question 7 Advocating patience 1 
International slogans 7 
Sukhanov [1955] p. 20 
Kerensky [1966] pp. 197-8 for an eye witness account. 
Ferro [1972] p. 115 
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The way in which the Provisional Government and the Soviet assessed and responded to 
workers' demands is an essential factor in their loss of support. The Soviet assessment of 
workers' demands, published on March 7*^', details the demands the Soviet felt the 
workers should make on their return to work. These can be divided into those dealing 
with economic or welfare related issues, and political demands. On the practical side, the 
Soviet expected pay for the days spent striking, immediate formation of worker, shop and 
factory committees, and the immediate regulation of women's and children's work. Rather 
less specifically, they demanded protection for workers from 'exhaustive and excessive 
labour' in fijll time work, and suggest a h i ^ level of worker solidarity by dividing 
remaining work equally where workers are operating part-time due to lack of raw materials 
etc. These practical levels all accord with the demands made in Ferro's table, suggesting 
that the Soviet leaders were in tune with the workers' demands in that early period. The 
political demands were more radical than anything the table suggests for March. The 
Soviet stated that should an employer try to shut down production, the workers should 
insist the work be handed over to them under the direction of the Soviet, trade union, and 
party organisation. This was a forerunner of worker control, which was later to be 
restricted by the Soviet and Provisional Govemment. The other political recommendation, 
that workers should guard factories with armed forces, and co-operate with local militia' 
reflected the fear o f the Soviet that the new revolution lacked much organised military 
support, but interestingly also foreshadows the Red Guard which was to bring the 
govemment down. 
Though the issues of length o f day, and regulation of the labour of women and children 
are dealt with, these pomts are very brief, and do not specifically mention the 8 hour day 
and pay rises. This lack of attention to the critical issues pressing upon the workers is 
reflective of the fact that the authors of the piece were not workers, but intelligentsia, 
observers of the crisis rather than participants. Galili reports that the detachment of the 
Menshevik leaders f rom the crisis in industry was to infuriate the workers later in 1917, 
when mediation became increasingly difficult^l The Mensheviks' success in the first four 
months o f the new administration did not simply reflect the oft-cited euphoria and good 
will that came with the February revolution, but was a product of a systematic effort to 
involve the workers in the democratic process and to meet their needs whilst preventing a 
total collapse o f Russian industry. 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc 619, in Izvestiia. 
Galili [1989A] p. 256 
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In contrast to the populist statement of the Soviet, the Provisional Government's address 
to the workers on the same day takes a much more sombre tone''. I t starts with rhetoric 
typical o f this period, emphasising the value of the workers, 
'Labor is the basic productive force of the country. The welfare of the mothedand depends upon 
labor's achievements' 
The address then outlmes the Provisional Government's response to the problems facing 
the labour force; to form a Ministry of Labour to study the problems of labour, to expand 
trade unions and develop arbitration boards to promote the growth of labour legislation, 
and to abolish criminal penalties for meetings and strikes. The only comment affecting the 
immediate economic needs of the workers was a pledge for the immediate preparation of 
draft laws on the length o f the working day, protection o f labour, insurance, arbitration 
chambers, labour exchanges, and other measures to promote worker welfare. The piece 
ends with a profession o f good faith, and an appeal for an immediate return to work, 
'The minister will strive wholeheartedly to satisfy, as much as possible, the needs of the workers. 
He hopes, however, for vigorous co-operation on their part'. 
The tone is predominantly stem, almost academic. Most of the points are dry and 
bureaucratic; whilst the creation of the Ministry of Labour and details of its specific 
functions is valuable, it fails to capture the hearts of the readers. The preparation of draft 
laws does not convey any sense of immediacy. The intention of the Provisional 
Govemment to produce lasting and worthwhile legislation is commendable, but did not 
accord with the urgent need o f the workers for rapid change. T h o u ^ on careful reading 
one notes that the minister repeatedly says he will do everything possible to improve the 
position o f the workers, this sentiment is not immediately obvious. 
Strike action, and its significance 
The single most obviously identified tool for the workers to extract their demands from 
the ruling body was the strike. The strike is used as the thermometer for labour unrest, and 
peaks in strike action are associated with political mobilisation. Rosenberg shows how the 
Soviet and Provisional Govemment tried to legitimise and thus control the strike 
movement. Strikes were not generally desperate actions by the workforce, but on the 
contrary were 'a weapon and strategy adopted by workers in the expectation that their 
efforts will be rewarded''"'. In this light, strikes were not necessarily anarchic, but could be 
constructive bargainbg tools, on the proviso that their aims did not clash fundamentally 
' Browder and Kerensky [1961], doc 620, in Zhurnaly, March 7 
'Rosenberg [1989] p. 268 
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with those of the State. In the context of 1917, when both the Provisional Govemment 
and the Soviet saw the need to transform existing institutions and conditions for workers 
and legitimise strikes, strikes could be a mobilisation of workers without posing a threat to 
the fabric o f society''\ 
The Soviet requested on March 6* ''^  that the workers retum to work, as 'continued strikes 
would be extremely destmctive to the economy of the country'. I t also mentioned that a 
programme of economic demands was necessary, in order to protect the gains of the 
revolution. In an appeal to the workers on March 9* the Soviet asks that the workers 
cease their uncoordinated strike action, and continue to work, even i f their lists of 
economic demands are refused by the owners. I t stated that the Soviet would draw up a 
list o f general demands, in order that sporadic actions be prevented. I t also mled that 
'excesses, such as the damaging o f materials...and personal violence are absolutely 
forbidden'. But whilst offering some more sober commands to the workforce, it also 
condemned those owners who tried to shut down production when faced with new 
economic demands. Whilst calling for restraint, it offers no doubts about its loyalties, 
taking an opportunity to condemn the industrialists. The Soviet leaders attempted to guide 
the workforce away f rom confrontation and fiitile striking that the economy could ill 
afford, and towards conciliation and mediation with the industrialists. This I^estiia article 
in Apri l states it clearly; 
'the wartime situation and tlie revolution force both sides to exercise extreme caution in utilising 
the sharper weapons of class struggle- strikes and lockouts. These circumstances have made it 
necessary and possible to setde all disputes between employers and workers by means of 
negotiation and agreements, rather than by open conflict.'[.wv underliningj 
The failure of strikes and conciliation to achieve the desired affect however, meant that 
increasingly workers turned away f rom conciliation. Before July, strikes had tackled mainly 
economic issues, such as wages, and questions of respect for the workers; for example, the 
banning o f the degrading form of address 'ty', rather than 'ly'. After July, a l thou^ there 
were actually fewer strikes in Petrograd, contrary to the national pattems, the strikes that 
did occur centred on control and management issues. The owners regarded these strikes as 
anarchic and irrational, but f rom a certam perspective they were perfectly rational; the 
economic based strike procedure had failed to improve worker conditions. I t was perfectly 
logical to take the strikes out of that spectrum and into a more radical one, demanding 
Rosenberg [1989] p. 271 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc 618, in Izvestiia. 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc 621 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc 649 
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more. The failure o f strikes and conciliation drew workers to Bolshevism, and caused them 
to reject moderate politics. 
Koenker and Rosenberg's study about perceptions of strikes in 1917'" looks particularly at 
reporting o f strikes in various strata o f the press, and the significance of this for 
perceptions of strikes. What people read offers an explanation of the way their 
conceptions and demands changed, allowing some explanation of their subsequent actions. 
Koenker and Rosenberg assert that participation in strikes and positive reporting of strike 
action had formative roles in the development of the working class, and the increasing 
polarisation in society. I t is problematic to distinguish between how much reporting on 
strikes influenced increasing polarisation in society, and how much the reporting was 
formed by the events gobg on around it, according to the political affiliations of the 
writer. 
A case study will be made of the press response to a Provisional Govemment appeal in 
June''*. There is lack o f balance in the selection o f documents; no Bolshevik or r i ^ t wing 
response to the minister's appeal were offered, both of which would have been 
illuminating. Despite this, the responses available are still useful in assessing reporting of 
strikes. The appeal stresses the threat of economic collapse due to the enormous 
economic problems inherited f rom the old regime. The appeal mentions the refusal of 
some workers to negotiate, and to demand their requirements under threat of violence. I t 
asks the workers to desist f rom spontaneous action, which 
'assumes the aspect of a direct tlireat to the gains of the revolution.' 
Reactions to the appeal f rom the moderate press"" are in favour of the content and tone 
of the appeal. RusskaB vedomosti was a moderate liberal paper, and Volia naroda a moderate 
socialist one, both inclined towards attempts at conciliation politics. Russkie vedomosti 
suggests that the appeal will persuade the workers of the reality of the impending 
economic crisis, in a way that reports so far have not; 
'All the reports in the bourgeois press were not taken seriously by the workers. They were told., 
that they lie deliberately to please the industrialists. Therefore the authoritative voice of the minister 
of Labour Skobelev, whom no-one could suspect of partiality towards the Capitalists... is 
particulady significant.' [my underlining 
Kcenker and Rosenberg [1992] 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 642 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc's 643 and 644 
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Yet by early September 1917^ *^  the workers were accusing him of exactiy that. This 
statement shows the extent to which the moderates failed to recognise the depth of the 
threat to them f rom the left. The overall tone of the article is optimistic and very positive. 
Volia naroda echoes this, and speaks about the development of the proletariat, 
'And our yoimg proletarian movement could not, of course, possess that degree of organisation 
and preparedness which is formed and forged by years and decades' 
The newspaper is showing its political cards here. This statement reflected moderate 
socialist thought, in particular the Menshevik party, that the proletarian revolution could 
not take place until the proletariat had developed via capitalism. I t is in this l i ^ t that the 
Menshevik party were supportive of the Provisional Govemment in 1917; from the same 
article, 
'It is quite clear that democracy strives for constructive and not destructive work.' 
This statement did not accurately portray the mood in Petrograd; for the working classes, 
it was not at all clear that democracy was constmctive, particularly after the July. 
The factory committees and worker control 
The workers' control movement was centred around the factory committees, a widespread 
grassroots organisation, intended by the Provisional Govemment to direct worker activism 
into productive channels and mediation. Initially the factory committees were dominated 
by the Mensheviks and the SR's, but the Bolsheviks won increasing influence in the 
movement, so that by July they were in control*'. Tensions mounted as factory closures 
escalated through 1917. Between March and August 568 enterprises employing 104,372 
workers closed their doors, and in August and September another 231 enterprises 
involving 61,000 workers were shut down^". Factory committees were left somewhat 
redundant f rom late spring of 1917, when trade unions took over the role of wage 
bargaining. The factory committees increasingly saw their role as implementing workers' 
control of production. Smith^^ states that worker control should be seen primarily as an 
attempt to maintain production, rather than a political act. He points out that many of the 
officers running the state defence works fled during Febmary, forcing workers, many of 
whom supported the war effort, to take over administration in order to maintain 
production. For a few weeks, workers were in virtual control of production. 
Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 635 
"' Avrich [1963] pp. 165-6 
°^ Gill [1976] p. 45 
Smith [1983] 
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The Menshevik leaders argued that control of industry should be in the hands of the state, 
which accorded with orthodox Marxism. The Bolsheviks also favoured control of the 
state, but their difference was what sort o f state was to have control; 
'State control- we are for it. But by whom? Who is in control? The bureaucrats? Or the Soviets?" 
[Lenin]52 
The Bolsheviks sought to escalate the conflict, and to instigate workers' control of the 
state as well as of the factory. Lenin never satisfactorily theorised on the relation between 
state regulation of the economy, a central tenet of Bolshevik thou^ t , and worker control. 
The incompatibility of these two facets became evident only after the civil war, when 
worker control was drastically curbed, and the factory committees were turned into 'state 
institutions'. I t is ironic that the factory committees were effectively disarmed by the 
Bolsheviks, as they played a vital role in the seizure of state power in October, serving as 
mustering points for the Red Guard; 
'in the factories the committee rooms were filled with stacks of rifles, couriers came and went, the 
Red Guard driUed' [John Reed]53 
Western academics tend to view worker control as an attempt to oust bosses and run the 
factories^''. There certainly were such Syndicalist movements in Russia, but their 
significance ought not to be overstated; there is littie to suggest that anarchist forces 
became dominant in Russia; rather, worker control was an attempt to limit economic 
disruption, and to maintain production and work. This accords with the deep mistrust 
shown by workers towards the owners' assessments o f the economic crisis in Russia. 
Rumours circled that the owners were reaping large profits, and their claims that they 
could not continue production because of shortages of fuel or raw materials were 
disbelieved. The justice of many of the owners' claims would seem to be vindicated by the 
difficulties the 'pushers'^^ had in acquiring the necessary goods for the factories. As the 
economic crisis worsened, forms o f worker control became increasingly interventionist 
and offensive. Very few factory committees however, obtained control of company 
finances, and where they did gain access to the books, workers often found them 
indecipherable. Where more extreme worker control was instigated, despite some 
extravagant claims, the evidence suggests that workers' control had a devastating effect on 
production'^*; workers' control seemed to be sliding industry towards anarchical collapse. 
Smith [1983] p. xxiv. 
Reed [1919] p. 49 
For example Keep [1976] p. 89 
\^9rkers sent out to requisition supphes for the factories. 
Ayrich [1963] p. 172 
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The workers were unable to replace the experienced managers, technical experts and 
engineers they expelled, and frequentiy had to hand administration back to those they had 
ousted". 
The factory committees crisis in August was sparked by three main factors. The first was 
the suggestion that the Provisional Govemment m i ^ t move the seat of power to 
Moscow, because o f the threat o f German seizure of Petrograd. The workers regarded 
Petrograd as the centre o f worker power, and felt that any move of the govemment to 
abandon Petrograd was effectively an attempt to cmsh the proletarian movement. The 
second factor was the Komilov affair, which sent shock waves t h r o u ^ the capital at the 
perceived threat o f a rig^t wing takeover. A third element which alienated the workers 
f rom the Provisional Govemment was the Skobelev circulars which restricted worker 
influence over management prerogatives^^ The first, issued by Skobelev, the Minister of 
Labour, on August 22"'', confirmed that employers had absolute rights in the matter of 
hiring and firing, and that factory committees had no jurisdiction in this area. The second 
circular, sent on August 28*, stated that meetings of all kinds could not go on within 
working hours, as they affected productivity, and that anybody who took part in such 
meetings would have the relevant amount removed from their pay. 
Worker control had steadily expanded as the economic crisis worsened. These attempts at 
restriction of it were met with outrage from the labour movement, particularly as the 
declarations coincided with the Komilov movement. Violent and unrehearsed incidents, 
like the beatings and arrests of administrators were not uncommon^'. This excerpt from a 
factory committee response to the Provisional Govemment circulars on September 2"^ is 
characteristic. I t was extremely hostile, and stated that the circular was political in nature, 
'We are forced to state that the Ministry for the Trotection of Labour' has as a matter of fact been 
converted into a Ministry for the protection of Capitalist interests...in order to reduce the country to 
famine so that the Ibony hand may strangle the Russian revolution'*" 
The language is typical of Bolshevik rhetoric, demonstrating the Bolshevik dominance of 
the committees. This signified the failure of moderation. The workers had been failed by 
the Mensheviks leading the Soviet, and failed by the Provisional Govemment. Their 
material conditions had not improved despite their attempts to co-operate with the 
bourgeois regime. Whilst it is easy in retrospect to see that this failure to improve living 
" Avrich [1963] p. 173 
Browder and Kerensky [1961],2, doc's 633 and 634 
Smith [1983] p, xix, 
*°Browder and Kerensky [1961], 2, doc. 635 
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conditions lay not through bourgeois exploitation and bad govemment, but economic 
catastrophe, the workers were offered an explanation, and a way forward. The explanation 
was offered by the Bolsheviks, and the way forward was a proletarian dictatorship, and the 
seizure o f state power. 
Conclusions 
The economic crisis should be central to any discussion of the workers' movement, and 
the Provisional Government's failure placed squarely in that context. The Provisional 
Govemment played a dual role, as it strove to conciliate both the industrialists and the 
workers. 
1917 saw a definitive move to the left in the workers' movement. This was facilitated by 
the failure o f moderation and legitimate means, including strikes, to improve workers' 
living conditions. The Bolsheviks' proposed solutions to the workers' problems were 
increasingly widely recognised. I t is difficult to apportion significance for worker activism 
in any one sector o f the Petrograd working class, as even those, like the chemorabochie, who 
were without obvious political enlightenment, played an important role in the shaping of 
1917. 
On the worker question there was no duality between the Provisional Govemment and 
the Soviet. Both bodies sou^ t to regulate workers' conditions, and to improve their 
standard o f living whilst, striving to prevent the economy from collapsing. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A Profile of Alexander Kerensky 
The first question to answer is 'Why make a special study o f this one man, whose role in 
1917 has been so attacked?' Few figures associated with the revolution have faced such a 
barrage of criticism. Browder describes this criticism of him as symptomatic of the role 
given to Kerensky in emigre circles. Kerensky became 
'the personification of the inadequacies and shortsi^tedness of the men of March 1917* .' 
There is no need to expand on his roles and actions in 1917 here; study of the 
composition and policies of the Provisional Govemment has already been undertaken^, 
and clearly illustrate the significance o f Kerensky in the events. This chapter is an attempt 
to h i g h l i ^ t why he took on such an important role, and where he erred to have attracted 
such criticism. This chapter will show that although Kerensky's failings were evident in 
1917, they were human faihngs, and accounted for his success in the early part of 1917, as 
well as to his failure in the latter part o f 1917. 
In writing this chapter, Kerensky's own voluminous writings have been studied and have 
been utilised to a certain extent. Before going on, comment should be made on his work. 
His style was rather florid, and he was given to poetic language, particularly when 
describing the, in his terms, almost mythical February revolution. That the criticism he 
endured for his role in 1917 stung him is evident f rom the self-justification inherent in his 
work. This factor makes reading him rather tiresome, particularly in his undoubtedly biased 
account o f the Komilov affair\ Despite this, there is m s i ^ t to be gained from his work; i f 
one sets aside the most blatant errors and prejudice he displays, one is able to form an 
impression both o f the man, and the period in which he was politically active. 
Kerensky had his bterest in radical politics awakened as a student at Petrograd University 
in the years 1899-1904. He qualified in law, and initially worked in a legal aid office for the 
' Browder [1957] p. 421 
^ See chapter 2, 
^ Kerensky [1919] 
106 
PROFILE OF ALEXANDER KERENSKY 
underprivileged in a Narodnyi dom, organised by the great social worker Countess Panina"*, 
before defending in a number of important revolutionary cases, including the repression 
of Latvian socialists in 1906, and the massacre of Siberian miners at Lena in 1912. These 
very public cases enhanced his reputation as a front-line radical. He was elected to the 
fourth Duma in 1912, and aligned himself with the Tmdovik group, a labour group 
associated with the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Kerensky made a number of radical and 
doom laden speeches attacking the regime which frequentiy got him banned from the 
chamber, and his speeches edited in the Duma records. I t was in this period that he joined 
the freemasonry, which was to provide him with valuable cross-party contacts in the years 
to come. O f the twelve members o f the first Provisional Govemment, only Miliukov was 
not a freemason. Kerensky was very active in the organisation of the SR Party, particularly 
in the period 1915-16, as his Okhrana records show, though his relations with the SR's in 
1917 were decidedly distant^ 
Kerensky's signature policy was his absolute commitment to coalition govemment. Any 
modem European politician would agree that the politics of coalition govemment are 
difficult even in a stable democracy. To attempt them in Russia at this time, was, one 
might say, an act o f faith. As Louise Bryant commented, 
'He tried so passionately to hold Russia together, and what man at this hour could have 
accomplished that 
Kerensky's stubbom persistence in attempting to keep all 'reasonable' elements o f 
political t h o u ^ t was unwavering f rom the very beginning, and met with some success. 
His own participation in both Provisional Govemment and Soviet was the first step of this 
coalition policy, stemming f rom his determined refiisal to bow to the Soviet ruling that 
Soviet members could not participate in the Provisional Govemment. At his insistence, 
other socialist leaders joined the Provisional Government^. Coalition became increasingly 
difficult as 1917 progressed, however, and the Komilov affair made fijrther coalition 
unfeasible. Despite the evident crisis o f coalition in late August and September, Kerensky 
stmggled on to keep liberals and socialists in the same cabinet. 
Did Kerensky err seriously in attempting to pursue coalition after the August crisis? For 
Kerensky to reject coalition politics would have been for him to give up the basic tenet of 
" Countess Panina was a prominent Kadet, but was renowned for her work with the Narodnyi dom, or 
people's house, that provided training, recreational space and introduction to higher Russian culture for 
the working people of Petrograd. Her arrest and imprisonment in November by the Bolsheviks caused a 
storm of protest from ordinary people.( see Rosenberg [1968] p. 340) 
^Seechapter3, p. 51 
^Bryant [1970] p. 115. 
^ See chapter two and table one, p. 20, for a detailed account of the constitution of the Pro%asional 
Govemment, and the policies it pursued. 
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his political thought. No great theoriser or political philosopher, he strongly believed in 
coalition for the greater good. He avoided commitment to any one part}', thus avoiding 
the constraints o f the party line, but leaving him without the solid party backing and 
political alliances that could determine success or failure in a crisis. From his earliest days 
as a Duma politician he was willing to co-operate with politicians from all sides of the 
political spectrum, on the condition that they were working for the greater good as he saw 
it, that is, with progressive intentions'. This commitment to coalition politics, while 
blamed by some for the failure o f the Provisional Govemment, also kept Russia away 
f rom civil war for eight months. I t is hard to envisage any alternative policy avoiding civil 
war for any longer. There is a strong case, however, for making the coalition in the latter 
part of 1917 one solely of socialists. The vote of the democratic conference on September 
14* confirmed that this was what the 'democratic forces' wanted. I t is not clear what 
benefits the BCadets brougjit to coalition in the last months of the revolution. 
Kerensky associated himself closely with the continuation o f the war, and more specifically 
with the failed June offensive. His oratorical skills were strained to the limit, as he toured 
the fronts extensively, giving morale boosting speeches wherever he went. Sir George 
Buchanan, the British ambassador in Russia in 1917,commented that 
'while advocating fighting out the war to a fmish, he depreciated any idea of conquest... Witli his 
hold on the masses, with his personal ascendancy over his colleagues, and in the absence of any 
qualified rival, Kerensky was the only man to whom ^ t[the British] could look to keep Russia in the 
war.'9 
This determination to keep Russia in the war pushed Kerensky to establish stem penalties 
for deserters, and to re-establish the death penalty, a move which clearly caused Kerensky 
a great deal of personal distress. The death penalty had been something of a cause celebre 
for the Russian radical movement, and its abolition in March a cause for great celebration. 
The burden o f its reinstatement was one that was heavy indeed for a man who had been as 
active as any in stru^ling for its removal. That he felt this keenly was amply demonstrated 
by his response at the Moscow conference, when he mentioned the measure; 
' While still Minister of Justice I introduced in the Provisional Govemment the question of 
abolishing capital punishment. \Applause. Cries "Bravo!"]And as Minister of War it was also I who 
introduced in the Provisional Govemment partial restoration of capital punishment. [Cries: "Ri^it!" 
Boisterous applause, suddenly interrupted by the sharp and excited voice of the president^ Who dares to applaud 
when it is a question of capital pimishment? Don't you know that at that moment, at that hour, a 
part of our human heart was killed?'*" 
These measures were forced upon Kerensky by his determination to continue the war. 
Both he and Russia were placed in an untenable position by his stubborn patriotism, and 
• See Abraham [1987] p. 61 
'Buchanan [1923] p. 109 
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determination that Russia could and would figlit to the bitter end". By refiasing to even 
consider the possibility of a separate peace, he seriously damaged the Provisional 
Govemment's chances o f holding on until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, 
which was, after all, its main objective. Nowhere in his writings does he adequately address 
the question o f why Russia could not sue for separate peace. The pleas of patriotism and 
of loyalty to the allies are not enou^ to account for the continuation of a war that was 
clearly absolutely destmctive to Russia^ .^ I t is difficult to find any rationale for Kerensky's 
unbending attitude in this matter; the force o f patriotism which he cited so frequentiy 
seems to have produced a smokescreen, behind which Kerensky was unable to discern the 
tmly parlous state of the Russian army. Kerensky failed Russia most conspicuously on the 
war issue. This was one element o f 1917 over which Kerensky had the opportunity to 
extract something o f benefit to Russia. 
I t is ironic, in the light o f his policy continuing the war, that Kerensky's most abiding 
quality was his basic human decency, and desire to avoid bloodshed. A good example of 
this decency was his attitude towards the old Tsarist ministers and the policemen b r o u ^ t 
in by the crowds after the outbreak of revolution. Kerensky's intuitive knowledge of the 
appropriate action for the moment in the early days o f the revolution was unmatched by 
the other leading political figures o f the time. He faced demands from crowds outside the 
Winter Palace for harsh treatment of the former Tsarist ministers on Febmary 27*. His 
words are appropriate to describe the scene that followed; 
' I went to see Shcheglovitov [former president of the Imperial council] and found him in tlie 
custody of a hastily improvised guard and surrounded by a crowd of people. Rodzyanko and some 
of his deputies were already diere, and I saw Rodzyanko greet him amiably and invite him into his 
office as a "guest". I quickly interposed myself between the two and said to Rodzyanko, "No, 
Shcheglovitov is not a guest and I refuse to have him released." Turning to Shcheg^ovitov, I said, 
"Are you Ivan Grigoryevich Shcheglovitov?" 'Tes." " I must ask you to follow me. You are under 
arrest. Your safety will be guaranteed." Everyone fell back, and Rodzyanko and his friends, 
somewhat embarrassed, returned to their rooms, while I led the prisoner to the ministerial 
chambers known as the Govemment Pavilion, i ^ ' 
This description captures the theatrical quality of Kerensky's actions which were absolutely 
appropriate for the times. Scenes like this, incidentally, may well go some way towards 
explaining the vimlence o f Rodzyanko's attacks on Kerensky^''. Yet despite the noses he 
put out of joint by his prompt actions in Febmary, he was to save the lives of many 
members o f the old regime. Whilst his colleagues lacked the impetuosity and courage to 
simply arrest men like Protopopov and Goremykin, for so long symbolic of power in the 
'"BrowderandKerensky [1961], 3, doc. 1230, p. 1461 
For a more detailed analysis of the problem of peace, see chapter two, pp. 39-43. 
See chapter 4 for details of the military crisis. 
" Kerensky [1966] pp. 197-8 
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old regime, Kerensky could see that only legitimising their capture with arrest could 
protect them from the angry mobs in Petrograd. An alternative version of Kerensky's role 
adds another facet to his personality in those early days. Mstislavskii wrote this account of 
his meeting with Kerensky on 27* January; 
'[Kerensky said] "well now, Sergei Dimitrievich [Mstislavskii's first name and patronymic] it seems 
we have lived to see the day!" Quickly and happily he jumped up and stretched, as if to restore 
circulation to limbs gone numb. Suddenly he laughed out loud, slapped his pocket with boyish 
playfulness, and took from it a huge and ancient door key. "That's where I have him. That's where 
I have Shturmer. Oh, i f only you could have seen their mugs when I locked him up!"* '^ 
This excerpt suggests a youthfijl, exultant Kerensky, taking an almost childish pleasure in 
the confinement of the servants o f the old regime. When one considers his background, 
with a spell in prison for harbouring revolutionary materials in 1906, and constant 
shadowing f rom Okhrana agents, his joy was not at all surprising. He spent his short 
political life striving for the fall o f autocracy, and now he was overseeing it. This delist at 
the revolution was tempered with his desire to avoid bloodshed at all costs. In reference to 
the arrest o f the Tsarist ministers, he said, 
' I f I had moved a fmger, i f I had simply closed my eyes and washed my hands of it, the entire 
Duma, all St. Petersburg, the whole of Russia might have been drenched in torrents of human 
blood, as under Lenin in October. But the Russian revolution did not thirst for blood, did not seek 
for vengeance. Not a hair on the head of an "enemy of the people" has fallen by the fault or the 
default of any leader of the Febmary revolution. The crowd is an orchestra in the hands of its 
leader.'i* 
Whilst his dramatic prose is rather off-putting, the Febmary revolution was remarkably 
bloodless, and Kerensky's prompt actions and heartfelt efforts to capture the mood as 
essentially peaceflil must be credited for some part of this. The image of Kerensky leading 
a crowd as a conductor leads an orchestra is a vivid one, and was accurate, at least in the 
first months o f 1917. His faith in the goodness o f the Russian people in the first four 
months o f the revolution was moving, and it was faith, I think, which contributed to his 
popularity and to the success o f his speeches. He was able to appeal to people with tmst, 
and without fear. Buchanan commented on Kerensky's oratorical skills, 
'Kerensky was the only minister whose personality, i f not altogetlier sympathetic, had something 
arresting about it that did not fail to impress one. As an orator he possessed the magnetic touch 
which holds an audience spellbound, and in the eadier days of the revolution he unceasingly strove 
to instill into the workmen and soldiers some of his own patriotic fervour.* '^ 
Over and over in his rather cliche ridden but very successful speeches, he would make 
direct appeals to 'his' people; 
Browder [1957] p. 421 
Mstislavskii [1988] p. 33. Sergei Dmitrievich Mstislavskii was a militant left SR, who was part of the 
group that joined the Bolsheviks after October. One can imagine he was pretty hostile to Kerensky, 
Kerensky [1934] p. 254 
" Buchanan [1923] p. 109 
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'Comrades, do you trust me? [Chorus of voices shout Yesljl am speaking from the depths o f my 
heart, comrades, I am ready to die, i f that wi l l be necessary'i' 
' I cannot live without the people, and in that moment when you suspect me, kill me!''' 
One observer was disconcerted to see that tears ran down Kerensky's face as he spoke. 
Though his speaking was melodramatic, i t was certainly effective, and helped win a popular 
mandate to be a member bo th o f the Soviet and the Provisional Government His 
speeches were rarely prepared, and so lacked the intellectual content and logical 
conclusions notable in the speaking o f men like Tsereteli, but they would seem to be direct 
representations o f his emotional state. A f t e r his ascendancy to the premiership and the 
attempted Bolshevik rising o f July, his tone was increasingly authoritarian. Where once he 
had appealed directly to the goodness o f the people, n o w he called fo r the preservation o f 
the State. H e spoke publicly relatively little after July, a reflection perhaps o f his changing 
m o o d towards 'his people'. His inspiration f o r public speaking came from his opt imism 
and faith in people and in his revolution. As that faith declined, so his public speaking 
w o u l d become more stilted and less convincing. His performances at the Moscow 
conference in August were embarrassingly overblown^", but he still received extended 
standing ovations^\ 
Kerensky's personality was captivating. Sukhanov^^, who described himself as a 'convinced 
political opponent o f Kerensky's f r o m the day o f our first meeting'^^, was nevertheless on 
good personal terms w i t h h im . This makes his opinion o f Kerensky wor thy o f 
consideration; 
[Kerensky had] 'supernatural energy, amazing capacity for work, and inexhaustible temperament. 
But he lacked the head for statesmanship and had no real political schooling. Witliout these 
elementary and indispensable attributes, the irreplaceable Kerensky o f expiring Tsarism, the 
ubiquitous Kerensky o f the February-March days could not help but stumble headlong and 
flounder into his July-September situation, and then plunge into his October nothingness, taking 
with him, alas! an enormous part o f what we had achieved in the February-March revolution.'^'' 
Abraham [1987] p. 142 
Abraham [1987] p. 143 
°^ During Kerensky's speech a Moscow Kadet, NI Astrov, turned to his neighbour, an army doctor, and 
said, "This is more your business than ours. It's not politics, it's hysterics!" (in Katkov [1980] p. 62) 
Browder and Kerensky [1961] 3, doc. 1252, p. 1515 
Sukhanov, real name Nikolai Nikolayevich Himmer, was a socialist who had no party affiliation for 
much of 1917, though he was an SR at the start of his political life, and joined with Martov's faction of 
the Mensheviks in the middle of 1917. He was a principal Soviet figure in the negotiations with the 
'bourgeois elements' that led to the formation of the Provisional Government. He was honest and 
passionate, and objected to the Bolsheviks' seizure of power, though he agreed with many of their 
principles. He worked as a Soviet functionary in the twenties, without ever becoming a communist, and 
remained hostile to the political regime. He was tried in 1931 at one of the earliest show trials, the so-
called Trial of the Mensheviks. He was sent to a concentration camp in Verkhne-Uralsk, and was heard 
from no more. 
Sukhanov [1955] p. 32 
Sukhanov [1955] pp.31-2 
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...Tie was a sincere democrat and fighter for revolutionary victory - as he understood it [but] by 
conviction, taste and temperament he was the most consummate middle-class radical'^ s 
This comment f r o m Sukhanov has a number o f implications. I t is clear that Sukhanov had 
considerable personal respect f o r Kerensky, but no political respect. More important than 
his lack o f respect, Sukhanov placed the blame f o r the collapse o f the Provisional 
Government on Kerensky. T o suggest that Kerensky literally led the nation by the nose in 
1917 is a dubious statement. The military crisis, involvement in the war, the growth o f 
radicalism in the w o r k i n g population o f Petrograd, and the responses o f the moderate 
polit ical parties to the challenges facing 1917^*, were all factors which were to a large extent 
beyond Kerensky's control . This tendency to place the onus o f responsibility on 
Kerensky's shoulders occurs in many critiques o f h im . The last comment is a perceptive 
one, and t h o u ^ Sukhanov may have considered i t insulting, i t summed up Kerensky very 
well . He was humane, sincere, an ardent believer in the strength o f the Russian people, but 
he was a radical only in the most tempered sense o f the word . His politics in 1917 were 
moderate and conciliatory, as he f o u ^ t to keep what he considered to be a sense o f 
decency in the revolution. 
O n September 27*, Kerensky, under tremendous pressure trying to hold his coalition 
government together, suffered a total nervous collapse f o r two days. By the end o f 
October when the Bolsheviks made their confused and chaotic b id f o r power, Kerensky 
was vacillating wildly, and lacked a real grasp o f the situation. He moved to Gatchina on 
October 27* to avoid Bolshevik capture, supported by the Cossack unit o f General 
Krasnov. The Cossack move on Petrograd on October 28* was halted by Kerensky at 
Tsarkoe Selo, when they encountered a group o f the Red guard. He would not allow the 
Cossacks to fire, but instead appealed to the Bolshevik soldiers, a disastrous move that 
resulted in Cossack fraternisation wi th the Bolshevik forces. His humanity, which so 
appeals to the heart o f the m o d e m liberal, was a main cause fo r his failure to oust the 
Bolshevik insurrection in October. The faith in the people and refijsal to allow bloodshed 
that had made Kerensky the hero o f February tumed h i m into the failure o f October. I n 
this respect, at least, Sukhanov's description o f h im , that claimed that the qualities that 
rriade h i m a saviour in February tumed h i m into a pariah towards the end o f 1917, would 
seem justified. 
The delicacy o f his health and his nerves is a feature o f Kerensky which is often 
understated, but which should be taken into account in 1917. He was repeatedly forced to 
take breaks in a sanitarium f o r treatment o f his physical maladies, which included problems 
Sukhanov [1935] p. 33 
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w i t h his kidneys and lungs. He was out o f political life f o r much o f 1916 due to il l health. 
As 1917 progressed, the pressures he was under become increasingly evident in his 
personality; he lost his temper w i t h increasing violence and frequency, showed wi ld 
vacillation in policy which had n o t been evident before, and suffered f r o m a complete 
breakdown at the end o f September. Kerensky may well have suffered some sort o f 
mental breakdown in this period. When Louise Bryant gained an interview wi th Kerenskj'^ 
in early October, her description o f h i m was somewhat alarming; 
'Kerensky lay on a couch with his face buried ta his arms, as i f he had been suddenly taken i l l , or 
was completely exhausted. We stood there for a minute or two and then went out. He did not 
notice us.' His secretary commented, "He really is hysterical. I f he does not weep there he weeps 
here; and he is so dreadfully alone. I mean, he cannot depend on anybody". The secretary then 
went on to describe his serious illness, which necessitated him taking brandy and morphine.'^' 
Kerensky's tactiessness and vacillation in political circles meant that he did no t solder any 
effective alliances. By the end o f 1917, he simply had no friends left. A factor o f his 
behaviour that becomes clear when one reads accounts o f his actions is his inability to 
restrain f r o m saying whatever first comes to his head, and his willingness to listen to advice 
f r o m every sphere. This l ionesty ' , i f we may call i t that , was immensely dangerous in 
such a prominent political person, whose every w o r d held great w e i ^ t . His casual 
rejection o f the Stockholm conference to a French diplomat, f o r example, was to lose h i m 
his only ally on the Brit ish War Cabinet, Ar thu r Henderson. Henderson had publicly 
supported the Stockholm Conference, which had aimed to revise war aims, and when 
news got to the Brit ish prime minister that even Russia was rejecting the conference, he 
fel t safe to eject the socialist Henderson f r o m his cabinet. Such tactiessness on Kerensky's 
part was inexcusable in a man that had become so influential, nationally and 
internationally. 
His handling o f the K o m i l o v affair seems in retrospect quite absurd, and one wonders that 
he d id n o t see that by playing along w i t h K o m i l o v , Kerensky wou ld inevitably implicate 
himself. His actions in this affair show h i m to have perhaps an inflated opinion o f his own 
invulnerability, and a tenuous grasp o f political reality. His feeling that he was indispensable 
he utilised in his repeated threats to resign i f he could no t obtain the required concessions 
f r o m his coalition partners. Yet every time he threatened to resign, he obtained the 
required support or concession, and this held the tenuous coalition together. The 
impotence o f the other leading politicians in 1917 revealed a certain faith in Kerensky as 
the only man able to stem the flow o f anarchy. Such faith in the abilities o f one man is 
See chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Bryant [1970] p. 117 
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more a reflection o f the inadequacies o f the other leading politicians than a testimony o f 
Kerensky's greatness, however. 
I t is surely inevitable that given such responsibilities and feeling such weight o f 
expectation, Kerensky's personality altered. He has of ten been accused o f being power 
hungry, and interested only in his own prestige. Strakhovsky, representing the most 
virulent o f Kerensky's r ight w i n g critics, described h i m as 
'Kerensky, the tight-rope walker, the man who clung to power at all costs, even at the cost of 
Russia's fiimre' 28 
I t is hard to f i n d strong evidence f o r his well reported egotism and power mania. \X'^en 
Kerensky took over the premiership in the th i rd administration o f the Provisional 
Government on July 25*, his manner was reported to become notably more Bonapartist; 
he moved into the suite o f Alexander the th i rd w i t h his mistress, and dressed now not in 
the c o m m o n soldier's or workers clothes he had w o r n previously, but in a well tailored 
off icers ' u n i f o r m . His speeches, too , became increasingly sombre and less attuned to the 
popular mood . His allies on the lef t were increasingly critical, wi th Chernov baiting 
Kerensky daily in Delo naroda. Lenin described his govemment as 
"merely a screen for the counterrevolutionary Kadets and the military clique which is in power at 
present"29 
Such criticism o f Kerensky was memorable, but rather unfair; i t was directed as a personal 
attack, but was in fact an assault on the policy o f coalition. While his experience and 
abilities as an international diplomat and politician can be openly doubted, one should 
o m i t the personal criticisms his political opponents directed at h i m f r o m serious 
consideration. There seems to be no evidence to suggest that Kerensky had great personal 
ambit ion, and that this ambit ion superseded his desire to see a united and free Russia. 
These suggestions originated in slanderous accusations o f other 'nearly were's' o f 1917. 
The m u d slinging that went on in the emigre press after 1917 betrayed a lo t o f personal 
disappointment and sadness at Russia's fate. Kerensky, who was the only moderate 
prepared to take on the responsibility o f heading Russia, was a convenient scapegoat fo r 
these men's frustrations. 
There can be no doubt that Kerensky took the leading role amongst the liberal and 
socialist politicians in the February revolution. He showed a perceptiveness and boldness 
in t rying circumstances that other politicians lacked, most notably in attempting to place 
Strakhovsky [1972] p. 150. Leonard Strakhovsky was a staunch monarchist who served in the Russian 
armed forces between 1916 and 1920, before emigrating and becoming a professor of Russian history at 
the University of Toronto. 
Abraham [1987] p. 247 
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the D u m a at the centre o f the revolutionary movement, o f preventing violence against the 
members o f the o ld regime, and o f identifying the cause o f the revolution no t as some 
fearful anarchy, but as a positive movement, towards liberty. His greatest weakness was i n . 
fail ing to recognise the need f o r Russia to get out o f the war. 
His humanitarian, conciliatory qualities and his faith in the Russian people made h im 
successfijl in the events o f February, but meant that he lacked the ability to resort to 
extreme measures that were the only way f o r h i m to remain in power. As to his success, 
perhaps one should look at what makes a politician or public figure successfijl. I f the first 
objective o f a politician is to get in power, and once there, to remain in power, in order to 
best serve the needs o f the nation, by implementing their programme, Kerensky clearly 
failed. H e was unwil l ing (or unable) to take the measures that were required i f he was to 
remain in power. This, however, is surely a harsh assessment, f o r Kerensky would have 
had to take some sort o f extremist stance, something he had always despised. Should we 
n o t admire his refijsal to sacrifice those principles o f liberty he had long held dear? I t is 
unfair to lay upon one man the problems the Provisional Govemment faced. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis analyses the failure o f the Provisional Govemment to prevent the Bolshevik 
seizure o f power, and Kerensky's coalition politics in 1917. I t first examines the theoretical 
debate surrounding the issue, which has of ten restricted the potential o f the Provisional • 
G o v e m m e n t period. Models o f Russian life in 1917 which hold that the civil war conflict 
and subsequent Bolshevik regime were inevitable, as a result o f Russia's essentially 
backward and disparate social structure are untenable. By showing that a non-deterministic 
view is the only way o f reaping new perspectives on 1917, the first chapter opens the way 
f o r more open debate. Study o f the Russian soldiers and workers shows that their 
responses to the Provisional Govemment were rational reactions to the problems they 
faced, rather than anarchic and irrational responses. I t also indicates that the intelligentsia 
pedigree o f the political elite in 1917 caused them to be somewhat distant f r o m the 
popular mood , and less able to empathise w i t h the needs o f ordinary Russian people. This 
is particularly evident in policies on the war. The strain o f the war placed an impossible 
burden on the Provisional G o v e m m e n t and on Russia. The Provisional Govemment 
failed to recognise, as Lenin did, that f o r Russia to regain equilibrium, she had to be 
wi thdrawn f r o m the war. 
Recurrent themes in the body o f the thesis have been the emptiness o f the Bolshevik 
promises that they wou ld improve Russia's material position, and the threat o f civil war, 
that could only be staved o f f by coalition politics. Political, social and economic studies o f 
1917 are n o t disparate elements, but rather are most worthwhile when considered as a 
whole. This whole shows that although the Provisional Govemment did fail, its 
achievements, w i t h i n the context o f the period, were significant. As well as instigating a 
wide ranging programme o f reforms o f the legal and administrative systems, the 
Provisional Govemment , guided by Kerensky, succeeded in holding the disparate forces 
together i n govemment . Its greatest failures were the failure to realise Russia's need to get 
out o f the war, to consolidate the regime's military power, and thus prevent the 
Bolsheviks' easy takeover o f political power in October, and the inability o f individual 
members to put aside petty party squabbles, and to poo l their human resources f o r the 
benefit o f Russia. 
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One can suggest that the inclusion o f the Kadets in the coalition governments after 
August was o f l imited benefit to a stable Russia. A possible way out o f the coalition 
deadlock wou ld have been an extension o f the Menshevik/SR collaboration, as was seen in 
the Soviet, to taking control o f the affairs o f the State. This could have defiised Bolshevik 
accusations that the rightist led govemment was trying to negate the gains o f the 
revolution, and removed the weakness o f the Provisional Govemment that arose f r o m 
Kadet participation. The Kadets were unable to contemplate p ro found social change, on 
the land issue, and on the position o f the work ing classes. This effectively lef t the 
Provisional G o v e m m e n t wi thou t any options on these questions. 
Whils t giving msight into the picture o f 1917, this thesis has also given indications o f 
where fijrther w o r k could be profi tably done. One such area is solid information about the 
responses o f local party machinery to the revolution, w i th interest directed particularly 
towards the SR party, whose rural support was so widespread. Also, this study has looked 
at the actions and beliefs o f Russia predominantiy f r o m the view o f the political elite, 
because this is the source material most readily available. I t would be worthwhile to 
examine the views o f other groups in Russian society - ethnic minorities, peasants, workers 
and so on. Another area that could benefit f r o m fijrther study is regional studies o f the 
responses to the Provisional Govemment , and to the events o f 1917. By looking at a wider 
range o f source matenal, as is available in the Russian archives, we can fijrther deepen our 
understanding o f the period. 
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Table 8 on the returns of the parries in the Constituent Assembly elections, by area 
Area first second third 
Northern SR 76% Mensh 19% Kadet 7.8% 
North 
western 
SR 44% Bolsh 42% Kadet 8.4% 
Baltic Bolsh 50% o/nat 49% 
Western Bolsh 55% SR 27% o/nat 9.4% 
Central Industrial Bolsh 55% SR 44% Kadet 7.3% 
Central Black Earth SR 75% Bolsh 16% Kadet 3.6% 
Volga SR 51% hit/tax 16% 
Bolsh 16% 
Ukraine 11% 
Kama Ural SR 39% tur/tar 20% Bolsh 19% 
Ukraine Ukraine 58.5% 
+JLSR 14% 
Bolsh 11% SR 8% 
Southern- Black Sea SR 46% sp. Int 10% o/nat 9.5% 
South Eastern SR 44% sp. Int 37% Bolsh 13% 
Caucasus Mensh 29% tur/tar 24% o/nat 22% 
Siberia SR 71% Bolsh 10% Kadet 3.5% 
Metropolitan Bolsh 46% Kadet 29% SR 12% 
Fleet Bolsh 45% SR 31% o/soc 8% 
Army Bolsh 40% SR 38% Kadet 14.5% 
All districts SR 37% Bolsh 23% Ukraine 11% 
Party abbreviations 
SR-
Bolsh-
Mensh-
o/soc-
Kadet-
sp. Int.-
rel-rt-
Ukraine-
tur/tar-
o/nat-
Socialist Revolutionary 
Bolshevik 
Menshevik 
other socialist organisations 
Constitutional Democrats 
Special interest parties 
Religous and r i ^ t wing parties 
Ukrainian Nationalist parties 
Turkish and Tartar parties 
other Nationalist parties 
Districts covered by each region. 
Northern- Archangel, Vologda, Olonets. 
Northwestern- Petrograd province, Pskov, Novgorod. 
Baltic- Estonia, Livonia. 
Western- Vitebsk, Minsk, Mogilev, Smolensk. 
Central Industrial- Moscow province, Tver, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Vladimir, Kaluga, Tula, 
Riazan. 
Central Black Earth- Orel, Kursk, Voronezh, Tambov, Penza. 
Volga- Nizhni Novgorod, Simbirsk, Kazan, Samara, Saratov, Astrakhan. 
Kama Ural- Viatka, Perm, Ufa, Orenburg. 
Ukraine- Kiev, Volynia, Podolia, Chemigov, Poltava, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson. 
Southern-Black Sea- Bessarabia, Taurida[inc. Crimea]. 
Southeastern- Don Cossack region, Stavropol. 
Caucasus- Kuban- Black Sea, Ter-Dagestan, Caspian, Transcaucasus. 
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Siberia- Tobolsk, Steppe, Tomsk, Altai, Yenisei, Irkutsk, Transbaikal, Amur Maritime, 
Chinese Eastern railroad, Yakutsk. 
Metropolitan- Petrograd city, Moscow city. 
Fleet- Baltic, Black sea. 
Army- Northern front. Western front, Soutiiwestem front, Rumanian front, Caucasian 
front, all districts. 
J L - This designates a joint list, where two parties decide to collaborate for the election. In 
the Ukraine, for example, though the SR's won 8% of the vote on their own card, they 
also collaborated in a joint list with the dominant Ukraine Nationalist party, and won an 
extra 14% of the vote on this ticket. 
Notes on tables 
The figures in this table are based upon the work of Oliver H . Radkey'. His figures are 
highly detailed, and include breakdowns for voting at district level as well as at regional 
level. These very detailed district figures have been amalgamated into regional figures in 
this table for the purpose of simplification. This amalgamation inevitably obscures certain 
subtieties in voting patterns, and distorts the interesting voting patterns in some areas. For 
the purpose o f this study though, the summarised information offered in my table offers 
information about general voting trends in Russia, and the levels of support offered to the 
main parties in a more accessible form. 
The figures in the tables do not all add up to 100%. This is not due to errors, but rather 
because in an attempt to simplify the figures available, the percentages have been rounded 
up or down where pertinent, and have omitted the 'residue' column included in Radkey's 
tables, which included votes which were either joint lists, or votes that could not easily be 
categorised. This residue figure made up a total of nearly 4.5% of all districts' votes. 
The first table gives a detailed picture of voting patterns in the areas of Russia, whilst the 
second is more simple, and designed to map the relative dominance of parties in different 
areas more accurately, and to assess which parties won majorities. 
' Radkey [1977] 
APPENDIX 
Table 9 surveying Russian newspapers in 1917 according to political affiliation 
Right wing moderate liberal moderate socialist far left 
Russkaia volia Rech 
[Kadet] 
Rabochaia gazeta 
[Menshevik] 
Pravda 
[Bolshevik] 
Utro rossii Birzhevye vedomosti Den 
[Menshevik] 
Proletarii 
Russkie vedomosti Vpered 
[Menshevik] 
Rabochii put 
Torgovo-promyshlennaia 
gazeta 
Delo naroda 
[SR] 
Sotsial 
demokrat 
Russkoe slovo Tmd 
Zemlia i volia 
[SR] 
Volia naroda 
Novaia zhizn 
Proletarii 
Vlast naroda 
Edinstvo 
Narodnoe slovo 
Izvestia PSRD 
[Soviet, Petrograd] 
Izvestiia MSRD 
[Sowet, Moscow] 
Note This table serves only as a guide to the approximate political affiliation of 
newspapers in 1917; the loyalties o f some papers veered as the political climate altered. I t is 
useful to bear it in mind, however, when considering the value and bias of sources 
originating in newspapers. 
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